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Abstract
The main contribution of this thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the in-
ﬂuence of changes in the population structure on local communities, in par-
ticular with respect to the provision of publicly provided goods. The focus
is placed on the consequences of two of the major processes of demographic
change, namely aging and shrinking. The three main chapters of this con-
tribution consider the eﬀects at the local level from both a theoretical and
an empirical perspective. The ﬁrst model focuses on the inﬂuence of popula-
tion aging on the provision of local publicly provided goods, when the young
population may relocate. When aging advances, gerontocracies and social
planners substitute publicly provided goods aimed at the mobile young for
publicly provided goods for the elderly. However, due to ﬁscal competition,
gerontocracies will provide even more of the publicly provided good for the
young than the social planner. The second model considers in a two-period
setting, the interaction of a shrinking population when the investments made
by the previous generation are long lived. The laissez-faire and welfare max-
imizing outcomes are computed for two cases; ﬁrst with no costs of upkeep
and second for the case when costs of upkeep accrue. A comparison of the
solutions shows that public provision for the ﬁrst generation is ineﬃciently
low in laissez-faire when there are no costs of upkeep. However, if costs of
upkeep accrue, the laissez-faire outcome for the intergenerational publicly
provided good may be too high. Chapter four contains an empirical analysis.
In a two-stage analysis the eﬃciency of the provision of child care services in
municipalities is evaluated in the German State of Saxony. First, the results
of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) show substantial eﬃciency diﬀer-
ences; the median municipality is up to 28% ineﬃcient. In a second stage
bootstrapped truncated regression, determinants of the ineﬃciency are iden-
tiﬁed. Explanatory variables such as an uncompensated mayor or a larger
share of over 65-year-olds signiﬁcantly increase ineﬃciency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The economic consequences of a changing population structure are wide
reaching. Yet demographic processes are relatively predictable and slow,
giving governments and individuals time to adapt. Adaptation, both private
as well as government induced, can help mitigate any potentially adverse
consequences for society. For example: investment in education of the la-
bor force, investment in child care to increase the labor force participation
of women, preventative health care to allow older workers to remain active
longer, more ﬂexible nursing home solutions etc. may reduce the burden
on future generations. This contribution focuses on the consequences of de-
mographic changes at the local level. Even if ageing and shrinking of the
population are often documented at the national level, the ongoing popula-
tion processes diﬀer substantially on a smaller spatial scale. Comparatively
very little economic research has been conducted on this speciﬁc topic. The
underlying question therefore is: how does demographic change inﬂuence lo-
cal communities? The main contribution of this thesis is a detailed analysis
of the inﬂuence of changes in the population structure on local communities;
in particular with respect to their ability to produce the local public services
demanded by their populations.
In the past the impacts of demographic change have received broad at-
tention, from (economic) researchers in nearly all countries that are/will be
aﬀected. As the population pyramid becomes increasingly inverted the sus-
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tainability and reform of public pay-as-you-go pension schemes is one major
concern (Bongaarts, 2004; Fehr, 2000). Others have considered the impact of
aging on savings behavior (Bloom et al., 2007) and capital markets (Krueger
and Ludwig, 2007; Poterba, 2001, 2004; Börsch-Supan and Ludwig, 2009); a
topic of renewed interest in light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis in particular
with respect to losses in private pension savings (Whitehouse, 2009). Other
research considers the demographic prospects with respect to the labor mar-
ket (McDonald and Kippen, 2001). Here two main factors are considered,
namely the labor force participation and the (age speciﬁc) productivity of
the workforce. Studies have shown that an old labor force is not necessarily
less productive and that a mixed age structure is important for productivity
(Skirbekk, 2008; Prskawetz et al., 2008). In many countries additional labor
market reforms may still be necessary to remove incentives for early retire-
ment, which would in turn also reduce the burden on the pension systems
(D'Addio et al., 2010). In addition to the vast issue of pension reform, other
aspects of ﬁscal policy have also received increased attention in light of the
demographic developments. The increasing costs of health care (including
the growing burden of long-term nursing care) are becoming ever more ur-
gent (Breyer et al., 2010; Comas-Herrera et al., 2006; Cutler and Sheiner,
2001).
This introduction presents the general framework in which the ensuing
main Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are embedded. Therefore, the trends of the de-
mographic transition are brieﬂy presented in the following section. The pro-
jected population developments in many European countries are similar in
terms of low birth rates and increasing life-expectancy. Although institu-
tional settings may be diﬀerent, common consequences are expected, and
therefore also more general conclusions can be derived from the ensuing
analyses. In particular with respect to the models presented, the results
are largely independent of national contexts.
In Germany public discussions on "demographischer Wandel" (demo-
graphic change) regularly reoccur in diﬀerent domains. Moreover, the eastern
German states are particularly aﬀected by population ageing and comprise
one of the ﬁrst areas to experience large scale population loss. The data
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for the empirical analysis in the last chapter reﬂects this, but also the theo-
retical models in the other two main chapters were also conceived with the
German setting in mind. Thus the German institutional framework is also
brieﬂy introduced. Additionally important economic concepts that recur in
the ensuing chapters are also presented in this brief introduction. Finally,
the contributions of each chapter are highlighted.
1.1 Demographic trends
Due to high birth rates in developing countries, the global population is grow-
ing rapidly. However, many developed countries that have gone through the
second demographic transition are now faced with have stagnating and even
shrinking populations (see for instance: Van De Kaa (1987) and Lesthaeghe
(2010)).
The population size of a region in a given time is determined by two
factors: natural population change and migration. The natural population
size is determined by the birth and mortality rates. Birth rates are in turn
highly dependent on the number of women of reproductive age as well as the
fertility rate. Whereas mortality is inﬂuenced by the age structure of the
population. Moreover, migration can either contribute to population growth
or decline. In particular immigration of young persons, especially women, can
thus have a positive impact on natural population change. On the one hand,
the relative mortality is lowered by migration of relatively young persons.
On the other hand, the immigrant women may contribute to the birth rate
by having children, which further shifts the age structure. Conversely, the
emigration of young can reduce the natural population growth rates in the
region of origin.
1.1.1 Population aging through increasing longevity
With total fertility rates persistently below the replacement rate (TFR <
2.1) in European countries, population loss is inevitable if the natural deﬁcit
is not compensated by international immigrants. Simultaneously, people are
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living longer. Together low birth rates and increased longevity lead to an
increasing old-age-dependency ratio (the number of over 65 year olds divided
by the population aged 15-64 years times 100). This indicator of the burden
placed on the working age population is depicted in Figure 1.1 for selected
European countries as well as the average for the European Union (EU with
27 member states). Clearly the dependency ratios are projected to increase
in all of the countries, although at diﬀerent rates. The fastest change is in
Poland, where the ratio is projected to increase to the highest level in the
EU with almost 70% in 2060 from less than 20% in 2010. An important
contributing factor to this marked increase is the persistently high rate of
emigration of young Poles. Conversely, in Ireland the increase is relatively
slow (from about 17% in 2010 to 43% in 2060).
Figure 1.1: Projected old age dependency ratios (number of over 65 year
olds as a percentage of 15-64 year olds) in selected EU countries, 2010-2060
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Clearly such large demographic shifts have wide reaching impacts on
many aspects of life in the aﬀected societies. While demographic processes
pose challenges to policy makers at all levels of government, this contribution
concentrates on the local government provision of services. Furthermore, the
focus is placed on the consequences of two of the major process of demo-
graphic change, namely aging and shrinking. Thus the ongoing demographic
developments frame the topic. The consequences of potential generational
conﬂicts and the ineﬃciency that may arise from changes in the municipal
population structure are considered. This contribution, however, does not
aim to suggest or evaluate population policy.
The trend in Figure 1.1 depicts the signiﬁcant projected population age-
ing in European countries, at the national level. However, the developments
at the subnational levels are more diﬀerentiated. In Germany the largest
agglomerations tend to have younger populations, while the countryside is
becoming ever less populated (see Table 1.1)1. Since the young tend to be
more mobile, this implies that ageing in the rural areas is also progressing
more rapidly. In particular the future population growth in Germany is ex-
pected to take place in the sprawl areas of the largest cities (Berlin, Munich
and Hamburg). Moreover, vast areas of eastern Germany will experience
population losses. The contrasts are also sharp, in fact some counties (Ger-
man Landkreise and kreisfreie Städte) experiencing growth are located in the
immediate geographic vicinity of counties that will lose population.
Precisely due to the option to relocate, the eﬀects of population age-
ing and shrinking are distinctly diﬀerent at the sub-national levels.2 Chap-
ter 2 of this contribution deals in particular with the possibility of reloca-
1 The western German states refer to the ten states in addition to Berlin that
formed the Federal Republic of Germany before the reuniﬁcation in 1990, namely:
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria (Bayern), Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse (Hessen), Lower
Saxony (Niedersachsen), North Rhine-Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen) Rhineland-
Palatinate (Rheinland-Pfalz), Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. In turn the eastern
German states refer to those that comprised the former German Democratic Republic
(GDR) and include; Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern), Saxony (Sachsen), Saxony-Anhalt (Sachsen-Anhalt) and Thuringia
(Thüringen).
2 Spatial mobility is of course also possible at the national scale, however, both the
monetary and emotional costs tend to increase with increasing distance.
6 INTRODUCTION
Table 1.1: Share of old and aging in diﬀerent spatial types in the eastern
and western Germany
Region type
Share of over
65-year-olds
in 2008
Change in over
65-year-olds 2003-
2008 (in %)
west east west east
Urban areas 19.7 20.4 8.4 18.8
Densely populated
non-urban areas
19.9 24.4 11.7 14.6
Rural areas in vicinity
of urban areas
20.1 22.5 11.0 16.9
Rural areas 20.4 23.0 13.6 12.0
Source: Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aﬀairs and Spatial
Development (BBSR) (2010)
tion. Whereas democratic voting determines the ﬁscal policy at the national
level, at the regional and local levels the possibility to "vote with one's feet"
(Tiebout, 1956) in the pursuit of a more suitable bundle of publicly provided
goods presents an additional option for a mobile constituency. At the local
level, ﬁscal competition between local governments may therefore take place
over the bundle of publicly provided goods. Such competition may become
more intense as the size of the population shrinks or the young segment
becomes more scarce.
Furthermore, where population loss is rapid, the consequence might be
over-sized infrastructure: too many school buildings, idle sewage capacity
for many more households, and unused sports arenas. When decision makers
are unaware of the local population developments, misinvestments are likely.
Even if no malice is intended it is probable that in the future, communities
will be faced with a stock of infrastructure intended for a larger population.
The potential burdens that this may place on the smaller future generations
is considered in Chapter 3.
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1.1.2 Low fertility rates
When the population ages the supply of qualiﬁed labor may become scare
and hence the activation of labor force reserves will increase in importance.
Particularly increasing the labor market participation of women and mothers
is a source of qualiﬁed labor. The burden of the dual role of women as mothers
and full-time employees may also contribute to consistently low fertility (Ahn
and Mira, 2002; Björklund, 2006; Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000; Del Boca,
2002; Hank and Kreyenfeld, 2003; Vos, 2009). Potentially a lack of high-
quality child care is also a contributing factor. The main policy instrument
for the state is then to oﬀer such high-quality care to encourage working
women to also bear children. This also reduces the risk of employers to hire
women. In Germany a relatively small share of women, participate full-time
in the labor force. As Table 1.2 shows, the labor force participation rate
of females in the selected countries are similar, however with almost 40%
the prevalence of part-time employment is much higher in Germany and the
United Kingdom (UK).
Table 1.2: Female labor force participation in selected countries
Country
Female labor force
participationa
Female part-time
employmentb
Germany 71.0 38.1
France 66.1 22.4
Denmark 76.7 24.8
Finland 74.1 15.9
UK 70.4 38.8
EU-27 65.3 n.a.
a Civilian labor force participation of females as % of female population aged 15-64
years
b % of part-time employed females of total female civilian employed
Source: Annual Labour Force Statistics OECD (2011).
Through the expansion of the supply of child care, especially for children
under the age of three, the state may hope to motivate more highly qualiﬁed
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Table 1.3: Proportion of children cared for in formal arrangements in se-
lected countries (in % of children in the age group)
Country
Children up to
3 years old
Children from 3
years to school age
Germany 18 93
France 31 94
Denmark 73 96
Finland 26 77
UK 33 89
EU-25 26 84
Source: European Commission (2008)
women to have more children while not relinquishing their position in the
work force. The organization of child care is thus an important issue.
In most countries public child care is provided by the local government.
In Germany, the acceptance, use and supply of out of home care for young
children is still marked by an east-west divide. While in the former German
Democratic Republic (GDR) most mothers worked, and a comprehensive
system is still in place in the eastern states, the participation rates in the
western states are much lower. In eastern Germany 48% of children aged
0-3 attend child care, whereas the corresponding value for western Germany
is merely 17% (Federal Statistical Oﬃce, 2011b). The eﬃcient provision of
this local service remains important. As the municipal budgets are getting
ever tighter, the use of the resources is ever more scrutinized. Chapter 4
of this contribution evaluates the eﬃciency of the use of resources in the
provision of child care in the municipalities in the eastern German state
Saxony. Furthermore it shows that demographic factors play a decisive role
in the spending on child care.
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1.2 Key economic terms and concepts
The demographic reality presented in the previous section forms one basis
for the analyses in the three main chapters of this thesis. The other corner
stone for the analysis is the local provision of public goods. In the following
sections some concepts that form the basis for the analyses in the main
chapters are introduced. Under the heading "the role of local government in
the public sector" the topics included are: local public goods, ﬁscal federalism
and competition and intergenerational public goods. An additional section
is dedicated to brieﬂy explain local public ﬁnance in Germany. Moreover,
the references more closely tied to the models and ideas in a given chapter
are contained therein.
1.2.1 The role of local government in the public sector
Local public goods
Local (e.g. impure) public goods are characterized either as partially rival
and/or excludable (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1980). The formal deﬁnition of
local public goods stems from the theory of pure public goods (Samuelson,
1954). As opposed to pure public goods (such as national defense), the ben-
eﬁts of impure public goods may decline with every additional user (partial
rivalry). The beneﬁts of a local public good are generally deﬁned by a lim-
ited spatial scale (parks). Conversely, local public goods may also induce
beneﬁt spillovers if the exclusion of non-residents is not possible.3 The works
by Buchanan (1965) and Tiebout (1956) on clubs and the revelation of pref-
erences for publicly provided goods make the foundation for the analysis of
local provision of public goods.
Buchanan proposed a general theory of "clubs", where a group shares
an impure public good characterized by congestion and excludable bene-
3 Spillovers from local public goods may be either positive or negative. If for instance
one local community provides education, and then members who have received this
education emigrate, it entails a positive spillover onto the community to which they
move. Pollution emitted in one community that also adversely aﬀects its neighbor is
an example of a negative spillover.
10 INTRODUCTION
ﬁts. Club goods are excludable since each member's admission depends on
her willingness to pay. Ultimately both the Tiebout and Buchanan models
rely on the notion of an optimal group size arising from the trade-oﬀ between
beneﬁts from sharing and disutility from crowding. According to Buchanan's
Theory of Clubs, optimal provision of local public goods in an economy can
be achieved by establishing demand-homogeneous communities. In lieu of
this restrictive implication, the analysis of mixed communities is achieved
by assuming complementarities between diﬀerent types of individuals.4 Eﬃ-
ciency achieved through such homogeneous communities hinges crucially on
the underlying assumption of free mobility, which is also implied by Tiebout.
In such a setting where individuals are partitioned into clubs with homo-
geneous members, a decentralized mechanism can achieve Pareto optimality
in local public goods according to the Tiebout hypothesis (Cornes and San-
dler, 1996, p. 352). The preference revelation problem inherent to public
goods is overcome through the act of "voting with one's feet." Additional as-
sumptions include: perfect information, mobile voters (not restricted by em-
ployment opportunities), many municipalities and no beneﬁt or tax spillovers.
Under these assumptions individuals are able to choose the community which
oﬀers their most desired bundle of public goods, thus achieving an eﬃcient
level of provision in stratiﬁed communities.
Since these theoretical considerations, volumes of empirical studies have
been published. In the United States and Canada, many studies follow the
tradition initiated by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and
Goodman (1973) in estimating the demand for public goods at a sub-national
level. Characteristically these studies employ a median voter model to esti-
mate demand for speciﬁc categories of local public goods in terms of price
and income elasticities. These studies have veriﬁed the non-existence of pure
public goods at the local level. Instead local public goods are impure and
yield very little economies of scale in consumption (Reiter and Weichenrieder,
1997).
4 See Berglas (1976a) and Berglas (1976b), Brueckner (1979) and Brueckner (1994),
McGuire (1972), McGuire (1974) and McGuire (1991) and Sandler and Tschirhart
(1980) for a survey. The above references are not intended to represent an exhausting
listing of literature on club theory.
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In the above discussion the public goods are deﬁned over the beneﬁt they
award. Implicitly it is thus assumed that each type of good can be supplied
by a special district of optimal size. This is of course unrealistic, since in
reality communities instead supply a bundle of diﬀerent services. Instead
the size of a city is also determined by complementarities in the production
of these services and by negative eﬀects of agglomeration. Fiscal federalism
can be seen as a compromise resulting from the ineﬃciency of inﬁnite special
districts. A limited number of diﬀerent tiers of government are in charge of
providing the types of goods they can provide most eﬃciently.
The idea of local public goods is essential to all ensuing chapters. In
particular, in Chapters 2 and 3, a speciﬁc relation between the beneﬁt each
individual derives from the provision of public goods to the local population
size is assumed. Child care, a speciﬁc local public good, is considered in
Chapter 4.
Fiscal federalism and ﬁscal decentralization
Fiscal federalism describes the workings of the public sector in a multi-tiered
government framework. From a public ﬁnance perspective the need for a
multi-tiered system arises, given the characteristics of diﬀerent public goods
and services. The functions that diﬀerent levels of government should per-
form (Musgrave, 1959) and the "decentralization theorem" (Oates, 1972)
have given rise to a broad literature on ﬁscal federalism and public ﬁnance.
Fiscal decentralization takes place in two dimensions, when the power to tax
is given to a sub-national level or a sub-national level has the responsibility
for implementing an expenditure function. In recent years, many developing
countries have undergone ﬁscal decentralization.
Musgrave divides the ﬁscal functions into three diﬀerent categories: al-
location, distribution and stabilization. Accordingly a ﬁscal federal system
can be arranged so that each level performs those functions it is most suited
for. The central level is usually responsible for the stabilization of ﬁscal
and monetary operations as well as redistribution functions, whereas the re-
sponsibly for allocation should rest with both local and central government
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(Oates, 1968). Similar considerations apply to which tax instruments should
be available to the diﬀerent levels of government to ﬁnance these services.
Arguably the most mobile tax base (personal income and corporate taxes)
should be taxed by the highest level, while the local level should either rely
on user charges, or on relatively immobile tax bases such as the property
tax. Since incomes are likely unequally distributed within the federation,
either discriminatory taxation or inter community transfers could be used
by the central government. Through such transfers between communities
(subsidies) the central government could induce welfare maximizing levels of
public goods provision in all sub-national jurisdictions (Oates, 2005). The
"decentralization theorem" further presupposes that it would be politically
unfeasible for a central government to provide diﬀerent levels of public goods
in jurisdictions of the same tier.
Accordingly the allocation function should be maintained by the level
able to most economically provide the good or service. Generally this will be
as close to the consumer as possible. Therefore, the local level is justiﬁed in
performing certain functions, which are at least as cost eﬃciently provided
at the local level as they would be at the state or central levels. Since the
consumption of publicly provided goods is conﬁned to a geographic subset of
the population, the mobility of agents is not explicitly considered.
Justiﬁcation for local public goods provision is based on the more detailed
knowledge and information available at the local level, as well as the diversity
of tastes across larger areas. Furthermore, competition among the many
jurisdictions may lead to more eﬃcient outcomes, while also allowing for more
experimentation and innovation at a lower risk. If a local policy is deemed
good, then neighboring jurisdictions will imitate it. Furthermore, through
the competition that arises between jurisdictions it is possible from a public
choice perspective, that decentralization could prevent excessive growth of
the public sector (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 168-186).
In particular in Chapter 2 the federal structure is implied since the mu-
nicipalities receive per capita transfers to ﬁnance their chosen level of service
provision. Furthermore, the provision is considered in a framework of mul-
tiple communities. The inter-municipal competition aspect is further eluci-
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dated in the next section. In Chapter 4 the federal structure in Germany
is reﬂected in the empirical analysis. The sample consists of municipalities
from one state (the Free State of Saxony). In particular the eﬀect of the share
of revenues from inter-governmental grants of municipal revenues on the ef-
ﬁciency on the provision of child care is tested. It is found that eﬃciency
in child care provision is independent of the size of grants a municipality
receives.
Fiscal competition
Besides the potentially higher eﬃciency with which public provision can be
maintained by sub-national jurisdictions, the competition between them may
be eﬃciency enhancing. Whether competition is considered vertical or hor-
izontal depends on the actors involved. Vertical refers to the competition
between diﬀerent tiers of government that tax the same activity and thus
share the same tax base. Whereas horizontal refers to competition between
jurisdictions of the same sub-national level.
Broadly speaking, ﬁscal competition deals with the externality imposed
by a mobile productive resource on a jurisdiction (Wildasin, 2003a).5 The
literature within this scope is extensive, but can generally be divided into
three sub-categories according to the arena in which jurisdictions compete.
First, tax competition may be considered, where jurisdictions seek to of-
fer the lowest tax price while still providing comparable services. Secondly,
competition may arise with respect to diﬀerent aspects of the public goods
bundle oﬀered, including quality, cost and composition. Finally, non-tax in-
struments (excluding expenditures) may be used to attract investment in
local businesses, in order to increase production, employment and income
and thus broadening the local tax base (Wilson, 1999).
A distinction with respect to the mobility of resources is fundamental in
ﬁscal competition. Generally diﬀerent aﬃnities can be postulated for labor
5 Technically, welfare competition can also arise without mobility through yard-stick
competition (Besley and Case, 1995), where residents are able to receive information
from neighboring communities. The ﬁscal externality literature, including ﬁscal com-
petition, expenditure competition, welfare competition, and tax competition already
covers a wide range of issues.
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and capital, or ﬁner distinctions can be made with respect to skill levels, and
age of labor, or sector and type of capital.6 In analyzing the composition
of public spending, Keen and Marchand (1997) show that not only will tax
competition drive taxes to ineﬃciently low levels, but that the spending also
becomes skewed in favor of the mobile factor.7
In Chapter 2, competition is distinguished as taking place over the level
of public goods provision. There is heterogeneity between population groups
as the young individuals are mobile whereas the elderly are immobile. The
inﬂuence of competition is also considered in Chapter 4, by taking account of
facility density within a municipality in the eﬃciency analysis and considering
the inﬂuence of the presence of non-public child care facilities on the eﬃciency
of public facilities. However, inter-jurisdictional competition is not directly
analyzed.
Intergenerational public goods
Government debt incurred today may not be repaid for many years, poten-
tially even generations from now. Thus debt is an intergenerational issue.
Other examples include: pay-as-you-go pension systems, investments in long
lived public goods and environmental protection (Sandler, 1999). Similarly,
the idea of an intergenerational or a durable public good stems from the
fact that some decisions and investments have long lasting impacts. Inter-
generational public goods may have the characteristics of an impure public
good. Like local public goods intergenerational public goods may be rival in
consumption (and may thus be congested by the use) within a period. Fur-
thermore the beneﬁt of an intergenerational public good may be inﬂuenced
6 For instance Keen and Marchand (1997); Borck (2005) consider high and low skilled
workers. Welfare competition in general deals with mobile poor and immobile wealthy
(Brueckner, 2000). Wildasin (2003b) considers endogenously determined mobility
rates of labor and capital.
7 The same conclusion is reached with respect to public expenditures in favor of the
mobile factor when agents are heterogeneous (Borck, 2005). When skilled workers
are mobile and a capital skill complementarity exists, public expenditures geared
toward the mobile skilled labor are relatively higher than services for the unskilled and
immobile labor.The theoretical model developed in Borck (2005) is used to empirically
verify ﬁscal competition at the local level in Germany in Borck, Caliendo and Steiner
(2006).
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not only by current use, but the current use may also inﬂuence (reduce) fu-
ture beneﬁts. Whereas ﬁscal competition over local public goods deals with
the spillovers within a given period between jurisdictions, intergenerational
public goods induce spillovers between two or more periods.
Since the unborn future generations are unable to vote or sign contracts
with their predecessors, they may inherit a suboptimal stock of publicly
provided goods or be subjected to debt repayments. Nonetheless, land price
capitalization and altruism represent two potential alternatives to reduce any
adverse consequences for future generations. As discussed above, a ﬁscal fed-
eral structure can make the provision of local public goods more eﬃcient. In a
ﬁscal competition framework the capitalization of intergenerational spillovers
into local land values can protect the future generations (Rangel, 2005). New
residents are attracted to communities with low debt and high public goods
provision which will in turn increase property values. Thus current residents
have an incentive to vote for an attractive bundle of public goods and low
debt, since they themselves will reap the beneﬁts when selling their property.
Intergenerational altruism may also remedy potentially negative spillovers
from short-sighted decisions of current generations. If the members of the
current generation derive some indirect welfare from the future consump-
tion of their descendants, then long-term decisions will (at least partially)
take the future beneﬁt into account (Myles, 1997). Thus any adverse future
consequences are reduced.
Chapter 3 considers an intergenerational publicly provided good that is
aﬀected by congestion. The beneﬁt to each user is diluted by the number of
users and the intergenerational inheritance of the stock of public good may
beneﬁt the subsequent generation. The laissez-faire and welfare maximizing
outcomes are computed for two cases; ﬁrst with no costs of upkeep and second
for the case when costs of upkeep accrue. A comparison of the solutions shows
that public provision for the ﬁrst generation is ineﬃciently low in laissez-faire
when there are no costs of upkeep. However, if costs of upkeep accrue, the
laissez-faire outcome for the intergenerational publicly provided good may
be too high.
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1.2.2 Fiscal federalism and local public ﬁnance in
Germany
In a ﬁscally decentralized economy, taxes can either be levied and allocated
within a jurisdiction, or tax revenue from various levels can be pooled and
subsequently redistributed vertically and horizontally. In Germany most of
the revenues at the local level are not acquired from taxes raised locally,
but rather through a complex system of grants and revenue sharing schemes
between the other levels. The allocation of revenues between the states, and
the local authorities follows the principle of equalization, according to which
the provision of equal chances is to be guaranteed in all sub-regions. The
Basic Constitutional Law (Grundgesetz ) states that all regions should be able
to perform their assigned functions to largely the same extent, independently
of the local economic and ﬁscal means. This is achieved through both vertical
(between diﬀerent levels) and horizontal (between jurisdictions of the same
level) equalizing grants (Nam et al., 2001). The aim of this system is spatial
and social cohesion in all regions of the country.
In Germany there are mainly three ﬁscally relevant levels of government:
the federal (Bund), the state (Länder), and the local (Gemeinde) levels.8
The Basic Constitutional Law guarantees the local level self-governance and
administration, but the law also deﬁnes certain tasks to be performed by this
level (in terms of public goods and services). In order to implement these
functions, the local jurisdictions must engage in revenue sharing since their
revenues from own sources are insuﬃcient.
Over two-thirds of taxes raised in Germany are shared between the three
levels. The two main sources are the personal income tax as well as value
added tax (Krings, 2010).9 Since the own sources of revenues are particularly
small at the local level, the municipalities are highly dependent on the large
transfers they receive from the other two levels. For instance in 2009, the
municipalities (local level) raised about 40% of their current revenues from
8 Additional administrative levels, include the districts Regierungsbezirke and counties
(Kreise) both between the state and local levels in declining order.
9 Of the total taxes levied (524 billion) in 2009, the personal income tax (135.2 billion e)
and the value added tax (141.9 billion e) accounted for 26% and 27%, respectively.
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taxes (including the shared taxes), and much of the remaining 60% was
obtained from grants (Krings, 2010). The implementation is achieved by
ﬁrst dividing the tax revenue and the federal level compensating weak states
(Länderﬁnanzausgleich).10
Thereafter within the municipal reallocation system (kommunale Finan-
zausgleich) the revenues of local authorities within a given state are redis-
tributed with the aim of equalization. The size of local grants is state leg-
islation, therefore at the national level no common means of determination
of grant size is possible. However, generally the size of grants tend to be
highly correlated from year to year and the revenue development at the local
level is highly dependent on the revenues of the state. The constitution also
does not imply a speciﬁc method of redistribution, it only requires that the
distribution is fair. Generally the grant size is determined by the diﬀerence
of the computed expenditure "need"11 and the tax capacity of a municipality
(Parsche and Steinherr, 1995; Steinherr and Parsche, 1998).
The reallocation system has been criticized for being too focused on pop-
ulation size as a determinant of expenditure need, and not accounting for
several other important factors, including: age, employment, and economic
structures, incidence of commuting, prevalence of environmental damage and
hazards, age of local infrastructure. When a municipality is losing population
relative to other municipalities, in a state with generally weak ﬁscal situation,
then the local revenue losses will be signiﬁcant. Such a situation currently
prevails in many eastern German municipalities. Thus the main role of local
level is to allocate the ﬁxed resources between the services that the local
authority is required to provide (Borge and Rattsø, 1995; Borge et al., 1995).
In Chapter 2 the allocation of grant revenues between two diﬀerent types of
publicly provided goods are modeled.
The eﬃciency of the use of resources on one particular type of publicly
provided good, child care, is considered in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the
inﬂuence of population loss is considered in a setting where the public goods
provision is long lived.
10 Refer to, for instance, Eltges (2006).
11 The municipal expenditure "needs" remain to be subjectively determined.
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1.3 The structure and contribution of this
thesis
This work is intended to contribute to the discussion of the impact of the
current demographic developments, in particular, its implications for local
authorities. The theoretical models in Chapters 2 and 3 can be viewed in
diﬀerent national institutional arrangements, in particularly in federations
with a relatively strong and independent local public sector. The distinctly
German institutional setting is most important in the empirical analysis in
Chapter 4.
1.3.1 The main contribution
The main contribution of this thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the inﬂu-
ence of changes in the population structure on local communities; in partic-
ular with respect to the provision of publicly provided goods. This section
brieﬂy presents how the rest of this thesis is structured. Generally each en-
suing chapter is a paper that I have worked on during my doctoral studies.
The papers that are the basis for two of the three main chapters were written
by a co-author and myself. Speciﬁcally, Chapters 2 and 4 were co-authored,
where as Chapter 3 is not. In line with the university regulation, I will in
the following describe my contribution to each paper in more detail.
1.3.2 Contributions to the chapters
Chapter 2 is based on the article "Ageing municipalities, gerontocracy and
ﬁscal competition", which was published in the June 2010 issue of the Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy, as well as on the working paper version
of the same paper (CESifo Working Paper Series number 2469 ).12 Both ver-
sions are co-authored by my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Marcel Thum and
myself. The initial input to begin work on my thesis, by modeling demo-
graphic change in a ﬁscal competition framework, came from my supervisor
12 See citations: Montén and Thum (2010) and Montén and Thum (2008).
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and co-author. I proceeded to set up the model with two generations, two
communities and two congestible (local) public goods. Thus the ﬁrst draft of
the paper is based on these ideas. Thereafter, we discussed the implications
of the results in on multiple occasions. These conversations shaped the rest
of the paper.
Chapter 3 is written entirely by myself. Although the contents have of
course beneﬁted from discussions with my supervisor, colleagues and the
inputs of participants in the seminars in which I presented previous versions
of the model.
Chapter 4 is also based on a cooperative work. The paper "Determinants
of eﬃciency in child care provision", appeared as ifo Working Paper Number
83 in March 2010, and is co-authored by my colleague Christian Thater at
the Dresden Branch of the ifo Institute. This article has also recently been
accepted for publication in a forthcoming issue of the journal FinanzArchiv/
Public Finance Analysis.13 The original idea for the paper stems from a
project we worked on together at the ifo Institute's Dresden Branch, with
the title: "Making Saxon Municipalities Ready for Demographic Change 
Policy Options". The contents of the paper and subsequently this chapter
have changed substantially since the ﬁrst drafts. Originally a mere eﬃciency
analysis exercise was intended, but later the public ﬁnance implications of
municipal spending on child care were brought to the forefront. For the
working paper version of the paper, I computed the eﬃciency scores using
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) whereas my co-author implemented
the regression analysis. In the course of the revisions for the ﬁnal publication,
I executed the regression analyses whereas my co-author was in charge of the
eﬃciency analysis. The selection of the inputs and outputs (including the
school readiness data) as well as the regression variables was done in common.
The ensuing three chapters can therefore also be treated as self-contained
documents. However, the conclusions drawn in Chapter 5 pertain to the
whole thesis.
13 See citations: Montén and Thater (2010) and Montén and Thater (2011).
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Chapter 2
Ageing municipalities,
gerontocracy and ﬁscal
competition
2.1 Introduction
Low birth rates and increased longevity lead to population ageing in many
developed countries.1 This demographic transition will have wide-reaching
political, economic and social consequences. Economics literature has so far
mostly discussed the macroeconomic impact of ageing societies. This chap-
ter focuses on the local level and asks how demographic change will aﬀect
the provision of publicly provided goods. On the one hand, as the median
voter's age increases the provision of publicly provided goods may shift to-
ward those goods appreciated mostly by the elderly population. On the other
hand, the competition among municipalities for the young and mobile inten-
siﬁes, thus forcing the municipalities to provide more of those goods that
make the location attractive for the younger population. In a model of ﬁscal
competition among gerontocratic municipalities, we demonstrate that goods
1 This chapter is based on the article "Ageing municipalities, gerontocracy and ﬁscal
competition", as well as on the working paper with the same title, both co-authored
by Prof. Marcel Thum and myself (see Montén and Thum (2008) and Montén and
Thum (2010)).
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for the elderly may be excessively provided in the early phase of a geron-
tocratic regime. However, when the share of the old population becomes
suﬃciently large, the eﬀect of ﬁscal competition dominates and an ineﬃ-
ciently high amount of publicly provided goods for the young population is
supplied.
In the next decades, many European economies will undergo signiﬁcant
demographic changes. According to UN projections (United Nations, 2007),
the countries in central and eastern Europe will experience the most rapid
population loss. In southern and western Europe, the more signiﬁcant de-
mographic process will be ageing. Germany's population will only shrink by
0.12 percent by 2020.2 However, the median age is projected to increase by
as much as 5.2 years from 42.1 years in 2005 to 47.3 years in 2020. Then only
Italy is projected to have an even older population with a median age of 47.5
years. These shifts in the size and age structure can have signiﬁcant con-
sequences for the economy as a whole. In particular, the impact on capital
markets (e.g., Abel, 2001; Börsch-Supan et al., 2002; Krueger and Ludwig,
2007; Poterba, 2001, 2004) and on public pension schemes (e.g., Breyer and
Stolte, 2001; Casamatta et al., 2001; Demange and Laroque, 1999; Fehr, 2000;
Sinn and Uebelmesser, 2002) has been extensively studied.3 The focus on the
aggregate demography often hides that even more pronounced demographic
changes occur on the regional or local level.
The changing size and composition of the population poses many chal-
lenges for local policy makers. Downsizing of the infrastructure is needed in
order to maintain ﬁscal balances. The portfolio of publicly provided goods
has to be adjusted while taking into account the changing age structure.
While the younger population may mostly desire access to jobs, schools or
2 All values pertain to the medium variant of the 2006 revision of the World
Population Prospects Database by the Population Division of the Department
of Economic and Social Aﬀairs of the United Nations Secretariat, accessible at:
http://esa.un.org/unpp.
3 Breyer and Stolte (2001) and Sinn and Uebelmesser (2002) take a political economy
point of view on public pension reforms. Similar this chapter, Sinn and Uebelmesser
(2002) consider the power of the old in a gerontocratic society. According to their
calculations, Germany will be a gerontocracy in 2016 as pension reforms beneﬁting
the younger cohorts will then become politically unfeasible.
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child care facilities, the elderly may prefer aﬀordable public transport and
access to speciﬁc recreational opportunities and cultural oﬀerings. The nec-
essary adjustments in the public budget may create conﬂicts between gener-
ations. As the median age increases, majority voting outcomes may shift to
beneﬁt the elderly population at the cost of the younger generations. Such
generational conﬂicts in local service provision have been addressed in other
contributions, in particular with respect to the provision of public education
(e.g. Poterba (1998) for the US and Grob and Wolter (2005) and Cattaneo
and Wolter (2009) for Switzerland). Konrad (1995) shows that gerontocracies
have an excessive incentive to invest in immobile infrastructure as opposed
to mobile human capital. Our model also contains a strategic investment
motive on a subnational level. Haupt and Peters (2003) consider an over-
lapping generations model in which the contribution rates to public pension
schemes lead to interregional competition. When the young can strategically
migrate, their exploitation by the gerontocracy is limited. The exit option
of migration also plays a crucial role in our model. Finally, the studies by
Borge and Rattsø (1995); Borge and Rattsø (2008) are closely related to this
chapter. They mainly focus on local services, such as child care and elderly
care, and analyze the negative eﬀect of ageing on the per capita spending on
services for the younger cohorts. In contrast to this chapter, the inﬂuence of
local interaction and ﬁscal competition plays no role.
Fiscal competition in the context of generational conﬂicts arise, since the
young population is mobile, while the old are immobile. This is corroborated
by empirical evidence on intermunicipal mobility. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
age distribution of intermunicipal migration in Germany in 2007. The solid
line depicts the absolute number of in-migrants (left scale). The dashed line
shows the percentage of intermunicipal migrants in each age group (migrants
at age t / population at age t, right scale). Most migration occurs between age
20 and 35 when young people relocate because of job opportunities and family
formation. Given the decision to move, the ensuing choice is made between
alternative municipalities, e.g., in the vicinity of the workplace. Here, local
amenities and publicly provided services clearly play a decisive role.
Our contribution examines the eﬀects ageing has on the provision of pub-
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Figure 2.1: Age distribution of intermunicipal migrants in Germany (2007)
Source: Federal Statistical Oﬃce
licly provided goods at the local level. The young population faces a threat
once the elderly gain the majority, as a gerontocracy wants to provide less
of the impure public goods for the young. However, the young will ﬁnally
receive even more than under welfare maximization, if the share of elderly
is suﬃciently large. This seemingly counterintuitive result appears as ﬁscal
competition for the young intensiﬁes. As municipalities are often ﬁnanced
to a large extent through per capita grants, the local budget depends on the
population size. To attract young families, even gerontocratic municipalities
are forced to provide goods for younger cohorts. When ageing proceeds, ﬁscal
competition becomes so intense that the level of the publicly provided goods
for the young even exceeds the welfare maximizing level.
We also show that the initial distribution of the population eﬀects the
outcome. The paradoxical case where the gerontocracies provide too much
of the publicly provided good for the young is more likely when the elderly
population is more unequally distributed across municipalities. Regions with
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large disparities in their age structures experience a more intense ﬁscal com-
petition for the young.
Section 2 describes the setup of the model. In Section 3, we discuss the
equilibrium outcomes for gerontocracies that face ﬁscal competition. Section
4 derives the social planner's solution. In Section 5, the outcomes from
the previous sections are contrasted with one another and changes in the
distribution of the elderly are considered. Section 6 discusses alternative
variants and extensions of our approach. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 The model
We consider a region with two municipalities. The population of this region
consists of both young and old individuals. The fundamental diﬀerence be-
tween the two population groups is that the young are able to choose the
municipality in which they reside, whereas the old segment of the popula-
tion is immobile. Each municipality supplies two congestible public goods,
one for each population segment. The funding for the publicly provided
goods is achieved exclusively through per capita grants. When the popula-
tion increases, a municipality receives more resources for ﬁnancing its ser-
vices. However, when there are more users the individual beneﬁt from the
publicly provided good is reduced due to crowding eﬀects. Since the young
are mobile between municipalities, their utility maximizing behavior places
the municipalities in competition with one another.
2.2.1 Municipal budgets
There is a ﬁxed total young population, N , and each young person must
live in one of the two municipalities. Therefore, each municipality has a
young population Ni where i = 1, 2 stand for the respective municipality and
accordingly N = N1 +N2. Additionally each municipality also has a number
of elderly individuals Mi where i = 1, 2.
The size of the publicly provided goods for the young and the old are de-
noted by Yi and Xi, respectively. The prices of the two goods are normalized
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to unity. These publicly provided goods have to be ﬁnanced in each munic-
ipality by a transfer from an upper level of government. The municipality
receives a per capita block grant b.4 The municipal budget constraint thus
has the following form:
b(Ni +Mi) = Yi +Xi, where i = 1, 2. (2.1)
The assumption of per capita grants captures a stylized fact of many mu-
nicipal ﬁnancing schemes in continental Europe. Even when there is some
degree of tax autonomy, revenue sharing and equalization schemes make
the local budgets de facto dependent on the population size (OECD, 2005).
Transfers and grants are intended to achieve horizontal equity in per capita
revenue even when tax base disparities exist. We abstract from the ﬁnancing
of the grants and only consider the allocation of the funds. The introduction
of tax autonomy and local ﬁnancing through distortive taxation could clearly
change some details of the analysis.
2.2.2 Age group speciﬁc preferences
In each municipality, the utility of a young individual depends on the amount
of publicly provided goods (Yi) and on the size of the population in this age
group Ni. In particular, we assume the following utility function:
Ui =
(
Yi
Nαi
)β
i = 1, 2, (2.2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) ensures declining marginal utility. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1]
determines the degree of congestion. In the extreme cases when α = 0 and
α = 1, the publicly provided good has the characteristic of a pure public good
or a private good, respectively. The intermediate cases, 0 < α < 1, capture
the empirically relevant phenomenon of partial crowding for many publicly
provided goods (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Borcherding and Deacon,
1972).5 The characteristic of the publicly provided goods are assumed to be
4 The results of the model do not depend on the simplifying assumption of a single
source of ﬁnance. The per capita grant only has to be the marginal source of ﬁnance.
5 Edwards (1990) discusses the virtues of alternative crowding speciﬁcations and ﬁnds
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the same in two adjacent communities. For simplicity, we exclude spillover
eﬀects between the two municipalities, i.e. the utility from locating in munic-
ipality i is independent of the level of provision in municipality j. This may
seem to be an extreme assumption at ﬁrst sight. However, most spillovers
emerge from city centers to the beneﬁt of suburban municipalities. Spillovers
between suburban municipalities are probably negligible. As we consider
competition between two similar municipalities in suburban or rural areas
the exclusion of spillovers is reasonable. We also do not consider commut-
ing for consumption, but focus on locally provided services available to the
residents of a municipality.
The utility function of a representative old person is analogous to that of
a young individual:
Vi =
(
Xi
Mαi
)β
i = 1, 2. (2.3)
For simplicity, we assume identical parameters α and β for the young and
the old.6
2.2.3 Location choice
Fiscal competition takes place over the bundle of publicly provided goods
oﬀered in each of the two municipalities. The municipalities set their levels
of publicly provided goods knowing that young individuals can move to the
municipality oﬀering the better bundle for the young. For simplicity, we
assume costless mobility. Since the relocation decision is intraregional in
our case, the costs (both monetary and emotional) associated with mobility
that this simple decreasing marginal returns speciﬁcation fares fairly well. Refer to
Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997) for a survey of demand estimates of local public
goods as well as a discussion of the measurement of crowding. The empirical studies
ﬁnd that the degree of crowding is close to unity for many locally provided public
goods.
6 By construction, the model does not only represent the potential conﬂict of interest
arising between young and old. Instead the framework may also be interpreted in
terms of any two groups that demand diﬀerent publicly provided goods and diﬀer
in terms of mobility (e.g., families with children and single households). See Sec-
tion 6 for a brief discussion of intergenerational conﬂicts arising from intertemporal
considerations.
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should be relatively low. As more young move in, the congestion of the
public good will reduce the beneﬁts from the publicly provided good.7 The
migration equilibrium is achieved, when a young person is just indiﬀerent
between the two municipalities:
U1(N1, Y1) = U2(N2, Y2). (2.4)
It can easily be veriﬁed that the migration equilibrium is stable. Using
N2 = N −N1, the young population in municipality i amounts to
NEi =
N(
Yj
Yi
) 1
α
+ 1
(2.5)
with i 6= j. The equilibrium population in municipality i is only dependent
on the provision levels for the young in each municipality, as well as on the
total population of young.
2.3 Gerontocracies
When the elderly are in the majority and have full authority over the alloca-
tion decision, a municipality will be considered a gerontocracy. The elderly
choose the utility maximizing level of the publicly provided good. Full ex-
ploitation of the young generation is prevented by the mobility of the young.
Each gerontocracy tries to provide a suﬃcient level of publicly provided goods
for the young to remain competitive and to generate a suﬃciently large bud-
get. Hence, the elderly maximize the budget that can be allocated to their
own publicly provided good:
max
Yi
Xi = b · (Mi +NEi (Yi))− Yi. (2.6)
The municipality receives b per inhabitant. The size of the young population
7 We focus on the provision of publicly provided goods as the sole determinants of lo-
cation choices. In addition (or alternatively), production may be added to the model.
Decreasing marginal productivities limit the inﬂow of workers and also generate an
interior migration equilibrium.
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depends on the amount of the publicly provided good Yi [see Eq. (2.5)]. To
obtain the budget available for the publicly provided good of the elderly, the
expenditure for the young Yi is subtracted from the total budget. From the
perspective of a single gerontocracy, the optimal provision of the publicly
provided good for the young is implicitly given by
∂Xi
∂Yi
= b · N[(
Yj
Yi
) 1
α
+ 1
]2 · Y
1
α
j
α · Y
1
α
+1
i
− 1 = 0. (2.7)
For α > 1
2
, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium8 with
Y G1 = Y
G
2 =
bN
4α
. (2.8)
The provision for the young in either municipality does not depend on the
share of elderly, but only on the total number of young across both munici-
palities. Fiscal competition forces the gerontocratic municipalities to spend
more on the young population when the per capita transfer b is high, when
the young population N is large and when the crowding eﬀects are low (low
α). Using the budget constraint, the equilibrium level of the publicly pro-
vided good for the elderly Xi, i = 1, 2 amounts to:
XGi = b
(
Mi +
N
2
(
1− 1
2α
))
. (2.9)
As 1
2
< α < 1, the public provision of the good for the elderly does not only
increase in the size of the old population Mi but also in the size of young
population N as the gerontocracy diverts some resources from the young.
To analyze the impact of ageing on the provision of publicly provided
goods, we normalize the size of the total population to unity: N + M = 1.
The share of the elderly in the total population is then deﬁned as s ≡ M
1
.
For notational convenience, we furthermore introduce mi as the share of the
elderly population living in municipality i: mi ≡ MiMi+Mj . These deﬁnitions
allow us to write the equilibrium utilities of the young and old in municipality
8 For α ≤ 1/2, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. The details of the derivation and
the properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium can be found in 2.A.
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i as
UGi =
(
b · (1− s)1−α
22−α · α
)β
(2.10)
and
V Gi =
{
b ·
[
(mi · s)1−α + (mi · s)−α · 1− s
2
·
(
1− 1
2α
)]}β
, (2.11)
respectively.
Taking the derivatives of equations (2.10) and (2.11) with respect to s
yields information on whether the young and the old gain or lose from an
ageing society. The utility of the young clearly declines when the share of
the elderly increases. The impact on the utility of the elderly, however, is
less obvious:
∂V Gi
∂s
=β · [V Gi ]β−1 · b ·m−αi · s−α−1·{
s · (1− α) ·
[
mi − 1
2
(
1− 1
2α
)]
− α
2
(
1− 1
2α
)}
.
(2.12)
The impact of ageing on the utility of the elderly depends on the expression
inside the curly brackets.
Proposition 2.1. In gerontocratic municipalities that face ﬁscal competition
ageing decreases (increases) the utility of the elderly population if the degree
of crowding exceeds (remains below) a critical level α¯.
Proof. The impact of ageing on the utility of the elderly depends on the
sign of z ≡ s · (1 − α) · [mi − 12 (1− 12α)] − α2 (1− 12α). For α = 12 , we get
z(1
2
) = smi
2
> 0. α = 1 yields z(1) = −1
4
. As z is strictly declining in α
( ∂z
∂α
= −smi − s4α2 − 1−s2 < 0), there is exactly one critical value α¯ for which
∂V Gi
∂s
R 0⇔ α Q α¯.
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Figure 2.2: The impact of ageing on the elderly in a gerontocracy
The outcome is illustrated in Figure 2.2. We measure the share of the
elderly s on the horizontal axis and the degree of crowding α on the vertical
axis. sG denotes the minimum share of the elderly in society as a whole,
necessary to make municipality i a gerontocracy (s ·mi ≥ 12(1 − s) ⇒ s ≥
sG = 1
2mi+1
). In a gerontocratic municipality, the gains or losses of the
elderly depend on both their share (s) and the characteristics of the publicly
provided good (α). The elderly lose from an ageing society for all parameter
values α above α¯; when α < α¯, the old gain from ageing. The elderly are
more likely to lose from an ageing society when the publicly provided good
exhibits strong crowding eﬀects (high α) because ageing implies that the
transfers from young to old have to be shared among a larger number of
elderly people. Put diﬀerently: If the publicly provided good is closer to a
public good, the beneﬁts of the good can be shared among more elderly. As
the size of the publicly provided good for the elderly grows with an ageing
society, the utility of each old person will increase. Note also that the elderly
population in smaller municipalities is more likely to lose from the ageing
process; a reduction in the relative size of the elderly in municipality i shifts
the α¯-curve downwards and increases the shaded area (∂α¯/∂mi > 0).
In the following, we will derive the social planner's solution and compare
the outcome with the resource allocation and utilities derived by the two
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population groups in a gerontocratic society.
2.4 Welfare maximization
We consider the decision of a utilitarian social planner who maximizes wel-
fare by allocating the budget across municipalities and across the two types
of publicly provided goods. The social planner is not restricted to the bud-
get constraints of the individual municipalities but has to obey the aggregate
budget constraint. In welfare maximization we consider two alternative dis-
tributions of the young population. First, we consider the ﬁrst-best solution
where provision for the young only takes place in one municipality. Sec-
ond, we consider the case with the additional constraint of "equal living
conditions", where the young population is equally divided between the two
municipalities. Qualitatively the results do not diﬀer. The two diﬀerent
welfare maximization problems are solved in turn, ﬁrst the case of young
concentrated in one municipality, and then under equal division of the young
population. Each section is immediately followed by a comparison to the
gerontocracy.
2.4.1 Young concentrated in one municipality
In this case, the mobile young choose the municipality that grants the high-
est utility and the social planner has no power over individual migration
decisions. Alternatively, we assume in Section 2.4.3 that the social planner
maximizes welfare for a given distribution of the young population, i.e. half
of the young population resides in each municipality as is the case in the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium. We discuss additional alternative speciﬁcations of
the social planner in Section 2.5.
The social planner maximizes the utilitarian welfare function
W = N1U1 +N2U2 +M1V1 +M2V2
by choosing the sizes of the publicly provided goods for the young Yi and for
AGEING MUNICIPALITIES 33
the elderly Xi (i = 1, 2). She has to take into account the budget constraint9
Y1 + Y2 +X1 +X2 = b · (N1 +N2 +M1 +M2).
Since there are economies of scale in the provision of the public services
(α < 1) and the young are perfectly mobile, it is always optimal for the
social planner to provide the public services for the young in one municipality
only. The young will be concentrated in this municipality. Hence, the social
planner's maximization problem boils down to
max
Y,X1,X2
W = NU +M1V1 +M2V2
s.t. Y +X1 +X2 = b · (N +M1 +M2).
The subscript on Y is dropped because the young reside in one community
only.
Maximization of the welfare function yields the following provision levels:
Y W =
b
Nγ +Mγ1 +M
γ
2
·Nγ (2.13)
XWi =
b
Nγ +Mγ1 +M
γ
2
·Mγi (2.14)
with i = 1, 2 and γ ≡ 1−αβ
1−β . Note that, due to α > 1/2, we always have
γ > 1. The provision levels depend on the aggregate budget constraint and
on the relative share of the population groups. The provision level increases
in the size of a population group. Hence, with ageing, the social planner will
provide more of the publicly provided goods for the elderly and less for the
young.
The more interesting question is how the utilities of the diﬀerent groups
are aﬀected by an ageing society. Using the notation for the share of the
elderly s and the distribution of the elderly m1,m2, we obtain the utility
9 Even though we have normalized the total population to unity, we explicitly keep the
size of the distinct population groups in the formula to facilitate interpretation.
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levels as
UW =
[
b · (1− s) 1−α1−β
(1− s)γ + sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2)
]β
(2.15)
V Wi =
[
b · (s ·mi)
1−α
1−β
(1− s)γ + sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2)
]β
(2.16)
for i = 1, 2. As we have seen before, a decreasing young population will lead
to lower provision levels. However, the good also has to be shared among
fewer young inhabitants. For the elderly, the larger group size leads to higher
provision levels. The larger publicly provided good has to be shared among
more users. The net eﬀect of ageing on the utility of the young and the old
is summarized in
Proposition 2.2. (a) With welfare maximization, ageing leads to a lower
provision of the publicly provided good for the young and a higher provision for
the elderly. (b) Ageing causes a decline of the utility of the young population,
whereas the eﬀect on the utility of the old population is ambiguous.
Proof. (a) Immediately follows from the derivatives of (2.13) and (2.14).
(b) Taking the derivative of UW with respect to s leads to
∂UW
∂s
R 0⇔ α · (1− s)γ + sγ(mγ1 +mγ2)(α−
γ
s
) R 0. (2.17)
We evaluate the left-hand side at the maximum and show that it will never
exceed 0. Note that α−γ/s < 0. Hence, the left-hand side will be maximized
for m1 = m2 = 12 . As the expression grows in α, it has to be evaluated at
α = 1, which implies γ = 0. The left-hand side becomes zero at the maximum
and therefore ∂U
W
∂s
≤ 0. For the elderly, the sign of the derivative of Vi will
depend on
∂V Wi
∂s
R 0⇔ (1− s)γ−1
[
1− α
1− β + αs
]
− αsγ(mγ1 +mγ2) R 0. (2.18)
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For very old societies (s → 1), the derivative becomes negative. Hence, the
elderly lose from further ageing. For s = 1
2
and an equally distributed elderly
population m1 = m2 = 12 , the derivative is strictly positive. Here, the elderly
gain from an ageing society.
As in the case of a gerontocracy, the elderly gain for a certain combination
of ageing (s) and crowding (α). However, beyond a certain threshold they
lose. In Section 5, we compare the impact of ageing on the resource allocation
under the social planner and the gerontocrat.
The above approach also allows us to analyze the consequences of het-
erogeneities in the ageing process. One of the main challenges for ageing
societies is the large heterogeneity among municipalities. Whereas one re-
gion is still fairly young, the other already has a large number of elderly.
How will diﬀerences in the number of elderly aﬀect the provision of publicly
provided goods? Without loss of generality, let municipality 1 have more
old inhabitants than municipality 2: m1 = 0.5 + η and m2 = 0.5 − η with
η ∈ (0, 0.5].
Proposition 2.3. A more unequal distribution of the elderly population re-
duces the provision of the publicly provided good for the young and, therefore,
the utility of this group.
Proof. We rewrite (2.13) as
Y W =
b · (1− s)γ
(1− s)γ + sγ[(0.5 + η)γ + (0.5− η)γ] . (2.19)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to η yields
∂Y W
∂η
= −Y W s
γγ[(0.5 + η)γ−1 − (0.5− η)γ−1]
(1− s)γ + sγ[(0.5 + η)γ + (0.5− η)γ] < 0. (2.20)
As the size of the young population is ﬁxed, the utility of this group
(
YW
(1−s)α
)β
must also decline when heterogeneity increases.
36 AGEING MUNICIPALITIES
This result suggests that the young population will suﬀer more from an
ageing society if the elderly population is more unequally distributed across
municipalities. An unequal distribution of the immobile old makes it more
expensive for the social planner to provide the publicly provided good for the
elderly. As a consequence, the provision of the publicly provided good for
the young is reduced. The impact of a more unequal population distribution
on the elderly is ambiguous. Depending on the size of the elderly population
(s) and on the degree of heterogeneity (η), the elderly population may gain
or lose when the distribution becomes more unequal. The rising cost of
provision may be oﬀset by the changing group size.
Due to economies of scale, the provision of the publicly provided good for
the mobile young will only take place in one of the two municipalities under
welfare maximization. However, this result may not be in line with regional
policy which stipulates "equal living conditions" or "equal opportunities"
in all regions of a country. By requiring provision for the young in both
municipalities (e.g., assuming Y1 = Y2), the eﬀect of such policy can easily be
integrated into the current framework. The additional constraint forces the
social planner to lower the provision for both young and old. The qualitative
eﬀects of ageing, however, remain the same. In Section 2.4.3 this additional
constraint is imposed, and the results are discussed in detail. However, in
the subsequent section the welfare solution where all young are concentrated
in one municipality is compared to the gerontocracy outcome.
2.4.2 Comparison of the gerontocracy and welfare
maximization, young concentrated in one
The two preceding sections have shown that, in gerontocracies as well as with
welfare maximization, ageing leads to a lower provision of publicly provided
goods for the young and a higher provision for the elderly. The dominance
of the elderly per se would suggest that the public good for the young is
provided on a minimum scale only. However, the exploitation of the young
is limited as the municipalities have to compete for the mobile young. This
raises the question whether the provision of the publicly provided good for the
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young remains on an ineﬃciently low level in gerontocracies or whether, due
to ﬁscal competition, the provision may even exceed the welfare maximizing
level.
In order to compare the provision levels in the two scenarios (gerontocracy
and social planner with the young population concentrated in one munici-
pality), we rewrite the provision level for the young in a gerontocracy [see
Eq. (2.8)] as
Y G =
b · (1− s)
4α
(2.21)
and in the case of a social planner [see Eq. (2.13)] as
Y W =
b · (1− s)γ
(1− s)γ + sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2)
. (2.22)
Note that the comparison is carried out for gerontocratic societies (s ≥ 1
2
) and
for publicly provided goods with some crowding (α ∈ [0.5, 1]). Rearranging
the terms leads to
Y W R Y G ⇔ [4α− (1− s)] · (1− s)γ−1 R sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2) (2.23)
This comparison yields:
Proposition 2.4. The publicly provided good for the young is provided on
an ineﬃciently low level for `young' gerontocracies but is provided on an
ineﬃciently large scale for `old' gerontocracies.
Proof. Deﬁne lhs ≡ [4α− (1− s)] · (1 − s)γ−1 and rhs ≡ sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2).
The right-hand side of (2.23) increases in s (∂rhs
∂s
> 0). Diﬀerentiating the
left-hand side of (2.23) yields ∂lhs
∂s
= (1−s)γ−2 · [−(γ − 1)4α + γ(1− s)]. The
left-hand side of (2.23) has a maximum at s = 1 − γ−1
γ
4α < 1, as ∂
2lhs
∂s2
< 0.
We have lhs > rhs at s = 0.5 and lhs < rhs at s = 1. Hence, there is one
critical level s0 for which s R s0 ⇔ Y G R Y W .
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When the elderly gain the majority in a society, a gerontocracy will ini-
tially use its power to exploit the young. The provision of the publicly
provided good for the young remains on an ineﬃciently low level. Accord-
ingly, the provision of the publicly provided good for the elderly is excessively
large. However, when the society grows older, ﬁscal competition eventually
forces the gerontocracy to provide more of the publicly provided good than
the social planner.
This results in the critical level s0, beyond which an ageing society pro-
vides an excessive amount of publicly provided goods for the young. The
variable s0 can be used to carry out some interesting comparative statics.
Let
e ≡ [4α− (1− s0)] · (1− s0)γ−1 − sγ0 · ((0.5 + η)γ + (0.5− η)γ) (2.24)
where we have replaced m1 and m2 with 0.5 + η and 0.5− η, respectively, to
analyze the impact of a more unequal distribution of the elderly population.
Diﬀerentiating (2.24) immediately yields ∂e
∂s0
< 0 (see the Proof to Proposi-
tion 2.4) and ∂e
∂η
< 0. Diﬀerentiating with respect to the crowding parameter
α leads to
∂e
∂α
=4(1− s0)γ−1 − b
1− bs
γ·
{(0.5 + η)γ [ln(1− s0)− ln(s0)− ln(0.5 + η)] +
(0.5− η)γ [ln(1− s0)− ln(s0)− ln(0.5− η)]}.
(2.25)
Numeric evaluation of this expression shows that ∂e
∂α
> 0. Hence, we get the
following comparative statics results:
ds0
dη
= − ∂e/∂η
∂e/∂s0
< 0 (2.26)
and
ds0
dα
= − ∂e/∂α
∂e/∂s0
> 0. (2.27)
The excessive provision of the publicly provided good for the young is reached
earlier, i.e. with a lower share of the elderly s, when the population is more
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unequally distributed across the municipalities (η) and when the publicly
provided good exhibits less crowding (lower α).
So far we have focused on a comparison of the provision levels. However,
since the provision level is dependent on the number of users, the utility levels
achieved by the population should be considered. We can immediately state
that the utility of the young will be higher in a gerontocracy if the geron-
tocracy provides more publicly provided goods for the young than the social
planner. Note that the gerontocracies provide the publicly provided good in
each municipality whereas the social planner concentrates her expenditures
for the young in one municipality. Hence, the larger publicly provided good
has to be shared among fewer young people in a gerontocracy. In this case,
the young must be better oﬀ in a gerontocracy. Even with a slightly smaller
provision level in gerontocracies, the young may gain due to the ﬁscal com-
petition eﬀect. To obtain the general condition for the young being better
oﬀ in a gerontocracy, we compare the utility levels in the two scenarios. The
utility of the young is
UGi =
(
b · (1− s)1−α
22−α · α
)β
(2.28)
in a gerontocracy [see Eq. (2.10)] and
UW =
(
b · (1− s) 1−α1−β
(1− s)γ + sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2)
)β
(2.29)
with a social planner [see Eq. (2.15)]. The comparison of the utility of a
young person in a gerontocracy and in a welfare maximizing society then
yields
UW R UG ⇔ [22−αα− (1− s)] · (1− s)γ−1 R sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2) . (2.30)
This comparison has the same qualitative structure as Eq. (2.23), where
the provision quantities of the two scenarios are compared. Let s¯ denote the
critical share of the elderly where the utilities the young achieve are the same
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in a gerontocracy and in a welfare maximizing society (UW = UG). As we
have 22−α ≤ 4, we immediately get s¯ ≤ s0. This implies that UG > UW
occurs 'sooner', i.e. at a lower s, than for the case when Y G > Y W . The
young arrive at ineﬃciently low utility levels in moderate gerontocracies.
However, when society grows older, the young even beneﬁt. Due to ﬁscal
competition, their utility exceeds the welfare maximizing level.
2.4.3 Equal division of the young population between
the two municipalities
In contrast to the previous section, where public provision for the young
only took place in one community, here the a constraint to ensure provision
in both communities is added. To obtain a fair comparison with the geronto-
cratic scenario, we assume that the social planner has to obey a rule of equal
living conditions, i.e., she has to provide the same amount of the publicly
provided good for the young in both municipalities (Y = Y1 = Y2). Such con-
straints are frequently imposed to ensure equal opportunities for the young
across regions. As was shown in the previous Section 2.4.1, without such a
constraint, the social planner would provide the public good for the young
in only one municipality to beneﬁt from economies of scale. To isolate the
distortions emerging from ﬁscal competition of gerontocracies, we force the
social planner to obey this constraint of equal living conditions. An alterna-
tive justiﬁcation of a uniform Y is to have the same population distribution
in the social planner's problem as in the gerontocratic setting. The mobile
young choose the municipality that grants the highest utility. As the size of
the public good is the same, the young will be equally distributed across the
two municipalities in equilibrium.
The social planner maximizes the utilitarian welfare function
W = N1U1 +N2U2 +M1V1 +M2V2
by choosing the sizes of the publicly provided goods for the young Yi and for
the elderly Xi (i = 1, 2). She has to take into account the budget constraint
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Y1 + Y2 +X1 +X2 = b · (N1 +N2 +M1 +M2).
Due to the constraint of equal living conditions for the young, the social
planner's maximization problem boils down to
max
Y,X1,X2
W = N
(
Y
(N/2)α
)β
+M1
(
X1
Mα1
)β
+M2
(
X2
Mα2
)β
s.t. 2Y +X1 +X2 = b · (N +M1 +M2).
The subscript on Y is dropped because the provision level is identical across
the two municipalities. Maximization of the welfare function yields the fol-
lowing provision levels:
Y W =
b(N +M1 +M2)
2
(
N
2
)γ
+Mγ1 +M
γ
2
·
(
N
2
)γ
(2.31)
XWi =
b(N +M1 +M2)
2
(
N
2
)γ
+Mγ1 +M
γ
2
·Mγi (2.32)
with i = 1, 2 and γ ≡ 1−αβ
1−β . Note that due to α < 1, we always have
γ > 1. The provision levels depend on the aggregate budget constraint,
on the relative size of the population groups and on the distribution of the
elderly across municipalities.
To isolate the impact of ageing on the provision levels of the publicly
provided goods and on the utilities of both generations we again normalize
total population to unity. Using the notation s for the share of the elderly
and m1,m2 for the distribution of the elderly, the provision quantities can
be written as:
Y W =
b
2
(
1−s
2
)γ
+ sγ(mγ1 +m
γ
2)
·
(
1− s
2
)γ
(2.33)
XWi =
b
2
(
1−s
2
)γ
+ sγ(mγ1 +m
γ
2)
· (smi)γ . (2.34)
The corresponding utility levels amount to
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UW =
 b · (1−s2 ) 1−α1−β
2
(
1−s
2
)γ
+ sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2)
β (2.35)
V Wi =
[
b · (s ·mi)
1−α
1−β
2
(
1−s
2
)γ
+ sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2)
]β
(2.36)
for i = 1, 2. The eﬀect of ageing can now be found by considering changes in
the share of the elderly s. The results are summarized in
Proposition 2.5. (a) With welfare maximization, ageing leads to a lower
provision of the publicly provided good for the young and a higher provision for
the elderly. (b) Ageing causes a decline in the utility of the young population.
With ageing the utility of the old population increases, however when the share
of the elderly becomes suﬃciently high, the utility of the elderly decreases.
Proof. (a) Immediately follows from the derivatives of (2.33) and (2.34).
(b) Taking the derivative of UW with respect to s leads to
∂UW
∂s
R 0⇔ α ·
(
1− s
2
)γ
+ sγ(mγ1 +m
γ
2)(α−
γ
s
) R 0. (2.37)
We evaluate the left-hand side at the maximum and show that it will never
exceed 0. Note that α−γ/s < 0. Hence, the left-hand side will be maximized
for m1 = m2 = 12 . As the expression grows in α, it has to be evaluated at
α = 1, which implies γ = 1. The left-hand side amounts to −1−s
2
< 0 at the
maximum and therefore ∂U
W
∂s
< 0. For the elderly, the derivative of V Wi with
respect to s is
∂V Wi
∂s
R 0⇔ ∂V
W
i
∂s
= V Wi
(
β
s
)[
γ
(
1−s
2
)γ−1
2
(
1−s
2
)γ
+ sγ(mγ1 +m
γ
2)
− α
]
R 0.
(2.38)
The impact of ageing on the utility of the elderly depends on the sign of
the term in the square brackets. We ﬁrst evaluate this expression at the two
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extreme values of s. When s = 1
2
the term in the brackets is positive and
the utility of the elderly increases as ageing advances. However, when s = 1,
then ∂V
W
i
∂s
< 0. Since the term in brackets is strictly declining in s, there is
a unique threshold of s beyond which the utility of the elderly will decline.
Part (a) of Proposition 2.5 is not surprising. In an ageing society, the
social planner will provide more of the publicly provided goods for the elderly
and less for the young. The more interesting question is how the utilities of
the diﬀerent groups are aﬀected by an ageing society [part (b) of Proposition
2.5]. As we have seen before, a decreasing young population will lead to
lower provision levels. However, the good also has to be shared among fewer
young inhabitants. Proposition 2.5 shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates. The
social planner lowers the provision for the young, which leads to a reduction
in the utility level. For the elderly, the larger group size leads to higher
provision levels. The larger publicly provided good, however, also has to be
shared among more users. Proposition 2.5 demonstrates that the utility of
the elderly initially increases with ageing, but decreases as the share of the
elderly becomes suﬃciently large.
Propositions 2.1 and 2.5 reveal similar results. Both under the social
planner and the gerontocratic regimes, the elderly ﬁrst gain when society
ages but cease to beneﬁt beyond a certain level of ageing. Even with a
gerontocratic government, which pursues their own interests the old may lose.
The ﬁscal competition among municipalities partially destroys the beneﬁts of
being in power. As these results are based on changes in utility, they do not
necessarily reveal anything about the absolute utility of the elderly in ageing
societies, i.e. whether the elderly are better oﬀ with a social planner rather
than with a gerontocrat. In Section 2.4.4, we compare the utility levels with
social planners and the gerontocrats in ageing societies.
Since the provision for the young depends on the size of the elderly pop-
ulations in both municipalities, the above approach also allows us to analyze
the consequences of heterogeneities in the ageing process. Similarly to Propo-
sition 2.3 the heterogeneous distribution of the elderly can also be analyzed
in this case. Without loss of generality, let municipality 1 have more old
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inhabitants than municipality 2: m1 = 0.5 + η and m2 = 0.5 − η with
η ∈ (0, 0.5].
Proposition 2.6. A more unequal distribution of the elderly population re-
duces the provision of the publicly provided good for the young and, therefore,
the utility of this group.
Proof. We rewrite (2.33) as
Y W =
b · (1−s
2
)γ
2
(
1−s
2
)γ
+ sγ[(0.5 + η)γ + (0.5− η)γ] . (2.39)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to η yields
∂Y W
∂η
= −Y W s
γγ[(0.5 + η)γ−1 − (0.5− η)γ−1]
2
(
1−s
2
)γ
+ sγ[(0.5 + η)γ + (0.5− η)γ] < 0. (2.40)
As the size of the young population is ﬁxed, the utility of this group
UW =
(
YW
( 1−s2 )
α
)β
must also decline when heterogeneity increases.
Again this result indicates that the young population will suﬀer more
from an ageing society, if the elderly population is more unequally distributed
across municipalities. A more unequal distribution of the elderly makes it
more expensive for the social planner to provide the publicly provided good
and thus reduces provision for the young. Again the eﬀect on the elderly is
ambiguous.
2.4.4 Comparison of the gerontocracy and welfare
maximization, equal division
In order to compare the provision levels in the two scenarios (gerontocracy
and social planner), we rewrite the provision level for the young in a geron-
tocracy [see Eq. (2.8)] as
Y G =
b · (1− s)
4α
(2.41)
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and in the case of a social planner we use Eq. (2.33). Note that the compari-
son is carried out for gerontocratic societies (s ≥ 1
2
) and for publicly provided
goods with some crowding (α ∈ [0.5, 1]). This comparison yields
Proposition 2.7. If the share of the elderly exceeds a critical threshold s0,
the publicly provided good for the young is provided on an ineﬃciently large
scale.
Proof. Rearranging the terms leads to
Y W R Y G ⇔ 2 ·
(
1− s
2
)γ−1
·
[
α− 1− s
2
]
R sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2) . (2.42)
Deﬁne lhs ≡ 2 · (1−s
2
)γ−1 · [α− 1−s
2
]
and rhs ≡ sγ · (mγ1 +mγ2). The right-
hand side of (2.42) increases in s (∂rhs
∂s
> 0). Diﬀerentiating the left-hand
side of (2.42) yields ∂lhs
∂s
=
(
1−s
2
)γ−2 · [−γ · (α− 1−s
2
) + α
]
. The left-hand
side of (2.42) has a maximum at s = 1 − γ−1
γ
· 2 · α < 1, as ∂2lhs
∂s2
< 0. We
have lhs > rhs at s = 0 and lhs < rhs at s = 1. Hence, there is one critical
level s0 ∈ (0, 1) for which s R s0 ⇔ Y G R Y W .
The intuition is analogous to that of Proposition 2.4. Initially the geron-
tocracy can exploit the young by providing ineﬃciently low levels of public
goods. However, when the society grows older, ﬁscal competition eventually
forces the gerontocracy to provide more of the publicly provided good than
the social planner.
As the distribution of the population across municipalities is the same in
both the social planner and the gerontocracy scenarios, Proposition 2.7 also
has immediate implications for the utility levels achieved by the young:
UG R UW ⇔ s R max(s0, 1
2
). (2.43)
If the publicly provided good is provided on a larger scale in gerontocracies,
then the young gain from being ruled by the elderly and from the competition
for young inhabitants.
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Analogously to the comparison in Section 2.4.1 the comparative statics
are carried out using the critical threshold s0.10 Let
e ≡ 2
(
α− 1− s0
2
)
·
(
1− s0
2
)γ−1
− sγ0 · [(0.5 + η)γ + (0.5− η)γ] (2.44)
where we have replaced m1 and m2 with 0.5 + η and 0.5− η, respectively, to
analyze the impact of a more unequal distribution of the elderly population.
Diﬀerentiating (2.44) immediately yields ∂e
∂s0
< 0 (see the Proof to Proposi-
tion 2.7) and ∂e
∂η
< 0. Diﬀerentiating with respect to the crowding parameter
α and using the ﬁrst order condition leads to
∂e
∂α
=2 ·
(
1− s0
2
)γ−1
− b
1− b · s
γ
0 ·{
(0.5 + η)γ
[
ln
(
1− s0
2
)
− ln(s0)− ln(0.5 + η)
]
+
(0.5− η)γ
[
ln
(
1− s0
2
)
− ln(s0)− ln(0.5− η)
]}
.
(2.45)
Numeric evaluation of this expression shows that ∂e
∂α
> 0. Hence, we get the
following comparative statics results:
ds0
dη
= − ∂e/∂η
∂e/∂s0
< 0 (2.46)
and
ds0
dα
= − ∂e/∂α
∂e/∂s0
> 0. (2.47)
Again, the excessive provision of the publicly provided good for the young
is reached earlier, with a lower share of the elderly (s), when the population
is more unequally distributed across the municipalities (η) and when the
publicly provided good exhibits less crowding (lower α).
10 For the comparative statics, we assume a critical threshold of s0 >
1
2 .
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2.5 Alternative speciﬁcations and extensions
The approach chosen is admittedly simple to highlight the conﬂicting forces
of gerontocratic power and ﬁscal competition. In the following, we will brieﬂy
highlight alternative speciﬁcations of the model and discuss policy implica-
tions for the central government.
Tentative policy implications
One of the messages of our model is that ageing societies may face increasing
ﬁscal competition for the young and mobile population. The ﬁscal compe-
tition may be so strong that a gerontocratic society spends even more on
the young population than the social planner. A central government that is
aware of this mechanism may try to correct the detrimental eﬀects of ﬁscal
competition. Our model suggests that some centralization of competencies
or at least some coordination among municipalities may be beneﬁcial. When
ageing has proceeded so far that ﬁscal competition forces gerontocracies to
an excessive provision for the young, an upper level government could im-
prove the allocation of resources by limiting the expenses on some age-speciﬁc
public services. For instance, the government could provide incentives for the
municipalities to coordinate the provision of critical services (such as sports
facilities, child care or libraries). Such coordination is beneﬁcial, if the ser-
vices in neighboring municipalities can be used by commuting (which was
excluded from our formal model by assumption). Alternatively the govern-
ment can make the provision of public services for the young more expensive
by reducing matching grants or by limiting the access to subsidized credit
programs.
If the autonomy of municipalities prevents such coordination or if the
services cannot be accessed by commuting, are there alternative means for
an upper level government to alleviate the distortions in the public goods
provision? The government could try to attract younger families to areas
aﬀected by demographic shrinkage. For instance, it could provide ﬁnancial
incentives for younger people to locate in those areas.11 In terms of our
11 We do not claim that such a measure is optimal from a global macroeconomic perspec-
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model, this implies an exogenous increase in N . Does an increase in N bring
the expenditures for the young closer to the welfare optimum? To analyze
this question, we deﬁne the budget shares for the publicly provided good of
the young in the gerontocratic and welfare scenarios as BSG ≡ 2·Y Gi
b·(N+M1+M2)
and BSW ≡ 2·YW
b·(N+M1+M2) , respectively. For simplicity, we focus on the case
of completely symmetric municipalities (also with respect to the distribution
of the elderly, M1 = M2). If the share of the budget spent on the provision
for the young is larger in a gerontocracy than with welfare maximization i.e.
BSG > BSW , then the provision in a gerontocracy is excessive. If
BSG > BSW ⇔ 1
2α
· 1
1 +DR
>
1
1 +DRγ
(2.48)
or 1 − 2 · α − 2 · α · DR + DRγ > 0, where DR ≡ M
N
is the dependency
ratio, then the provision of the publicly provided goods for the young can be
brought closer to the welfare optimum by increasing N and thus decreasing
the dependency ratio.
Social planner
We focus on a social planner who governs over an aggregate budget in two
diﬀerent scenarios. Either all young individuals are concentrated in one mu-
nicipality (Section 2.4.1) or the social planner is bound by an equal provision
rule (Section 2.4.3). In principle, our model also allows analyzing alternative
welfare scenarios.
An additional conceivable welfare scenario considers one social planner
in each municipality. Here, the social planners compete for the young pop-
ulation to maximize the local welfare. This scenario allows the isolation of
the impact of gerontocracies as the decision makers diﬀer only in terms of
the objective function. However, the analysis is complicated by the critical
question of whether the social planner should include or exclude the migrant
population in her welfare considerations. Finally, the case of a central geron-
tocratic government is trivial because no services would be provided for the
young.
tive but solely discuss the measure with respect to the detrimental ﬁscal competition.
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Intergenerational links
Our framework incorporates three dimensions of ageing. Firstly, the model
takes into account that ageing causes municipalities to become gerontocra-
cies which changes the power relation. Secondly, we highlight that ageing
demands a restructuring of the public goods bundle. Thirdly, ageing also
inﬂuences the competition for the mobile young. As the young cohorts con-
tinuously become smaller there are fewer mobile individuals and consequently
the competition intensiﬁes. A fourth facet of ageing that is neglected in our
analysis concerns intertemporal linkages. Intertemporal aspects are impor-
tant for age-speciﬁc publicly provided goods. For instance, a gerontocratic
society may decide on infrastructure investments suitable for the current pop-
ulation size. This infrastructure, however, will be excessive for the smaller
future generations. The current generation thus puts a ﬁscal burden on future
generations and may make the public ﬁnances unsustainable. An analysis of
such investment decisions requires an intertemporal model, which is beyond
the scope of the static model presented here. Accounting explicitly for declin-
ing future generations in a ﬁscal competition framework could bring valuable
insights into the consequences of decisions made today. A closer examination
of these aspects would certainly be interesting for future work.12
2.6 Conclusion
We have developed a simple framework that allows us to analyze the ﬁscal
competition of ageing municipalities. The ageing of a society will lead to
shifts in the provision of public services. When ageing advances, it is optimal
from a welfare maximizing point of view to gradually substitute publicly
provided goods aimed at the young population with publicly provided goods
preferred by the elderly population. This substitution process does not only
depend on the ageing itself but also on the degree of crowding and on the
regional distribution of the elderly population.
12 The next chapter considers the intergenerational link of long lived publicly provided
goods in a setting where future generations are smaller. However, the inﬂuence of
ﬁscal competition is not considered.
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Once the elderly gain the majority in society, they try to use their power to
reduce the provision of the publicly provided good for the young to an ineﬃ-
ciently low level. As our analysis has shown, the downscaling of the provision
of the publicly provided good proceeds even slower in a gerontocracy than in
a welfare maximizing society. The driving force behind this phenomenon is
the ﬁscal competition for the mobile young among the municipalities. When
the share of the elderly is suﬃciently large, the utility of the young is higher
in gerontocracies than in welfare maximizing societies. Ultimately, the geron-
tocracies will provide even more of the publicly provided good for the young
than the social planner. Put diﬀerently: The threat of ageing towns is not
so much the exploitation of the young but rather the excessive incentives for
making municipalities attractive for the mobile young. The enormous invest-
ments in sports facilities and in family-friendly environments which currently
occur in the rapidly ageing rural areas in eastern Germany may already be
telling examples of this trend. According to a survey of municipalities in the
eastern German states of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, the preser-
vation and expansion of kindergarten and elementary school infrastructure
were stated as the most important aspects of local population policy. Some
local decision makers admit that the current supply is intentionally oversized
in order to be attractive to families (Sedlacek, 2007).
To our knowledge, this contribution is the ﬁrst attempt to analyze the
consequences of ﬁscal competition in ageing societies. Our approach is ad-
mittedly simple to highlight the main driving forces of this process. Many
open questions remain for future research. First, we have mostly focused on
the ageing process but demographic change also leads to a declining popula-
tion size. Second, altruistic motives may change the outcomes, if a signiﬁcant
proportion of the younger generation stays in the municipality of their par-
ents. The elderly may care for the well-being of their children. Such altruism
could prevent the downsizing of publicly provided goods for the young, if the
young generation remains in the same municipality with their parents. Inter-
generational links may also create barriers to mobility for the young, which
aﬀects ﬁscal competition and may even lead to path dependence in the popu-
lation distribution. Third, the complexity of municipal decision-making goes
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far beyond the simple provision of two types of publicly provided goods. Al-
ternative means of ﬁnancing through taxes may change the provision levels
of publicly provided goods. Fourth, municipalities do not only compete for
households but also for ﬁrms. Attracting new investments may create jobs
and generate a subsequent inﬂow of households. Finally, changes in the size
of publicly provided goods often entail considerable adjustment costs that
have to be taken into account.
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Appendix
Appendix 2.A Mixed strategy equilibrium
In the case of two gerontocracies, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium
for α ≥ 1/2. However, when α < 1/2, only a mixed strategy equilibrium
exists. In the following, we derive the equilibrium properties of the geronto-
cratic solution in detail.
The ﬁrst order condition for municipality i is (see Section 2.3):
FOCi ≡ b · N[(
Yj
Yi
) 1
α
+ 1
]2 · Y
1
α
j
α · Y
1
α
+1
i
− 1 = 0. (2.49)
In order to determine the reaction function, we diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to Yi and Yj.
∂FOC
∂Yi
=
bN
α2
Y
1
α
j
((
Yj
Yi
) 1
α
+ 1
)−3
Y
− 2
α
−2
i
[
(1− α)Y
1
α
j − (1 + α)Y
1
α
i
]
(2.50)
and
∂FOC
∂Yj
=
bN
α2
Y
− 1
α
−1
i
((
Yj
Yi
) 1
α
+ 1
)−3
Y
1
α
−1
j
(
−
(
Yj
Yi
) 1
α
+ 1
)
. (2.51)
Equation (2.50) gives the second-order condition. In equilibrium, we need
∂FOC
∂Yi
< 0⇔ Yi >
(
1− α
1 + α
)α
Yj (2.52)
for a local maximum. The slope of municipality i's reaction function is given
by
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Figure 2.3: The pure strategy equilibrium of provision for the young
dYi
dYj
= −∂FOC/∂Yj
∂FOC/∂Yi
=
Yi
Yj
Y
1
α
i − Y
1
α
j
(1 + α)Y
1
α
i − (1− α)Y
1
α
j
. (2.53)
The reaction function has a positive slope for Yi < Yj and a negative slope
for Yi > Yj (as long as the second-order condition is fulﬁlled). Figure 2.3
illustrates the equilibrium in pure strategies.
There is a unique symmetric equilibrium with Yi = Yj = bN4α . So far,
we have neglected the possibility that the municipalities are worse oﬀ when
competing for the young. If a municipality has to spend more on the young
than it receives via the per capita grant, it will be better oﬀ by withdrawing
from the ﬁscal competition. Hence, in equilibrium, the expenditures on the
young must not exceed the grants received for the young ( bN
4α
≤ bN
2
), which
is the case for α ≥ 1/2.
For α < 1/2, the participation constraints for the municipalities become
binding and, therefore, the reaction function exhibits a discontinuity (see Fig-
ure 2.4). For low provision levels in municipality j, municipality i competes
for the young by providing a positive amount of the publicly provided good.
However, when the provision in municipality j exceeds the threshold level Y˜j,
the participation constraint becomes binding for municipality i and it reacts
with zero provision for the young. We ﬁrst determine the threshold Y˜j and
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Figure 2.4: The mixed strategy equilibrium of provision for the young
then show that the provision of Y˜j in one municipality and a randomization
of provision in the other municipality is an equilibrium.
The threshold for municipality i is reached when it spends as much on
the publicly provided good as it receives in grants for the young: b ·Ni = Yi.
Substituting the equilibrium migration from (2.5) and solving for Yj yields
Yj =
(
bN
Yi
− 1
)α
· Yi. (2.54)
This expression determines all provisions of publicly provided goods
(Yi, Yj) where municipality i is indiﬀerent between providing Yi and nothing
for the young. In addition, the provision of Yi has to be a local optimum for
municipality i. Therefore, we substitute (2.54) into the ﬁrst-order condition
(2.49) and obtain Yi = (1−α) ·b ·N and Y˜j = αα ·(1−α)(1−α) ·b ·N . If munic-
ipality j plays Y˜j, municipality i is just indiﬀerent between Yi = (1−α) ·b ·N
and Yi = 0.
For an equilibrium, municipality i must choose the alternatives Yi =
(1 − α) · b · N with probability pH and Yi = 0 with probability 1 − pH
such that municipality j ﬁnds it optimal to play Y˜j. The expected utility of
municipality j amounts to
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E [Uj(Yj)] =p
H (b(Mj +Nj)− Yj) + (1− pH)(b(Mj +N)− Yj) =
bMj + p
H bN(
(1−α)bN
Yj
)1/α
+ 1
+ (1− pH)bN − Yj. (2.55)
We get the ﬁrst order condition for an optimal choice of Yj by diﬀerenti-
ating the expected utility:
∂E [Uj(Yj)]
∂Yj
= pH
bN[(
(1−α)bN
Yj
)1/α
+ 1
]2 [(1− α)bN ]1/α
αY
1/α+1
j
− 1 = 0. (2.56)
Substituting Yj = Y˜j and solving for pH yields
pH =
(
α
1− α
)α
< 1. (2.57)
It is easy to verify from the second order condition that Y˜j is indeed a max-
imum
[
∂2E[Uj(Yj)]
∂Y 2j
< 0
]
. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, municipality i
chooses Yi = (1 − α) · b · N with probability pH =
(
α
1−α
)α
and Yi = 0 with
probability 1− pH . Municipality j (j 6= i) plays Y˜j.
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Chapter 3
Intergenerational publicly
provided goods, costly upkeep
and population loss
3.1 Introduction
Many economic decisions made today have impacts that last beyond the
current generation. However unborn generations aﬀected by current choices
cannot vote or sign contracts to protect their interests; this presents a well
known political economic conundrum. Some examples of choices that have
long lasting impacts include: PAYGO pension schemes, environmental pro-
tection, debt and investments in long lived public goods. This chapter fo-
cuses on intergenerational public goods (IPGs), i.e. public goods that provide
beneﬁts both within the current generation as well as among the successive
generation(s). Examples of such public goods include most municipal infras-
tructure (i.e. roads and parks) (Sandler, 1999). What is the inﬂuence of a
shrinking population on the provision of locally provided intergenerational
public goods?
Local provision of IPG's is particularly aﬀected by changes in the demo-
graphic composition. When communities experience population growth new
and additional investments in infrastructure (IPG's) is necessary. In times
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when successive generations are suﬃciently large to use and ﬁnance the ac-
cumulated stock, this growth is sustainable. However, when the number of
users declines due to population loss, the ensuing generations may perceive
the existing stock as excessive. When population loss is locally conﬁned the
continued use of past investments can in part be achieved by consolidating
municipalities. However, when through demographic change and emigration
vast regions are depopulated, scaling back of existing infrastructure becomes
imminent. This may be diﬃcult to accomplish technically and such adjust-
ments may also be costly.
In many developed countries the ongoing demographic transition, will re-
sult in more widespread population loss in the next decades. Already today
many communities are experiencing population loss due to migration and
natural population change. In the future the share of communities experi-
encing population loss will become larger. Moreover, population loss is not
uniform across countries nor between regions within a country. In Table 3.1
the projected population change in Germany is shown for diﬀerent spatial
types for the time period 2008-2025. The developments in the diﬀerent re-
gion types are further diﬀerentiated for the eastern and western parts of the
country. While the population in the diﬀerent regions in the western parts
will remain relatively stable, the eastern regions will experience marked pop-
ulation loss across all types. The magnitudes in the rural and urbanized
areas are large. Of all German counties more than half (225 of 413) are pro-
jected to lose population by 2025, some of which will lose up to one quarter
of their populations in 2008.1 For public service provision to be adapted to
the changing population, farsighted public policies are necessary. However,
past decisions may prevent ﬂexible adjustment.
Local communities provide an array of services whose need is highly de-
pendent on the age composition and population characteristics of the commu-
nity (schools, child care facilities, recreation and culture). Thus changes in
the demographic composition of a community inﬂuences the local ﬁscal bur-
dens (Ladd, 1994; MaCurdy and Nechyba, 2001). Underprovision of publicly
1 See Table 3.1 and Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aﬀairs and
Spatial Development (BBSR) (2010).
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Table 3.1: Projected population change 2008-2025 in Germany diﬀerenti-
ated by type of region and areas in the east and the west (in %)
Region type west east
Agglomerationsa 0.8 -1.2
Urbanized areas/regional centersb -0.1 -15.2
Rural areasc 0.2 -16.4
a Population density of 300 persons/km2 and a total population of more than 300.000.
b Either a population density of 150 persons/km2 or a population of over 100.000 with
a density of 100 persons/km2.
c Population density below 100 persons/km2 if in a region with a center with more than
100.000 inhabitants, otherwise areas with population density below 150 persons/km2.
Source: Federal Statistical Oﬃce and the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban
Aﬀairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) INKAR (2009)
provided goods arise at the local level when positive spillovers are present
(McKinnon and Nechyba, 1997). Such intragenerational spillovers imply that
non-residents from neighboring jurisdictions also beneﬁt from the publicly
provided good in another jurisdiction without contributing to its ﬁnancing.
Moreover intergenerational publicly provided goods may also yield positive
spillovers since beneﬁts may incur to ensuing generations. In the presence of
intergenerational beneﬁt spillovers, the contribution of an investment made
today is underestimated when its longevity and beneﬁt to successive gener-
ations if not accounted for. In both cases the publicly provided good will be
under provided. Such provision decisions have been studied in a setting of
intergenerational clubs, where atemporal and intertemporal decision-making
are distinguished (Cornes and Sandler, 1996; Sandler, 1999). Decentraliza-
tion will lead to more eﬃcient outcomes than centralized provision (Hatﬁeld,
2007) and diﬀerent tax bases also inﬂuence the ineﬃciency of investment in
provision of IPG's (Rangel, 2005; Hatﬁeld, 2007).
This chapter describes the underlying assumptions and the outcomes of
a simple model with two generations. In each period only one generation
is alive. The single period utility depends on the consumption of a private
numeraire good as well as the publicly provided intergenerational good. The
period speciﬁc consumption of the publicly provided good is inﬂuenced by
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crowding (atemporal) and depreciation (intertemporal). Furthermore, the
investments made previously cannot be converted into cash (irreversibility).
The provision levels of a publicly provided intergenerational good are de-
termined for the cases of laissez-faire and welfare maximization. In laissez-
faire, the assumed intergenerational link is simply an intergenerational pub-
licly provided good. In the welfare maximizing case, the social planner al-
locates the aggregated budgets of the two generations. I additionally dis-
tinguish between the baseline case and the case of costly maintenance. In
the baseline case the beneﬁt the second generation derives from the inher-
ited stock is free of charge. Conversely in the case of costly maintenance,
maintenance costs accrue on the inherited investment. Under the respective
assumptions the allocation choices diﬀer.
In the baseline case with generational laissez-faire, when the ﬁrst gen-
eration becomes larger, the utility of this generation will increase due to
economies of scale in the public goods provision. When the second genera-
tion grows this is not necessarily the case. Instead for the second generation
there is a critical level of population loss beyond which no publicly provided
goods are provided. If the second generation does not invest in publicly pro-
vided goods, then the utility of the second generation declines in response
to a size increase. Moreover, if public provision does take place, an increase
in the size of the second generation may still lower the utility of this genera-
tion since the disadvantage of sharing among more users may dominate the
beneﬁt of allocating more resources.
In comparison to the provision with a social planner, the ﬁrst generation
under-invests in public provision in laissez-faire. Furthermore, the public pro-
vision and consumption levels by the second generation in the social planner's
case are either less than or equal to the corresponding levels in laissez-faire.
In the event that the second generation does not unconditionally beneﬁt from
the investments made in the past, the allocation choices change. If costs of
maintenance accrue on the inherited investment, then the eﬀect of increasing
provision in the ﬁrst period is no longer unambiguously positive. In contrast
to the baseline case, the provision in the ﬁrst period may be lower in wel-
fare maximization than laissez-faire, if the costs of maintaining the inherited
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stock is relatively high. If population loss is severe and the inherited stock
as well as the cost of maintenance is large, then default (in the sense of no
private consumption) may occur in laissez-faire.
This chapter is structured as follows: the second section presents the
model setup. The third section derives the solutions for the baseline case
in the laissez-faire setting and additionally considers the eﬀect of increasing
wealth. In the fourth section the intergenerational welfare maximization is
derived and the welfare maximizing results are compared to the laissez-faire
outcomes. Similarly in sections ﬁve and six the inﬂuence of costly mainte-
nance is considered in the cases of laissez-faire and welfare maximization.
Additionally the results are compared to the baseline case. The ﬁnal section
concludes.
3.2 The model
The model descirbes the provision of publicly provided goods at the local level
over a timespan of two generations.2 The two generations do not overlap,
instead an intergenerational trade-oﬀ is generated over the intergenerational
characteristic of the publicly provided good. When the investment made by
one generation is long lasting and subsequently inherited (at least partially),
then the remaining stock of publicly provided good from this generation
inﬂuences the choice of consumption and investments made by the ensuing
cohort.
3.2.1 Preferences of the two generations
The preferences of the representative individual are described by a utility
function over the consumption of a private good ci and a function of a publicly
provided good f(Gi) where i = 1, 2. For the ﬁrst generation the utility is
2 The term generation is used for a period of many years that is relatively long in
comparison to election periods. A familial generation, or the mean interval between
successive generations (the mean age of mothers in a given year), is approximately
30 years (van de Walle, 1982).
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given by:
U1(c1, f(G1)) where f(G1) =
(
G1
Nα1
)
. (3.1)
The function f describes the congestion by usage common to locally provided
public goods. N1 is the size of the ﬁrst generation and the parameter α ∈ [0, 1]
determines the degree of congestion. At the extremes, when α = 0 or α = 1,
the characteristic of the publicly provided good is respectively either purely
public or private. The empirically relevant intermediate levels of crowding
of locally provided goods lie within the range 0 < α < 1 (Borcherding and
Deacon, 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Edwards, 1990).
The utility function of the second generation is given by:
U2(c2, g(G1, G2)) where g(G1, G2) =
(
δG1 +G2
Nα2
)
, (3.2)
where the function g not only captures the congestion of the use of the pub-
licly provided good, but also includes the intergenerational spillover to the
second generation from the investments made by the previous generation.
The congestion from usage by the number of members of the second gener-
ation is analogous to that of the ﬁrst generation, and is given by Nα2 . The
depreciation of the publicly provided good is δ ∈ [0, 1].3 When δ = 0 the
publicly provided good is not intergenerational, in the sense that none of the
investment made by the ﬁrst generation will be available to the members
of the second generation. When δ = 1 all of what was invested in the ﬁrst
period will also be available to the second generation. In general, a higher
δ implies more of the beneﬁt is carried over. As will be shown below, very
low rates of depreciation may become "problematic" when a municipality
is experiencing population loss. I assume that it is always possible for the
second generation to make additional investments in the publicly provided
good (G2 ≥ 0), but I do not allow G2 < 0.
3 For the treatment of intergenerational spillovers a similar speciﬁcation is used by
Hatﬁeld (2007). However, his analysis is restricted to additively separable utility
functions.
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3.2.2 Budget constraints
The budget constraint for a member of each generation (i = 1, 2) is deﬁned
by an exogenously given level of wealth wi which is equated to the expendi-
tures on consumption and a head tax ti. This tax reﬂects the individual's
contribution to the production of the publicly provided good, and the price
of the private good is normalized to unity,
wi = ci + ti. (3.3)
The tax has to be ti =
θiGi
Ni
, for the government budget to equate to
tiNi = θiGi. The production of the publicly provided good is linear, such
that θ units of private good produces one unit of the publicly provided good
(since there may be technological progress, the θ's of the two periods do not
need to be equal). The total aggregate budget of generation i is given by:
Niwi = Nici + θiGi. (3.4)
For ease of exposition the subscripts are dropped whenever a parameter or
variable is assumed to remain constant between generations. Furthermore,
no discounting is assumed.
The above setup describes a very simple framework to study intergenera-
tional interdependence of two generations. To analyze the eﬀects of a change
in the population on the provision of the publicly provided good, the size of
the second generation N2 is assumed to be diﬀerent from that of the ﬁrst
generation (N1 6= N2). This general model framework not only allows the
analysis of population loss, but results are also derived for diﬀerent assump-
tions of economic growth (in terms of an increase in the exogenous wealth)
and in Section 3.5 the possibility of costly upkeep is considered. The results
from the case of two generations acting under laissez-faire assumptions is
contrasted with those achieved under a benevolent (foresighted) social plan-
ner.
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3.3 Laissez-faire generations: the baseline case
To reach explicit solutions for the consumption and provision levels of the
publicly provided good a speciﬁc functional form is chosen for the utility
functions. Here Cobb-Douglas utility functions are assumed. In order to solve
for the laissez-faire solution, the utility of each generation will be maximized
independently. First the solutions to the ﬁrst generation problem are derived.
Subsequently the allocations of the second generation, which are dependent
on the provision chosen by the ﬁrst generation, are solved for.
First period utility The utility function of the representative member of
the ﬁrst period deﬁnes the choice between private consumption (c1) and the
publicly provided good G1:
max
c1,G1
U1 = c
β
1
(
G1
Nα1
)1−β
s.t. w = c1 +
θ1G1
N1
. (3.5)
The crowding parameter is α ∈ [0, 1]. As described in Section 3.2, this means
that the amount of publicly provided good enjoyed by the representative
member depends on the level of crowding. β ∈ (0, 1) to ensure diminishing
marginal utility. The preference between public and private consumption
is given by the parameter β. In period 1 the resulting allocations are the
following:
GL1 =
(1− β)wN1
θ
, (3.6)
cL1 = βw, (3.7)
where the superscript L identiﬁes the allocations in the case of laissez-faire.
The provision of the publicly provided good GL1 depends positively on the
wealth, w, and the ﬁrst period population N1. Private consumption is obvi-
ously independent of the size of the population.
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Second period utility The preferences of the second generation are simi-
lar. However, the depreciated stock of the publicly provided good chosen by
the ﬁrst generation additionally enters the utility function. This signiﬁes an
impure intergenerational spillover. The utility function of the representative
member of the second period thus deﬁnes the choice between private con-
sumption (c2) and the publicly provided good (as the sum of δG1 and G2).
Speciﬁcally the utility maximization problem of the second generation is:
max
c2,G2
U2 = c
β
2
(
δG1 +G2
Nα2
)1−β
(3.8)
s.t. w = c2 +
θ2G2
N2
.
The eﬀective level of publicly provided good depends on the amount of de-
preciated public provision from the ﬁrst generation δG1 (where δ ∈ [0, 1],
and 1 − δ is the rate of depreciation and G1 stands for the provision level)
and the current provision G2.
In other words, from the view of the second generation, only the total
stock of publicly provided goods are relevant. Thus δG1 and G2 are perfect
substitutes. Using the budget constraint yields the following provision level
of G2 in period two in terms of G1:
G2(G1) = max
{
(1− β)wN2
θ
− βδG1; 0
}
. (3.9)
The above expression includes the intergenerational spillover: δG1. The level
of G2 is declining in G1 and is rising in the wealth w and the size of the second
generation population N2. There is incomplete crowding out: when more of
G1 is inherited, the level of investment in G2 will be lower.4 In order to ﬁnd
the consumption and provision levels in the second period in terms of the
population variables, the level of G1 from the ﬁrst period problem (equation
(3.6)) is used. The provision level of GL2 is written in the below form since it
may be optimal from the view of the second generation not to provide any
publicly provided goods at all. Or conversely the existing stock of publicly
4 Speciﬁcally, a one unit decrease in G1 leads to a less than one unit increase in G2.
0 < |dG2dG1 | < 1 since 0 < |−βδ| < 1.
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Figure 3.1: Provision levels of the intergenerational publicly provided goods
G1 and G2 in the baseline case, plotted against the population relation N2N1
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provided goods will beneﬁt the successive generation but may be insuﬃcient
and require additional new investments.5
GL2 =
{
0 if N2
N1
≤ βδ,
(1− β)w
θ
(N2 − βδN1) if N2N1 > βδ.
(3.10)
Proposition 3.1. If the population shrinks moderately or grows such that
N2
N1
> βδ, then the level of GL2 will be greater than zero. If the population
shrinks such that N2
N1
≤ βδ then GL2 = 0.
Proof. Follows from equation (3.10) and is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
5 Some authors have also considered the cost of population growth to local communities.
Ladd (1994) examines the relationship between population growth and per capita
spending. She argues that in theory population growth could either cause an increase
in spending and service quality, or an eﬀective decrease in spending. For instance,
population growth that increases population density, may on the one hand make
infrastructure more eﬀective and hence reduce per capita spending. On the other
hand, increased population density may create a "harsher environment" (in terms of
public safety and ﬁre protection) in which case service provision is more costly. Hence
the eﬀect of population growth on per capita spending is a priori unclear.
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In Figure 3.1, GL1 is independent of N2 and only for
N2
N1
> βδ is the pro-
vision GL2 > 0. If G
L
2 = 0 the existing stock of G
L
1 is more than necessary to
maximize the utility of the second generation given the budget constraint.
In this case, private consumption could be further expanded if the existing
stock could be converted into cash. Whether it is possible to scale back the
existing stock at no cost depends on the publicly provided good. For in-
stance, in the case of school buildings the municipality may be able to sell
the building to a private investor and convert the proﬁts into lower taxes.
However, not all investments are as easily convertible as a building, for ex-
ample a four lane street is not easily transformed into a two lane street when
demand is halved. If it is not possible to scale back existing stock, the second
generation would not fully beneﬁt from the choices made by the members of
the ﬁrst generation.
The above public provision levels are subsequently used to solve for the
levels of private consumption. Private consumption levels depend on the size
of the second generation. If the depreciated stock of GL1 is suﬃciently high
and the population loss is severe then no GL2 may be provided, in which case,
all wealth will be allocated toward private consumption. The expressions for
private consumption are:
cL2 =
{
w if N2
N1
≤ βδ,
βw
N2
(N2 + δ(1− β)N1) if N2N1 > βδ.
(3.11)
Consequently, using the derived public provision and private consumption
levels I ﬁnd the generation speciﬁc utility functions (U1 and U2) in terms of
the population variables:
UL1 =
(
1− β
θ
)1−β
ββN
1+β(α−1)−α
1 w (3.12)
and
UL2 =

(
(1−β)δN1
θ
)1−β
N
α(β−1)
2 w if N2 ≤ βδN1,(
1−β
θ
)1−β
ββN
β(α−1)−α
2 w [N2 +N1δ(1− β)] if N2 > βδN1.
(3.13)
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The eﬀect of a change in the size of the population of the ﬁrst genera-
tion N1 on the utility levels of the ﬁrst and second generations are positive:
∂UL1
∂N1
> 0 and ∂U
L
2
∂N1
> 0. If the size of the population in the ﬁrst generation
increases, then the amount of publicly provided good will increase. Since
α < 1 this will have a positive eﬀect on the utility of both generations.
When the size of the second generation changes the eﬀect on the utility of
the second generation depends on whether any public provision takes place
in the ﬁrst place (GL2 ≥ 0). If N2 ≤ βδN1 and thus GL2 = 0, then ∂U2∂N2 < 0.
An increase in the size of the second generation population implies that
the inherited publicly provided good is shared among more users, and hence
causes a decline in the utility. However, if N2 > βδN1 the eﬀect of a change in
the size of the second generation on the utility of the second generation is U-
shaped. The beneﬁt of more resources may not be realized, if the additional
users crowd the beneﬁts of the public goods provision.
Lemma 3.1. If N2 > βδN1, the second generation utility function is convex
with respect to changes in the size of this generation.
The utility of the second generation ﬁrst decreases and then increases when
the size of this generation increases (given GL2 > 0). The shape of the utility
function with respect to the size of the second generation is illustrated in
Figure 3.2.
The form of the function results from the dependence of the second period
utility on the provision in the ﬁrst period and the relative size of the two
generations as well as the characteristics of the publicly provided good. The
ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) of UL2 with respect to N2 is:
∂UL2
∂N2
=
(
1− β
θ
)1−β
ββwN−γ2
[
1− γ
(
1 +
N1
N2
δ(1− β)
)]
R 0 for N2 > βδN1
(3.14)
where γ ≡ β(1 − α) + α. At N2 = N1βδ the second generation utility is
declining in N2, ∂U2∂N2 < 0. Furthermore, equation (3.14) is at an extremum
when the expression in brackets is zero, i.e. if
[
1− γ
(
1 + N1
N2
δ(1− β)
)]
= 0.
Solving gives: N2 =
γδ(1−β)
1−γ N1. I verify that this point is a minimum by
diﬀerentiating the above ﬁrst order-condition (in equation (3.14)) to give the
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Figure 3.2: The second generation utility function is U-shaped with respect
to the size of the second generation (N2)
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second-order condition: ∂FOC
∂N2
> 0. Thus for a second generation population
βδN1 < N2 <
γδ(1−β)
1−γ N1 the utility of the second generation will decline
for an increase in the size of the population. In other words, in this range
the disadvantage of sharing dominates the beneﬁt of more resources. When
N2 >
γδ(1−β)
1−γ N1, a marginal increase in the size of the second generation will
cause the utility of this generation to increase.
The critical size of the second generation depends on the counteract-
ing eﬀects of crowding and depreciation. In particular if crowding increases
(α → 1), if depreciation increases (δ → 0) and if the population shrinks
(N2 ↓); then the minimum will move to the right. The utility of the second
generation will decline for a larger second generation population. Therefore,
in contrast to the ﬁrst generation utility, the utility of the second generation
may decline when the number of users rises.
The above section describes the baseline model of generational laissez-
faire. The only intergenerational link is the (depreciated) intergenerational
public good. However, other linkages, which may attenuate or strengthen
the eﬀects of population loss, are also conceivable. One such alternative
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speciﬁcation, namely increasing wealth, is considered in the following section.
Section 3.5 is devoted to a thorough discussion of the eﬀect of introducing
a cost on the usage of the inherited stock on the second generation. These
results are subsequently contrasted with the above baseline case outcomes.
Excursion: The eﬀect of increasing wealth
So far I assumed that the endowment per person is equal between the two
periods. Given economic growth, this need not necessarily be the case. More
wealthy members of a community may demand more (street-lights for pre-
viously unlit streets) or better services (for example in schools or kinder-
gartens). To study any potential wealth eﬀects I assume in the following
section that w2 > w1, implying that the second generation is wealthier. How
does increasing wealth inﬂuence the provision of the publicly provided good?
Using the altered budget constraints, the allocations are as follows:
Gw1 =
(1− β)w1N1
θ
cw1 = βw1
and
Gw2 =
{
0 if N2
N1
≤ βδw1
w2
,
(1−β)
θ
(w2N2 − βδw1N1) if N2N1 > βδw1w2 .
cw2 =
{
β
(
w2 + δ(1− β)w1N1N2
)
if N2
N1
≤ βδw1
w2
,
w2 if N2N1 > βδ
w1
w2
,
when w1 and w2 are appropriately substituted in for w in the expressions
(3.6), (3.7), (3.10) and (3.11). The superscript w distinguishes these expres-
sions from the previous section. The demands for the private as well as the
publicly provided goods are increasing in wealth. The interpretation of the
expressions for the ﬁrst generation remain unchanged. However, in the ex-
pressions of the second generation, the eﬀect of wealth is now visible. Gw2 > 0
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if w2N2 > βδw1N1, even if there is population loss, such that N2 < N1, the
assumed increase in wealth will oﬀset some of the eﬀect. Since rising income
implies an increased demand for the publicly provided good, a faster rate of
population loss is thus required to reach the critical level of population loss
beyond which no resources will be invested in Gw2 .
3.4 Welfare maximization with an
intertemporal budget: the baseline case
The previous sections show that due to the simple intergenerational spillover
of publicly provided goods, the provision choices of the subsequent generation
are altered. Furthermore the second generation can beneﬁt from an inherited
stock since no costs are associated with its usage. In the following section,
the welfare maximizing outcomes are computed, and subsequently these are
contrasted with the results obtained in the baseline laissez-faire case.
Suppose now that a foresighted benevolent social planner allocates the
current and next generation resources toward the provision for both genera-
tions. Thus the total budget of the two generations is available in the ﬁrst
period and the ﬁrst generation utility is maximized under the condition that
the second generation utility attains some level of utility U¯2. Analogously to
the laissez-faire case, I assume no discounting. The individual generational
utility functions remain the same but the aggregate intertemporal budget
constraint now reads:
(N1 +N2)w = c1N1 + c2N2 + θ(G1 +G2). (3.15)
The welfare of the ﬁrst generation is maximized subject to the above bud-
get constraint and the aforementioned constraint on the second generation
utility:
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max
c1,c2,G1,G2
W SP = cβ1
(
G1
Nα1
)1−β
(3.16)
s.t. w(N1 +N2) = c1N1 + c2N2 + θ(G1 +G2)
U¯2 = c
β
2
(
δG1 +G2
Nα2
)1−β
.
There are inﬁnitely many conceivable U¯2's. However, to compare the out-
comes of the baseline laissez-faire case to those under welfare maximization,
I equate the exogenous level of reservation utility (U¯2) to the level achieved
from utility maximization in laissez-faire (UL2 in expression (3.13)). In other
words, to facilitate a welfare analysis I focus in the following on the speciﬁc
case where U¯2 = UL2 . Put diﬀerently: I ask whether U1 can be increased
while keeping U2 constant. The results for a generic U¯2 can be found in the
appendix in Section 3.A.1.
3.4.1 Provision levels of the publicly provided goods
Solving the above maximization problem and using UL2 gives the following
expression for the provision toward the ﬁrst generation under welfare maxi-
mization (where SP stands for the case of the social planner):
GSP1 =
{ (
1−β
θ
)
w(N1 +N2) if N2N1 ≤
βδ
1−δ ,(
1−β
θ
)
wN1
[
1 + δβ
1−δ
]
if N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ .
(3.17)
The ranges for the two cases are slightly diﬀerent than in the baseline laissez-
faire case. When N2
N1
≤ βδ
1−δ the provision of G
SP
1 now depends on the pop-
ulation in both generations, and is rising in the size of both (∂G
SP
1
∂N1
> 0,
∂GSP1
∂N2
> 0). When N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ , G
SP
1 is independent of N2. These results are
illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Analogously the expressions for GSP2 are:
GSP2 =
{
0 if N2
N1
≤ βδ
1−δ ,(
1−β
θ
)
w
[
N2 −N1 βδ1−δ
]
if N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ .
(3.18)
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the second generation provision levels in laissez-
faire GL1 and welfare maximization G
SP
1 , plotted against the population re-
lation N2
N1
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L  
N2
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As in the laissez-faire case, for N2
N1
≤ βδ
1−δ the provision of G
SP
2 is zero. More-
over, from the second line of the above expression it is clear that GSP2 > 0
only for N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ . Since 1−δ < 1, positive provision of GSP2 will be attained
for a larger population relation than for GL2 . This is illustrated in Figure 3.4
and the result is summarized in:
Proposition 3.2. When the second generation utility in the case of laissez-
faire and a social planner are equalized:
a) Public provision for the ﬁrst generation in the social planner's case is
higher than the provision in laissez-faire (GSP1 > G
L
1 ).
b) Public provision for the second generation in the social planner's case is
less than than or equal to the provision in laissez-faire (GSP2 ≤ GL2 ).
Proof: a) GSP1 > G
L
1 since when
N2
N1
≤ βδ
1−δ the comparison of functions (3.6)
and (3.17) gives: N1 +N2 > N1. Furthermore, whenN2N1 >
βδ
1−δ the comparison
of welfare maximization to laissez-faire is: βδ
1−δ > 0. See also Figure 3.3.
b) See above paragraph and Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of the second generation provision levels in laissez-
faire GL2 and welfare maximization G
SP
2 , plotted against the population re-
lation N2
N1
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Since in welfare maximization the critical population size beyond which
GSP2 will be zero is:
N2
N1
= βδ
1−δ this level is higher than in the case of laissez-
faire (where N2
N1
= βδ). In the case of laissez-faire, provision of GL2 will
be positive for shrinking populations (N2
N1
< 1). However, in the case of
the social planner, if βδ
1−δ > 1 then positive provision of G
SP
2 will require
population growth (N2
N1
> 1).6 In order for the utility maximizing level to
be achieved by the second generation under welfare maximization, the social
planner will invest more in G1 and less in G2 than would be the case under
laissez-faire. Thus from a welfare maximizing point of view too much GL2 is
provided under laissez-faire whereas GL1 is under-provided.
What is the aggregate public provision level G = δG1 +G2 in the laissez-
faire and welfare maximizing cases? If N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ then the aggregate provisions
6 The population relation N2N1 =
βδ
1−δ determines the point at which provision for the
second generation will be positive under the social planner. This point is equal to
one when β = δ = .618. If β or δ < .618 then N2N1 < 1. If β or δ > .618 then
N2
N1
> 1.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of the aggregate provision of intergenerational
publicly provided goods G = δG1+G2 in laissez-faire and the social planner's
case
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will be equal. If however, N2
N1
< βδ
1−δ then G
SP > GL. The aggregate public
goods levels are illustrated in Figure 3.5. Thus the total provision will be
higher under the social planner than under laissez-faire to the point when
provision for both generations is positive also in the welfare maximizing case.7
3.4.2 Private consumption
The private consumption achieved by the ﬁrst generation in welfare maxi-
mization when the second generation utilities are equalized (U¯2 = UL2 ) are
also inﬂuenced by the population relations. The relevant population ranges
are determined by the public goods provision for the second generation and
the utility levels that result. Since, as shown above, the threshold popula-
tions for positive provision are not the same in laissez-faire and the social
7 For the ﬁrst generation the diﬀerence in provision is given by GSP1 > G
L
1 ⇔
1−δ(1−β)
1−δ > 1. The diﬀerence in the provision of the second generation is given
by GSP2 < G
L
2 ⇔ − 11−δ < −1.
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planner's case, three ranges arise for private consumption.8 Consumption of
the ﬁrst generation is given by:
cSP1 =

w
(
1 + N2
N1
)[
β − N2
N1
(
N1
N1+N2
) 1
β
]
if N2
N1
≤ βδ,
βw
(
1 + N2
N1
)[
1− δ
(
N2+N1δ(1−β)
δ(N1+N2)
) 1
β
]
if βδ < N2
N1
≤ βδ
1−δ
βw (1− δ(1− β)) if N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ .
(3.19)
These levels are in turn compared to the consumption in laissez-faire where
cL1 = βw (see equation: (3.7)). Whether c
SP
1 R cL1 depends on the relevant
population range. The function cSP1 is non-linear in the population relation
within this range. In Figure 3.6 the diﬀerent levels of private consumption of
generation one in laissez-faire and welfare maximization are drawn. When the
population of generation two approaches zero, the private consumption of the
ﬁrst generation in laissez-faire and in the social planner's case are identical.
When N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ the consumption by the ﬁrst generation is constant with
respect to the population relation but remains lower in welfare maximization
than in laissez-faire (cSP1 < c
L
1 ⇒ 1− δ(1− β) < 1).
Similarly the comparison with respect to the second generation consump-
tion levels is given by expression (3.11) and:
cSP2 =

w
(
N1
N1+N2
) 1−β
β
if N2
N1
≤ βδ,
βδw
(
1 + N1
N2
) [
N2+N1δ(1−β)
δ(N1+N2)
] 1
β
if βδ < N2
N1
≤ βδ
1−δ ,
βw
N2
[N2 + δ(1− β)N1] if N2N1 >
βδ
1−δ .
(3.20)
When N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ the private consumption by the second generation will be
equal in laissez-faire and welfare maximization (cL2 = c
SP
2 ). However, when
8 First, in the range N2N1 ≤ βδ the utility comparison is for the cases when public provi-
sion for the second generation is zero in both laissez-faire and welfare maximization.
Second, in the range βδ < N2N1 ≤
βδ
1−δ public provision for the second generation is
positive in laissez-faire but zero in welfare maximization (U¯2 is now equated to the
lower line of UL2 ). Third, public provision for the second generation is positive in
both laissez-faire and welfare maximization which is again reﬂected in the equated
utilities.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison private consumption levels cL1 and c
SP
1 in laissez-
faire and the social planner's case when U¯2 = UL2
N2
N1
  
wβ
c1
L
c1
SP 
c1
βδ βδ
1‐δ
wβ(1‐δ(1‐β)) 
N2
N1
≤ βδ the private consumption under laissez-faire is equal to the whole
wealth since none is spent on public provision. In this case the consumption
under the social planner will be lower cSP2 < c
L
2 .
3.4.3 First generation utility
The second generation utility in laissez-faire and the social planner's case are
by deﬁnition set equal, however the utility achieved by the ﬁrst generation
will be diﬀerent. In the laissez-faire case the utility levels will be lower than
with a social planner. In the social planner's case the endowment of the
second generation can be allocated already by the ﬁrst generation, thus a
resource transfer from the second generation to the ﬁrst can take place. In
laissez-faire this is not the case.
In the welfare maximizing case the utility achieved by the ﬁrst generation
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is described by:
USP1 =

N−γ1 w(N1 +N2)
(
1−β
θ
)1−β [
β − N2N1
(
N1
N1+N2
) 1
β
]β
if N2N1 ≤ βδ,
N−γ1 w(N1 +N2)
(
1−β
θ
)1−β [
β − βδ
(
N2+N1δ(1−β)
δ(N1+N2)
) 1
β
]β
if βδ < N2N1 ≤
βδ
1−δ ,
N1−γ1 (1− δ)β−1
(
1−β
θ
)1−β
ββw [1− δ(1− β)] if N2N1 >
βδ
1−δ .
(3.21)
The relationship between UL1 and U
SP
1 depends on the three ranges of the
population relations (whether N2
N1
< βδ, βδ < N2
N1
≤ βδ
1−δ or
N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ ).
Lemma 3.2. The utility of the ﬁrst generation is always higher in the social
planner's case than in laissez-faire.
a) When (in laissez-faire and with the social planner) no additional publicly
provided goods are provided for the second generation the welfare loss de-
creases with the population.
b) When provision for the second generation does take place, the welfare dif-
ferential between laissez-faire and the social planner is constant with respect
to the population.
Comparing the above expressions to the utility achieved under laissez-faire
from Section 3.3 equation (3.12) for the case when N2
N1
≤ βδ gives:
USP1 > U
L
1 ⇔ 1 +
N2
N1
> β
(
1 +
N2
N1
) 1
β
.
Hence the utility diﬀerential depends on the relative size of the second gen-
eration. When there is no public provision for the second generation, the
smaller N2 is in relation to N1 the larger the utility diﬀerential in favor of
welfare maximization will be. For permissible parameter values, the util-
ity achieved under laissez-faire will always be lower than under the social
planner.
When βδ < N2
N1
≤ βδ
1−δ the utility of the ﬁrst generation with the social
planner is compared to that in laissez-faire according to:
USP1 > U
L
1 ⇔
[
N1 +N2
N1
] 1
β
>
[
1 + δ
(
N2
N1δ
+ 1− β
) 1
β
]
.
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Also for this comparison, in the range of relevant parameters the USP1 > U
L
1 .
In turn when N2
N1
> βδ
1−δ the utility comparison is the following:
USP1 > U
L
1 ⇔ 1− δ(1− β) > (1− δ)1−β.
Clearly in this case the diﬀerential does not depend on any population vari-
ables.
3.5 Costly maintenance: laissez-faire
Since in the baseline case the depreciated stock of publicly provided goods
is usable free of charge, the second generation beneﬁts. The incomplete
depreciation induces a positive externality. However, most infrastructure
cannot continue to be used for generations without maintaining the existing
stock, which will incur additional costs. For example, highways or sewage
systems may become unusable if investment is not continued (due to potholes
or leakages). In the following section I introduce a such a trade-oﬀ i.e. costly
maintenance and discuss the implications of this additional cost with respect
to the no-cost alternative.
Assume that in order to beneﬁt from the level of provision from the
previous generation, the second generation has to pay a share in upkeep
for the inherited stock of publicly provided goods. Whereas the problem
of the ﬁrst generation remains unchanged, for the second generation the
cost of upkeep q ∈ (0, 1] is an exogenous charge paid on the depreciated
provision from the ﬁrst period. Thus the maintenance charge is a percentage
of the stock of the publicly provided good from the previous period and
can be considered a running cost on the investment. This charge entails an
additional cost in the budget constraint of the second generation:
N2w = N2c2 + θ(qδG1 +G2). (3.22)
A higher q reduces the beneﬁt derived from the inheritance. When q = 0 the
problem reverts back to the baseline case. The utility function of the second
generation remains as in equation (3.8).
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Since the maintenance cost only aﬀects the second generation the alloca-
tions for the ﬁrst generation remain the same as in the baseline laissez-faire
case in Section 3.3 equations (3.6) and (3.7). The second generation public
provision is now given by the following expression:
GL,q2 =
{
0 if N2
N1
≤ δ (β + q(1− β)) ,
(1−β)w
θ
[N2 − δN1 (β + q(1− β))] if N2N1 > δ (β + q(1− β)) .
(3.23)
The critical level of population loss beyond which GL,q2 = 0 is now deﬁned
by: N2
N1
≤ δ [β + q(1− β)]. The critical level depends on β and q, and is lower
than when no maintenance costs are accounted for (βδ < δ(β + q(1 − β)).
Still for this level N2
N1
< 1, such that positive provision takes place even when
there is some population loss.
Depending on whether the second generation invests in GL,q2 or relies en-
tirely on the upkeep of the GL1 also inﬂuences the private consumption deci-
sion. The private consumption levels are thus also aﬀected by the additional
cost:
cL,q2 =
{
w(1− N1N2 qδ(1− β)) if δq(1− β) < N2N1 ≤ δ (β + q(1− β)) ,
βw
N2
(N2 + δ(1− β)N1(1− q)) if N2N1 > δ (β + q(1− β)) .
(3.24)
In order for the utility of the second generation to be positive, private con-
sumption must take place. When N2
N1
> δ (β + q(1− β)) also cL,q2 > 0 will
hold. However, when N2
N1
≤ δ (β + q(1− β)) there is a lower limit for cL,q2 > 0.
Only if N2
N1
> δq(1 − β) can also this condition be fulﬁlled. If this condition
were violated, then the second period consumption would have to be less
than zero to meet the cost of upkeep, this however, is infeasible. If popula-
tion loss is severe and the costs of maintaining infrastructure are high, then
"bankruptcy" may arise.
Moreover, the inﬂuence of the cost of upkeep on private consumption
also depends on whether GL,q2 ≥ 0. The diﬀerence is most conveniently
demonstrated using the comparative static eﬀects of changes in N1 and N2
on cL,q2 . If δq(1 − β) < N2N1 ≤ δ (β + q(1− β)) the eﬀects are
∂cL,q2
∂N1
< 0 and
∂cL,q2
∂N2
> 0. Regardless of the size of the share of upkeep costs, an increase in
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N1 will increase G1 and hence the costs of upkeep, which in turn implies a
reduction in private consumption of the second generation. If N2 increases
then cL,q2 will increase. More users contribute to the upkeep of the inherited
stock of publicly provided goods such that more private consumption by each
can take place. However, if N2
N1
> δ (β + q(1− β)) such that GL,q2 > 0, the
consumption choice is analogous to the baseline case, and the partial eﬀects
are ∂c
L,q
2
∂N1
< 0 and ∂c
L,q
2
∂N2
> 0.
Using the above expressions for GL,q2 and c
L,q
2 the utility achieved by the
second generation is:
UL,q2 =

N−γ2 w
(
(1−β)δN1
θ
)1−β
[N2 −N1qδ(1− β)]β if δq(1− β) < N2N1
< δ (q + β(1− q)) ,
N−γ2 wβ
β
(
1−β
θ
)1−β
[N2 +N1δ(1− β)(1− q)] if N2N1 > δ (q + β(1− q)) .
(3.25)
The following section considers the welfare maximizing outcome of the
case with costly upkeep. In a welfare analysis similar to Section 3.4 the
laissez-faire solutions are compared to the welfare maximizing solutions with
upkeep. The following section is largely analogous to the case when no costs
of maintenance are considered and the general case is therefore delegated to
the Appendix (see Appendix Section 3.B).
3.6 Costly maintenance: welfare maximization
with an intertemporal budget
The results when costs of upkeep are considered show that the lower bound
for population loss, to prevent insolvency of the second generation, carries
over from the laissez-faire case. In the following the solutions from the above
case of laissez-faire generations with upkeep are contrasted with the case in
which welfare is maximized.
Again the welfare of the ﬁrst generation is maximized subject to the
aggregate budget constraint modiﬁed for costs of upkeep (for the second
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generation) as well as the constraint on the second generation utility. Thus:
max
c1,c2,G1,G2
W SP,q = cβ1
(
G1
Nα1
)1−β
(3.26)
s.t. w(N1 +N2) = c1N1 + c2N2 + θ((1 + qδ)G1 +G2)
U¯2 = c
β
2
(
δG1 +G2
Nα2
)1−β
.
To conduct the welfare analysis, the utility maximizing level UL,q2 from equa-
tion (3.25) is used to derive speciﬁc allocations. For GSP,q1 the following
expressions results:
GSP,q1 =

(1−β)
θ(1+qδ)
w(N1 +N2) if δq(1− β) < N2N1 <δ(β + q(1− β))
w
(
1−β
θ
)
N1
[
1−δ(1−β)(1−q)
1−δ(1−q)
]
if N2
N1
> δ (β + q(1− β)) .
(3.27)
These allocations in the social planner's case with maintenance are similar to
those derived in the baseline case. When δq(1− β) < N2
N1
< δ (β + q(1− β))
such that GSP,q2 = 0, then G
SP,q
1 > G
L
1 will only hold if N2 is suﬃciently
large (namely N2/N1 > qδ). In contrast to the baseline case, when main-
tenance costs are accounted for and N2/N1 < qδ, the provision for the ﬁrst
generation will be too high in laissez-faire. When N2
N1
> δ (β + q(1− β)) such
that GSP,q2 > 0, then G
SP,q
1 > G
L
1 . In the lower line of equation (3.27) the
term in brackets is greater than one since the numerator is greater than the
denominator. Therefore as illustrated in Figure 3.7 the provision of G1 with
maintenance will be higher in the social planner's case than in laissez-faire.
Correspondingly the allocations of the second generation are given by:
GSP,q2 =

0 if δq(1− β) < N2
N1
< δ (β + q(1− β)) ,
w
(
1−β
θ
) [
N2 − N1δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))1−δ(1−q)
]
if N2
N1
>δ (β + q(1− β)) .
(3.28)
These public goods provision levels with maintenance costs are illustrated in
Figure 3.8. When the population relation is given by N2
N1
> δ (β + q(1− β))
then the provision GL,q2 will be positive. Positive levels of G
SP,q
2 will be
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of the provision levels for the ﬁrst generation in
laissez-faire GL1 and the social planner's case G
SP,q
1 with costs of upkeep,
plotted against the population relation N2
N1
qδ
G1 
G1
L
G1
SP,q
N2
N1
  δ(β+q(1‐β))
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of the provision levels for the second generation
in laissez-faire GL,q2 and the social planner's case G
SP,q
2 with costs of upkeep,
plotted against the population relation N2
N1
G2
L, q
G2
SP,q
δ(β+q(1‐β)) δ(1‐(1+qδ)(1‐β)(1‐q))
1‐δ(1‐q)
G2 
N2
N1
  
achieved for N2
N1
> δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) .
9 Thus a positive provision under wel-
fare maximization requires a larger second generation population in compar-
ison to laissez-faire.
With maintenance the aggregate provision level G = δG1 + G2 of the
laissez-faire and welfare maximizing outcomes depend on the size of the sec-
ond generation. This comparison is summarized in:
Proposition 3.3. i) If N2
N1
< qδ, then the aggregate provision in laissez-faire
is too high compared to the welfare maximizing level.
ii) If qδ < N2
N1
< δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) , then the aggregate provision in laissez-
faire is too low compared to the welfare maximizing level.
iii) If N2
N1
> δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) , then the aggregate provision in laissez-faire
is equal to the welfare maximizing level.
9 Whether the threshold δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))1−δ(1−q) R 1 is not clear. The value depends on
three parameters that can all be between zero and one, therefore parameter constel-
lations yielding N2N1 R 1 are possible.
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of the aggregate provision of intergenerational
publicly provided goods G = δG1 +G2 with with costs of upkeep in laissez-
faire and the social planner's case
qδ
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L, q
δG1
SP,q G2
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δ(β+q(1‐β)) δ(1‐(1+qδ)(1‐β)(1‐q))
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Proof: The above proposition results from the aggregate provision of pub-
licly provided goods for the two generations when maintenance is accounted
for, in equations (3.27) and (3.28). The comparison of laissez-faire and the
social planner's case is illustrated in Figure 3.9.
For N2
N1
< δq the provision under the social planner will now be lower
than in the laissez-faire case. This results from the fact that in the wel-
fare maximizing case, the burden of the upkeep costs placed on the second
generation is taken into account. Thus for cases of severe population loss
the welfare maximizing outcome will allocate fewer resources toward the ﬁrst
generation than would be the case in laissez-faire. For intermediate popu-
lation relations (relatively stable populations) the publicly provided goods
are under-provided in laissez-faire. Finally, for N2
N1
> δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) the
sum of the provision levels is the same in both the welfare maximizing and
laissez-faire cases. Thus when costs of maintenance are accounted for, the
public provision in laissez-faire may either be too high, too low or just right.
86 IPGS, UPKEEP AND POPULATION LOSS
When the population shrinks the existing infrastructure may be too large,
however, it is not clear whether the positive externality from inheritance or
the burden from costly upkeep dominates. If δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) <
N2
N1
<
1, then for moderate shrinking the aggregate provision in laissez-faire and
the social planner's case is equal. However, if δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) > 1 then
population growth is required for the aggregate provision to be equal.
Also the private consumption levels now depend additionally on the cost
(q). The speciﬁc results are shown in the Appendix 3.C. These consumption
levels are in turn used to compute the utility levels of the ﬁrst generation.
Since the threshold values for positive provision for the second generation
are again diﬀerent in laissez-faire and in the welfare maximizing cases, three
relevant ranges arise. The utility achieved by the ﬁrst generation in the social
planner's case with costs of upkeep (when U¯2 = U
L,q
2 ) are given by:
USP,q1 =

w [N1 +N2]N
−γ
1
(
1−β
θ(1+qδ)
)1−β [
β −
(
N2−N1qδ(1−β)
N1(1+qδ)
)(
N1(1+qδ)
N1+N2
) 1
β
]β
if δq(1− β) < N2N1 < δ (q + β(1− q)) ,
w [N1 +N2]N
−γ
1
(
1−β
θ(1+qδ)
)1−β [
β −
(
δβ
1+qδ
)(
(1+qδ)(N2+N1δ(1−β)(1−q))
δ(N1+N2)
) 1
β
]β
if δ (q + β(1− q)) < N2N1 ≤
δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) ,
N1−γ1 wβ
β
(
(1−β)
θ(1−δ(1−q))
)1−β
[1− δ(1− β)(1− q)]
if N2N1 >
δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) .
(3.29)
As in the baseline case a comparison of the utility levels of the ﬁrst gen-
eration in the social planner's and laissez-faire settings follows. When the
size of the population of the second generation is such that: δq(1 − β) <
N2
N1
< δ [β + q(1− β)], the utility comparison of the ﬁrst generation is the
following:
USP,q1 ≥ UL1 ⇔ β
[(
N1 +N2
N1
) 1
β
(1 + qδ)
β−1
β − 1
]
>
N2
N1
− qδ(1− β).
For some parameter constellations of (β, δ and q) equality is possible, other-
wise USP,q1 > U
L
1 . The diﬀerence in utility is rising in the second generation
population.
When the population relation lies in the intermediate range, the utility
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comparison is the following:
USP,q1 > U
L
1 ⇔(
N1 +N2
N1
) 1
β
> (1 + qδ)
1−β
β
[
1 + δ
(
N2
N1δ
+ (1− β)(1− q)
) 1
β
]
.
Similarly when N2
N1
> δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) the utility comparison gives:
USP,q1 > U
L
1 ⇔
[
1− δ(1− β)(1− q)
1− δ(1− β)
]
> (1− δ(1− β))β.
Again the diﬀerence is independent of the size of the population when publicly
provided goods are provided in both periods.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter a simple model on the provision of intergenerational publicly
provided goods was developed. The focus laid on the eﬀect of local population
loss on the provision. In the laissez-faire case, the assumed intergenerational
link is simply the inherited stock of publicly provided goods. In the welfare
maximizing case, the social planner additionally allocates the aggregated
budgets of the two generations. Moreover, the outcomes of the baseline case
were contrasted with the results when costs of upkeep accrue to the ensuing
generation.
The choices of private consumption and public goods provision are dif-
ferent when the population shrinks in comparison to cases of population
growth or stability. In a laissez-faire setting, if a jurisdiction is experiencing
population growth, public goods will always be provided in both periods. If,
however, the community experiences population loss, it may be optimal from
the view of an ensuing generation not to provide any additional public goods.
Conversely under welfare maximization the resources are shifted between pro-
vision for each generation depending on their size. Thus in comparison to
welfare maximization, in laissez-faire the provision of intergenerational public
goods will be ineﬃciently low from the view of the next generation when no
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costs accrue. However, when maintenance is expensive successive generations
may prefer less provision by past generations.
When provision toward the second generation does take place, i.e. the
population is growing or stable then the welfare diﬀerential between laissez-
faire and the social planner remains constant with respect to the population
size change. However, when population loss is so severe that no publicly
provided goods are provided for the second generation the loss in welfare
increases with further population loss. Hence, in times of severe population
loss intergenerational planning of long term investments is paramount.
Since a welfare improvement may result when the resources of both gen-
erations are allocated at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, and the ensuing
generation beneﬁts from the previous investment, the setup can be used to
justify debt. Today debt is raised to pay for infrastructure that will outlast
the current generation. Hence the future generations contribute by paying
back the debt incurred to build up the stock from which they derive utility.
However, it was also shown that in situations with high population loss, the
ensuing generations may become too small to eﬀectively beneﬁt from existing
stock of public goods. In such cases smaller investments in previous periods
would suﬃce.
The demographic risk due to a smaller future population may thus also
contain a ﬁscal risk. To prevent mis-investments in times when future pop-
ulation loss is likely, a comprehensive evaluation of demographic risk could
be conducted. Local governments could commit to evaluate (infrastructure)
investment decisions, with respect to their demographic sustainability (aging
and shrinking) before approval. In light of the projected population devel-
opments in many developed countries with extensive infrastructures, dealing
with the consequences of population loss will become an important policy
issue. More careful weighing of current and future needs for investment,
accompanied by a more detailed consideration of future population develop-
ments particularly at the local level, should become more common.
The model developed here is admittedly simple. Considering only two
generations may mask longer term eﬀects. Therefore, similar issues could
be considered with a model in multi-period setting. Furthermore, a more
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sophisticated cost function in lieu of the exogenous cost share used here
could allow more detailed analysis of the incentives to shift resources between
current and future consumption.
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Appendix
Appendix 3.A Welfare maximization with an
exogenous second generation
utility level
3.A.1 Provision levels of the publicly provided goods
In the following the welfare maximization problem from Section 3.4 equa-
tion (3.16), is solved for a general exogenously given U¯2. A non-negativity
restriction deﬁnes the range of U¯2 for which feasible allocations are achieved
(as shown below). The provision level GSP1 is given by the below expressions
depending on whether GSP2 ≥ 0, the superscript SP indicates the case of the
social planner:
GSP1 =

(1−β)
θ
w(N1 +N2) if U¯2 ≤ δz,
1
1−δ
(
1−β
θβ
)β
Nγ2
[
φw(N1 +N2)N
−γ
2 − U¯2
]
if δz < U¯2 < z.
(3.30)
For clarity of the exposition I consolidate the parameters by deﬁning
φ ≡ (1−β
θ
)1−β
ββ and again the exponent γ ≡ β(1−α) +α. The provision of
GSP1 may not be zero, because otherwise the whole generational utility would
be zero. However, due to the intergenerational character of the provision in
the second period, GSP2 = 0 may be the solution, if the inherited G
SP
1 is
suﬃcient to satisfy U¯2. Thus when GSP2 = 0, G
SP
1 is given by the top line in
equation (3.30). Solving for GSP2 gives:
GSP2 =
 0 if U¯2 ≤ δz,1
1−δ
(
1−β
θβ
)β
Nγ2
[
U¯2 − δφw(N1 +N2)N−γ2
]
if δz < U¯2 < z.
(3.31)
Together the above provision levels imply that GSP1 , G
SP
2 > 0 only if:
δφw(N1 +N2)N
−γ
2 < U¯2 < φw(N1 +N2)N
−γ
2 . (3.32)
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Figure 3.10: Provision levels GSP1 and G
SP
2 for the ﬁrst and second gener-
ations in the feasible range δz < U¯2 < z
 
U2 δz z
G1
SP
G2
SP 
G2
SP=0 
where φw(N1 +N2)N
−γ
2 ≡ z. At the extremes of the range δz < U¯2 < z
one of the provision levels will be equal to zero, at U¯2 = δz, GSP1 > 0 and
GSP2 = 0, and at U¯2 = z, G
SP
1 = 0 and G
SP
2 > 0. If U¯2 > z it implies that the
exogenously chosen level of reservation utility for the second generation is so
high that not enough resources remain to provide any GSP1 . Beyond U¯2 = z
when GSP1 = 0 the utility of the ﬁrst generation will be zero, and therefore
feasible allocations only arise when U¯2 ≤ z.
Figure 3.10 provides a stylized illustration of the provision levels. The
horizontal axis depicts the level of U¯2. This line is intersected by two dashed
vertical lines that mark the range of values (i.e. δz < U¯2 < z ) for which both
GSP1 > 0 and G
SP
2 > 0. The two intersecting lines represent the provision
levels, where GSP1 is given by the downward sloping black line that ends at z
and GSP2 by the upward sloping gray line. Beyond the relevant range, either
GSP1 or G
SP
2 would equal zero. The shaded area to the right of z shows that
GSP1 = 0 is not feasible. In contrast, to the left of δz, G
SP
2 = 0 but the level
of provision for GSP1 is positive and feasible.
Moreover, the amount invested inGSP1 depends on the rate of depreciation
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δ. When 0 < δ < 1 the provision levels GSP1 and G
SP
2 of the intergenerational
publicly provided good are given by the bottom expressions in (3.30) and
(3.31). When δ → 1, GSP2 → 0 as is clear from (3.31), and correspondingly
GSP1 is given by the upper line in (3.30). If δ = 0, the publicly provided
good is not intergenerational, and the provision for the second generation is
equal to GSP2 =
(
1−β
θβ
)β
Nγ2 U¯2. G
SP
1 is increasing in δ and consequently G
SP
2
is decreasing in δ. For low rates of depreciation less will be inherited and
there will be more investment in the publicly provided good for the second
generation.
3.A.2 Private consumption
I also derive the levels of private consumption in the welfare maximizing case.
For the ﬁrst generation the following private consumption levels are found:
cSP1 =

w
(
1 + N2
N1
)[
β −N2
(
δ(1−β)
θ
)β−1
β
(
U¯2N
α(1−β)
2
w(N1+N2)
) 1
β
]
if U¯2 ≤ δz,
1
N1
[
βw(N1 +N2)− U¯2
(
1−β
θβ
)β−1
Nγ2
]
if δz < U¯2 < z.
(3.33)
The eﬀects of changes in N1 and N2 on cSP1 depend on which range is con-
sidered, but in either case the eﬀects are ambiguous.
The corresponding private consumption of the second generation is given
by:
cSP2 =

[
U¯2N
α(1−β)
2
(
δ
(
1−β
θ
)
w(N1 +N2)
)β−1] 1β
if U¯2 ≤ δz,(
1−β
θβ
)β−1 [
U¯2N
γ−1
2
]
if δz < U¯2 < z.
(3.34)
3.A.3 First generation utility
Given the second constraint of the problem, the second period utility is ﬁxed
at some value U¯2. However, the ﬁrst period utility depends on the popula-
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tion and the parameters of the model as well as this U¯2. By inserting the
derived provision and consumption levels into the utility function of the ﬁrst
generation, the following expressions result:
USP1 =

N−γ1 w(N1 +N2)
(
1−β
θ
)1−β [
β −N2
(
δ(1−β)
θ
)β−1
β
(
U¯2N
α(1−β)
2
w(N1+N2)
) 1
β
]β
if U¯2 ≤ δz,(
N2
N1
)γ
(1− δ)β−1 [φN−γ2 w(N1 +N2)− U¯2]
if δz < U¯2 < z.
(3.35)
In all of the above expressions U¯2 = UL2 is substituted in the relevant
range to give the expressions found in Section 3.4.
Appendix 3.B Welfare maximization and
analysis with costly
maintenance
The welfare of the ﬁrst generation is maximized subject to the budget con-
straint modiﬁed for costs of upkeep and the constraint on the second gener-
ation utility which also accounts for the costs q. Thus:
max
c1,c2,G1,G2
W SP,q = cβ1
(
G1
Nα1
)1−β
(3.36)
s.t. w(N1 +N2) = c1N1 + c2N2 + θ(G1 + qδG1 +G2)
U¯2 = c
β
2
(
δG1 +G2
Nα2
)1−β
.
The provision of publicly provided good GSP,q1 is now given by:
GSP,q1 =

(1−β)
θ(1+qδ)w(N1 +N2) if U¯2 <
δ
1+qδz
1
1−δ(1−q)
(
1−β
θβ
)β
Nγ2
[
φw(N1 +N2)N
−γ
2 − U¯2
]
if δ1+qδz < U¯2 < z.
(3.37)
Save for the expression for the depreciation the provision levels are identical.
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When δ
1+qδ
z < U¯2 < z, the denominator of the ﬁrst fraction to the left,
reﬂects the additional term from the costly upkeep. The cost of upkeep will
result in a lower provision of G1 than in the case where potential costs are not
taken into account. Furthermore the additional cost factor is also involved
in the provision of GSP,q1 even when U¯2 <
δ
1+qδ
z. Due to the additional cost
the total budget available is lower.
Similarly the second generation provision levels are now given by:
GSP,q2 =

0 if U¯2 < δ1+qδz,
1
1−δ(1−q)
(
1−β
θβ
)β
Nγ2
[
U¯2(1 + qδ)
−δφw(N1 +N2)N−γ2
]
if δ
1+qδ
z < U¯2 < z.
(3.38)
Therefore the range in which both GSP1 and G
SP
2 are positive is now:
δ
1 + qδ
φw(N1 +N2)N
−γ
2 < U¯2 < φw(N1 +N2)N
−γ
2 .
The ﬁrst generation consumes according to:
cSP,q1 =

w(N1+N2)
N1
[
β −N2
(
δ(1−β)
θ(1+qδ)
)β−1
β
(
U¯2N
α(1−β)
2
w(N1+N2)
) 1
β
]
if U¯2 < δ1+qδz,
1
N1
[
βw(N1 +N2)− U¯2
(
1−β
θβ
)β−1
Nγ2
]
if δ
1+qδ
z< U¯2 < z,
(3.39)
analogously for the second generation:
cSP,q2 =

[
U¯2N
α(1−β)
2
(
δ(1−β)
θ(1+qδ)
w(N1 +N2)
)β−1] 1β
if U¯2 < δ1+qδz,(
1−β
θβ
)β−1 [
U¯2N
γ−1
2
]
if δ
1+qδ
z < U¯2 < z.
(3.40)
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Hence the expressions for USP,q1 are given by:
USP,q1 =

w(N1 +N2)N
β(α−1)−α
1
(
1−β
θ(1+qδ)
)1−β{
β −N2
[
δ(1−β)
θ(1+qδ)
]β−1
β
[
U¯2N
α(1−β)
2
w(N1+N2)
] 1
β
}β
if U¯2 < δ1+qδz,
N−γ1 (1− δ(1− q))β−1[(
1−β
θ
)1−β
ββw (N1 +N2)− U¯2Nγ2
]
if δ
1+qδ
z < U¯2 < z.
(3.41)
Appendix 3.C Private consumption levels
with costly maintenance when
the second generation utility
level is equal to the
laissez-faire outcome
The private consumption levels of the two generations are given by the fol-
lowing two expressions when the utility of the second generation achieved
laissez-faire is equated to the exogenous utility level U¯2:
cSP,q1 =

w
(
N1+N2
N1
){
β −
[
N2−N1qδ(1−β)
N1(1+qδ)
] [
N1(1+qδ)
N1+N2
] 1
β
}
if δq(1− β) < N2N1 ≤ δ (q + β(1− q))
βw
(
N1+N2
N1
){
1− δ1+qδ
[
1+qδ
δ
(
N2+N1δ(1−β)(1−q)
N1+N2
)] 1
β
}
if δ (q + β(1− q)) < N2N1 ≤
δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q)
βw [1− δ(1− β)(1− q)] if N2N1 >
δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) .
(3.42)
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cSP,q2 =

w
N2
(
δ(1−β)
θ
) [
N1+N2
(1+qδ)
]β−1
β
(N2 −N1qδ(1− β))
if δq(1− β) < N2N1 ≤ δ (q + β(1− q)) ,
βw δ1+qδ
(
N1+N2
N2
) [(
δ
1+qδ
)(
N2+N1δ(1−β)(1−q)
N1+N2
)] 1
β
(N2 −N1qδ(1− β))
if δ (q + β(1− q)) < N2N1 ≤
δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) ,
w(1− N1N2 qδ(1− β)) if N2N1 >
δ(1−(1−β)(1+qδ)(1−q))
1−δ(1−q) .
(3.43)
Chapter 4
Determinants of eﬃciency in child
care provision
4.1 Introduction
During the past three decades most developed countries have had sustained
below-replacement fertility. One reason for the low fertility rates is the diﬃ-
culty to reconcile careers and family life. Governments can implement family
policy to encourage both female labor market participation and fertility. One
such instrument is public child care provision. In addition to the positive ef-
fect on fertility (Hank et al., 2003) and increased labor market participation
of women (Minagawa and Upmann, 2006), child care also has a positive in-
ﬂuence on the children's future labor market performance (Heckman and
Masterov, 2007).1
Whereas family policy is a national issue, the provision of child care is
usually delegated to the local level. Aging and shrinking populations present
new challenges to local policy makers (Geys et al., 2008). Nonetheless, munic-
ipalities are legally required to provide certain services and are thus limited
1 This Chapter is based on the paper "Determinants of eﬃciency in child care pro-
vision", which appeared as ifo Working Paper Number 83 in March 2010 and has
subsequently been published in Finanzarchiv/Public Finance Analysis (FA). The pa-
per was co-authored by Christian Thater (see Montén and Thater (2010) and Montén
and Thater (2011)).
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in their maneuverability to the allocation of a set of resources between man-
dated activities. Given the heterogeneity in the size and socio-demographic
structure of municipalities, diﬀerences in expenditure decisions are to be ex-
pected (Oates, 1972). A municipality that is more eﬃcient in the allocation
of its resources may thus be able to provide more child care services with
fewer resources than a comparable less eﬃcient municipality.2
In the coming years, the federal government of Germany hopes to sig-
niﬁcantly expand the availability of child care. The aim is to facilitate the
re-entry of young mothers into the labor force and to support the reconcili-
ation of work and family life. By the end of 2013, the parents of all children
between one and six years will have a legal claim to public child care (KiföG,
2008). The municipalities are in charge of the implementation of this expan-
sion and will therefore be faced with increasing expenditures. One possibility
to increase the number of places oﬀered without substantially increasing the
expenditures is to raise the eﬃciency in the public provision of child care.
In this chapter, we use a unique data set on child care expenditures in the
eastern German state of Saxony to assess the eﬃciency of service provision.
In spite of the obvious importance of the child care sector, only a few
studies have attempted to analyze its eﬃciency. To our knowledge, the only
study that analyzes the eﬃciency of child care centers is Bjurek et al. (1992).
They investigate the eﬃciency of expenditures of child care facilities in the
city region of Gothenburg in Sweden. Using data on the facility level, they
ﬁnd that the same level of input could produce 10 to 15% more output
and that centers in more auent areas and centers with a more experienced
2 In recent years, the studies analyzing local government eﬃciency have expanded.
Some authors have considered the overall eﬃciency of the local public sector, such
as De Borger and Kerstens (1996), Geys (2006) and Geys and Moesen (2009), the
Belgian local government, Kalb et al. (2012) German municipalities, Sampaio de
Sousa and Stosic (2005) Brazilian municipalities, Worthington (2000) the Australian
local government, Afonso and Fernandes (2008) and the Portuguese local government.
The last mentioned and Kalb et al. (2012) also contain a more comprehensive surveys
of relevant literature. Others focus on the provision of speciﬁc services, such as police
protection (Drake and Simper, 2003), public libraries (Hemmeter, 2006; De Witte
and Geys, 2011), street-lighting (Lorenzo and Sánchez, 2007), county roads (Kalb,
2009) or public schools (Millimet and Collier, 2008).
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director are more eﬃcient.3 Because we consider municipalities instead of
the individual facilities, the factors that inﬂuence eﬃciency are not directly
comparable to those considered here. Our focus on municipalities is in line
with Millimet and Collier (2008), who stress the importance of the school
district as the ﬁnancier of education as the correct level of analysis as opposed
to the schools themselves.
In a two-stage analysis, we evaluate the eﬃciency of municipalities in the
provision of child care services. First, we employ a Data Envelopment Analy-
sis (DEA) to compute the eﬃciency scores, and then, in the second stage, we
implement the bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) to
investigate the determinants of eﬃciency in a truncated regression. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant eﬃciency reserves, but the diﬀerences between the municipalities
are large. In the median municipality, a given level of provision could be
achieved with 22-25% lower inputs. Because quality diﬀerences may inﬂu-
ence the eﬃciency of service provision, we test whether this is the case in our
sample. Using data on children's school readiness, we do not ﬁnd evidence
for diﬀerences in the quality of care between the municipalities. Second, we
use economic and socio-demographic variables to explain the diﬀerences in
eﬃciency. In particular, the lack of professionalism of the mayor and a larger
share of the elderly population in a given municipality have a negative impact
on the eﬃciency.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents both the meth-
ods of eﬃciency analysis as well as the second stage regression. In Section
4.3, we introduce the data and discuss the results of the eﬃciency analysis.
The variables used in the second stage and results of the regression are dis-
cussed in Section 4.4. The ﬁnal Section 4.5 concludes with a discussion and
policy implications.
3 The results they obtain in the second stage eﬃciency determination analysis are to
be viewed with caution. Methodological developments in recent years have shown
that the adopted Tobit speciﬁcation and the serial correlation of the eﬃciency scores
may induce biased results (Simar and Wilson, 2007).
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4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Eﬃciency analysis
Generally eﬃciency analysis is concerned with the measurement of an organi-
zation's ability to use its inputs to produce outputs. In the eﬃciency analysis
literature, two main methods have been employed to measure an organiza-
tion's ability to use its inputs to produce outputs: the non-parametric Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Farrell, 1957; Charnes et al., 1978; Banker
et al., 1984) and the parametric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) (Aigner
et al., 1977; Meeusen and van Den Broeck, 1977; Battese and Corra, 1977).
The main beneﬁt of using a stochastic approach is that a deviation from the
frontier can be identiﬁed as either statistical noise or technical ineﬃciency. In
DEA, by contrast, all deviation is considered ineﬃciency. However, an advan-
tage of the non-parametric approach lies in the ﬂexibility to model multiple
inputs and outputs when prices are not available. In this respect, the SFA is
less ﬂexible, as a speciﬁc functional form must be chosen to estimate the pro-
posed cost or production function.4 As the form of the production function
is not obvious when considering public units, in this case, it is preferable to
employ non-parametric methods where assumptions need only to be made
with regards to the properties of the points in the production set (dispos-
ability, proportionality or convexity) (Pestieau, 2009). For these reasons, the
non-parametric method has been prevalent among studies considering the
public sector. In the current context, the eﬃciency will be evaluated with a
DEA.
Due to the well-known diﬃculties in deﬁning inputs and outputs for public
goods, the method of eﬃciency analysis is not beyond critique (Pestieau,
2009). The risk of mis-specifying the eﬃcient frontier can be reduced by
two means. Firstly, the more narrowly the public service is deﬁned, the
more closely appropriate inputs and outputs can be matched to the service.
Secondly, testing diﬀerent combinations of inputs and outputs increases the
4 Usually either a Cobb-Douglas or the more ﬂexible trans-logarithmic speciﬁcation is
chosen (Christensen et al., 1973).
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reliability of the speciﬁed eﬃcient frontier. Hence, we evaluate the eﬃciency
in the provision of the relatively narrowly deﬁned category child care and
test several diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
4.2.2 Data envelopment analysis (DEA)
In the application of a DEA, some critical assumptions regarding the pro-
duction process need to be made. The process may either be input or output
oriented. Input orientation implies that a frontier is generated based on those
observations that use the lowest mix of inputs to produce their outputs. Al-
ternatively, in the output orientation, those observations that achieve the
highest mix of outputs given the level of inputs are evaluated. The choice of
orientation depends on the objective or the dimension in which the policy-
maker is believed to have more discretion (Worthington and Dollery, 2000;
Fried et al., 2008). Furthermore, an assumption on the convexity of the pro-
duction set determines the returns to scale. We test assumptions on both
constant returns to scale (CRS) (Charnes et al., 1978) and variable returns
to scale (VRS) (Banker et al., 1984) (accounting for both increasing and de-
creasing returns to scale). Figure 4.1 in Appendix 4.B illustrates the CRS
and VRS frontiers for the production of one output with one input.5
The eﬃciency of the units in the sample is assessed in two steps. In the
ﬁrst step, a frontier is generated based on those observations that use the
lowest mix of inputs to produce their outputs (input orientation).6 In the
second step, each observation is compared to the piece-wise linear surface of
the eﬃcient observations derived in the ﬁrst step, and then each is assigned
an eﬃciency score. By solving a distinct linear program for each unit, the
eﬃciency of each is maximized by ﬁnding the best possible weights of inputs
and outputs. The procedure is constrained by the condition that when all
units receive the weights that maximize their respective eﬃciency, none may
receive an eﬃciency score greater than 1. Generally, all weights are non-
5 In section 4.3.4, the results from both input and output orientations and the results
of the CRS and VRS speciﬁcations are discussed.
6 Alternatively, those observations that achieve the highest mix of outputs given the
level of inputs (output orientation) could be evaluated.
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negative, and no set of other weights will render a higher eﬃciency. Thus,
the frontier is the set of eﬃcient units "enveloping" those that are not as
eﬃcient.
The ineﬃciency of a unit (in this case a municipality) is thus the distance
from the eﬃcient surface, or its input-output ratio, in comparison to the units
(municipalities) that lie on the surface. Ineﬃciency (in input orientation) is
how much a unit (municipality) could reduce inputs while still achieving the
current output level.7 The problem below formally describes the envelopment
form of the input oriented variable returns to scale model according to Banker
et al. (1984):
min
θ,λ
θ, (4.1)
s.t. −yi + Y λ ≥ 0,
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0
N1′λ = 1
λ ≥ 0.
θ is a scalar and is the eﬃciency score of the i-th unit. θ ≤ 1, where a value
of 1 indicates a technically eﬃcient unit that lies on the frontier. A set of
N municipalities uses M inputs and generates S outputs. Then for the i-th
municipality, the known inputs and outputs are represented by the vectors xi
and yi, respectively. For all N units, the input matrix X has the dimensions
(M × N), and the output matrix Y is represented by an (S × N) matrix.
λ is a (N × 1) vector of constraints, and N1 is an (N × 1) vector of ones.8
Thus, a convex hull that envelops the data points is constructed as described
above.
The information contained in the computed eﬃciency scores shed only
7 In the output orientation, this refers to how much it could increase its output while
not employing more inputs.
8 If CRS are assumed, the model is computed without the convexity constraint N1′λ =
1 according to Charnes et al. (1978). The CRS speciﬁcation is only valid when all
eﬃcient units are operating on this ray; when this is not the case, a variable returns
to scale speciﬁcation is more appropriate.
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limited light on the sources of ineﬃciency, as the decision-making units
(DMUs) are traditionally treated as a black box turning inputs into outputs
at diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency (Fried et al., 2008). Recently, however, the de-
velopment of methods for conducting a statistically sound explanatory anal-
ysis has contributed to attempts at identifying the sources of (in)eﬃciency
(e.g. Simar and Wilson (2007)). In such a two-stage approach, factors that
inﬂuence the eﬃciency (environmental variables) beyond the direct produc-
tion process are regressed on the eﬃciency scores from the ﬁrst stage to
describe the conditions that are more and less suitable for eﬃcient outcomes.
The set of explanatory variables used here is discussed in Section 4.4.
4.2.3 Second stage regression analysis: Estimation
procedure
The naive OLS regression or Tobit regression of DEA eﬃciency scores in a
two-stage approach is to be viewed critically (Fried et al., 2008; Simar and
Wilson, 2007). However, once the serial correlation of the eﬃciency scores is
accounted for by an appropriate bootstrapping procedure, the use of a second
stage regression becomes legitimate. The basis of such a two-stage approach
is the assumption that the DMUs face certain environmental variables (z)
that constrain their choices of inputs (x) and outputs (y). In other words,
the variables in z inﬂuence the mean and the variance of the ineﬃciency
process but do not inﬂuence the production process itself.9 To estimate the
model, we specify a truncated regression. Formally, the observations stem
from the set Sn = (xi, yi, zi)
n
i=1, where xi and yi are the inputs and outputs,
used in the i-th unit (municipality) to derive the eﬃciency (θo) of each of
the n observations in the previous section. Additionally, the observations are
characterized by certain environmental variables contained in the vector zi.
The problems that arise when conducting a naive second stage regres-
sion include: slow convergence of the estimated parameters towards the true
values when more than one input and output are included, and serial cor-
9 For example, a municipality's source of revenues, whether from taxes or transfers,
does not inﬂuence the production of child care but may inﬂuence the incentives to
use the resources eﬃciently.
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relation of unknown form between the eﬃciency scores and the explanatory
variables. Moreover, by construction a change in one eﬃciency score can
change the whole frontier. In other words the eﬃciency of all units are de-
pendent on all other units. Since several eﬃciency scores equal one, it may
suggest a censoring at the probability mass of 1. Some authors therefore
use a Tobit speciﬁcation in the second stage regression (e.g., Bjurek et al.,
1992; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Kirjavainen and Loikkanen, 1998; Wor-
thington and Dollery, 2001). However, since by construction an eﬃciency
score cannot exceed 1 the dependent variable is in fact truncated and not
censored. Therefore a truncated regression is more appropriate, and has also
been shown to perform better in simulations (Simar and Wilson, 2007).
In the input orientation the dependent variable (the inverse of the ef-
ﬁciency score) is the obtained by the input distance function and hence
θ = (1,∞) (Shephard, 1970). The eﬃciencies (θi) are in this case computed
within the production possibilities (P ) according to:
θi = θ(xi, yi|P )
with the Banker et al. (1984) assumption of VRS.10
The model we want to estimate is the following: θi = ziβ + εi ≥ 1, where
β are the parameters to be estimated and ε is the error term. However, as θ
is not observable, we instead estimate:
θˆi = ziβ + ξi ≥ 1 (4.2)
where β are the parameters to be estimated and ξ is the error term and θˆ
were computed in the ﬁrst stage. Clearly because θˆi is derived from xi and yi,
it will also be correlated with zi. Therefore a bootstrap procedure to correct
for serial correlation is necessary in the maximum likelihood estimation in the
second stage. To implement the bootstrap, samples of pseudo-data x∗i , y
∗
i , z
∗
i ,
are drawn from the density fˆ(x, y, z). We follow Algorithm #1 with 2,000
replications as proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007).11 The speciﬁc steps
10 The deﬁnition of VRS in DEA can be found in the Appendix 4.A
11 A detailed description of the algorithm can be found therein.
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taken in the bootstrap algorithm can be found in Appendix section 4.C.
Because this bootstrap procedure was conceived for a left truncated de-
pendent variable, our dependent variable is the inverse of the eﬃciency score
as obtained by the input distance function. The bootstrapped values and
original estimates are then used to construct estimated conﬁdence intervals
for the estimated parameters. These estimated parameters describe the in-
ﬂuence of the environmental variables on the ineﬃciency scores obtained in
the ﬁrst stage.
4.3 Empirical eﬃciency analysis
4.3.1 Data and sample
We use cross sectional data for the year 2006 that pertain to the munici-
palities in the state of Saxony in Germany. In that year, the state had a
total of 496 municipalities. About two-thirds (332) of all municipalities have
a population of less than 5,000, and there are only three larger cities.12 In
total, 214,361 children were cared for in either public or non-proﬁt child care
facilities.
Our sample of municipalities is restricted in three steps. First, the munici-
palities with fewer than three individual child care providers are not disclosed
in the statistic. Data on child care provision is only recorded for 282 mu-
nicipalities (State Oﬃce of Statistics of Saxony, 2008b). Therefore, many
small municipalities are disqualiﬁed from the analysis, but consequently, the
remaining sample is more homogeneous. Second, observations that contain
missing values in any of the potential inputs or outputs are excluded. Third,
as non-parametric approaches are very sensitive to outliers, it is important
that potential outliers are removed from the sample. Thus, an outlier de-
tection procedure is applied to eliminate additional inﬂuential observations
(Wilson, 1993). Ultimately, a sample of 213 municipalities remains.13
12 Leipzig with 506,578, Dresden with 504,795 and Chemnitz with 245,700 inhabitants.
13 Of the sample of 282 municipalities with more than three facilities, for 226 obser-
vations the data on all inputs and outputs is available. Among these observations
13 are found to be outliers and are subsequently dropped. Thus 213 municipalities
106 DETERMINANTS OF EFFICIENCY
In child care, we distinguish between three distinct groups: the under
3-year-olds, the 3- to 6-year-olds and the 6- to 12-year-old participants in
after school programs. In Saxony, the youngest of the three groups accounts
for 13.8% of all children receiving care, the group of 3- to 6-year-olds forms
the largest group with 47.5%, and 38.8% of children in child care are above
the age of 6.14 The diﬀerences in care intensity between the three groups
are apparent in terms of the legally deﬁned personnel-to-children ratio. For
the youngest group, one care person may assume responsibility over no more
than six children; for the middle group the ratio is 1:10 and 1:18 for the group
of the oldest children. In other words, the number of personnel is dependent
on the age structure of the children in care.
If a parent in Germany is interested in child care for his or her child, there
are generally three diﬀerent types of child care services to choose from (we
call these Type I, II and III). Type I contains all non-proﬁt, governmental
(public) care centers. The non-proﬁt, non-governmental centers deﬁne Type
II (e.g., the welfare organizations of the evangelical and catholic churches).
The municipalities subsidize the Type II providers for the number of children
they care for. The subsidy is based on the average cost of care per child
in the municipality's own (Type I) facilities. The ﬁnal category, Type III,
comprises private, for-proﬁt child care centers. Type III facilities must cover
their operating costs solely through tuition.15 Most children who attend child
care in Saxony do so either at a Type I (1,365 or 51.5%) or a Type II (1,257
or 47.5%) center. Thus, Type III centers play an insigniﬁcant role in the
Saxon child care market. Because we are interested in municipal expenditure
eﬃciency and because municipalities may organize the required number of
child care centers either in fully public facilities (Type I) or through the
remain in the sample.
14 In the group of above 6-year-olds, the aggregate statistic at the state level includes
cohorts up to the age of 12. However, from the population statistic at the municipal
level, we are only able to distinguish the age group as 6- to 10-year-olds. As the
number of 10 and 11-year-olds attending child care after school is relatively small, we
use the population statistics on the 6- to 10-year-olds.
15 The attendance in fully private facilities is not recorded separately in the oﬃcial
statistics. However, most of these are located in one of the large agglomerations and
are therefore excluded from our analysis.
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non-proﬁt providers (Type II), we analyze Type I and II facilities.16
Although we use a regionally restricted data set, our results may also
be more generally applicable. Table 4.1 compares the child care situation
across German regions in the following three dimensions: facility density
(the number of facilities per 1,000 inhabitants), the ratio of personnel to
assigned places and assigned places per child (the ratio of assigned places to
the number of children in the relevant age group 1 to 12).
Table 4.1: Comparison of child care in Germany
Facility
density
Personnel
per assigned
places
Assigned places
per child
Saxony 0.62 0.10 0.65
Eastern Germany 0.61 0.11 0.55
Western Germany 0.59 0.14 0.28
Germany 0.59 0.13 0.32
Sources: Federal Statistical Oﬃce (2011a,c).
Both the ﬁgures for facility density and the ratio of personnel to assigned
places are very similar in Saxony and the other regions. The facility density
is slightly higher in Saxony (0.62 compared to 0.59 for Germany in total),
whereas the personnel ratio (0.10) is lower than the German average (0.13).
However, with respect to the ratio of assigned places to children in the rele-
vant age group, larger regional diﬀerences persist. Both the Saxon (0.65) as
well as the eastern German ratios (0.55) are much higher than the one for
western Germany (0.28). This reﬂects the lower availability of child care in
the western parts of the country.
16 Alternative issues that may inﬂuence the supply of or the demand for child care slots,
such as rationing or the duration of daily care, do not require special consideration
in our case. Rationing does not occur in eastern German municipalities, and most
child care centers oﬀer care for the whole day.
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4.3.2 Quality Considerations
A challenge in eﬃciency analyses of the public sector is that output quality
is diﬃcult to control for because variables that describe quality are hard to
deﬁne. The diﬃculty in controlling for quality could be seen as a potential
shortcoming when considering such a sensitive area as child care services.
Due to lack of data, the factors that actually drive the quality of a facility
in a given form of child care (e.g., public child care) have so far only been
investigated for child care providers in the USA (Blau, 1997; Blau and Hagy,
1998). These studies ﬁnd a very weak inﬂuence of factors, such as education
of the personnel or the ratio of personnel-to-children, on the human capital
accumulation of the children. Instead, the socio-economic background of
the parents determines the outcome of the children. Additionally, there is
a considerable literature on the eﬀects of early childhood programs on the
children's future development.17
In Germany, the minimum personnel-to-children ratio is ﬁxed by law,
and the education of the personnel is comparable across the country. In
addition, the Saxon law on child care services places further requirements
on the advanced training of the personnel. The endowment of the facilities
can be assumed to not vary much between facilities, as state law also deﬁnes
the basic needs of facilities. All of these factors suggest that there are only
slight quality diﬀerences between facilities and imply that the service quality
is standardized within a narrow band. Consequently, quality diﬀerences are
small in public child care between German regions (Felfe and Lalive, 2010).
Finally, the regulations set minimum standards. It may therefore be possible
17 Theoretical contributions ﬁnd that investment in the young, and especially in socially
disadvantaged children, is socially beneﬁcial (Heckman and Masterov, 2007; Cunha
and Heckman, 2007). Empirical ﬁndings support this theory. For instance, Andersson
(1992) shows that the time of entrance into public child care has an impact on the
child's future performance in school, and the timing of entrance, in turn, depends
partly on the family's socio-economic background. Furthermore, it has been shown
that high-quality public care outperforms informal care (Datta Gupta and Simonsen
(2010b) for Danish pre-school programs and Fitzpatrick (2008) for pre-kindergarten
programs in the USA). However, there are also studies that dismiss the advantages of
public care relative to informal care (Datta Gupta and Simonsen, 2010a; Baker et al.,
2008).
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that some municipalities invest more in child care than legally required (e.g.,
a better personnel-to-child ratio). However, because of the tight budget
constraints that the municipalities face, this seems unrealistic to us.
To test whether quality diﬀerences in child care are present in our sam-
ple, we use data from the school readiness examination.18 Before entering
primary school, all children in Saxony are checked for their school readi-
ness (regardless of attendance in public child care). The test measures the
children's anthropometric measures as well as cognitive, non-cognitive, and
motor skills as well as speech. We use the test scores on motor skills and
speech as a proxy for the quality of care oﬀered by the municipalities. In
Saxony, 93% of children between three and six years old attend a child care
facility (State Oﬃce of Statistics of Saxony, 2010). Most of these children
attend child care for eight hours a day (i.e., full-time). Thus, it is plausible
that child care inﬂuences the test outcomes. Nonetheless, these test scores
are also inﬂuenced by other factors, such as the socio-economic background
of the families. In the second stage analysis, we try to control for such factors
with the average income in the municipalities and the unemployment rate as
proxies for diﬀerences in the family background across the municipalities.
Table 4.2 shows the percentage of children with speech disorders and
deﬁcient motor skills of all children tested in the 29 Saxon counties in 2006.
Each category may be divided into four classiﬁcations: no deﬁciency, minor
deﬁciency, major deﬁciency and deﬁciency already in treatment. We then
computed the ratio of children with one of the latter three classiﬁcations to
all children for all counties. The ﬁgures in Table 4.2 present the corresponding
average values for all counties in Saxony. We must resort to county-level data,
as these highly sensitive data are not available at the level of municipalities.
For all three groups (speech disorders as well as ﬁne and gross motor skill
deﬁciencies), the standard deviation is very low. This indicates that, of the
Saxon children entering school in the diﬀerent counties, a similar share has
some deﬁciency in skills. We interpret this similarity as additional evidence
for low variation in the quality of care. Despite the small diﬀerences in quality
18 The data stems from the Saxon Ministry for Social Aﬀairs that annually compiles
information on the development of the children at school entry.
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of care, we also calculated the eﬃciency scores using each of the three quality
proxies as an additional output. The results diﬀer only slightly from those
without a quality proxy (see Appendix 4.D, Tables 4.11 and 4.12).
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of selected quality measures (county averages
for the share of children with a deﬁciency of all children)
Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Speech disorders 22.50 3.94 15.10 32.60
Fine motor skill deﬁciency 18.15 6.30 5.20 41.30
Gross motor skill deﬁciency 9.29 2.98 1.70 17.60
Source: Saxon Ministry for Social Aﬀairs (2006)
4.3.3 Inputs and Outputs
In our speciﬁcations, we consider combinations of two diﬀerent inputs and
ﬁve diﬀerent outputs (see Table 4.3). Expenditure variables that pertain to
the provision of municipal child care services are plausible inputs. We only
consider current expenditures (material costs and personnel); investment ex-
penses do not enter the analysis. In some municipalities, the provision of
child care is also partially provided by Type II (non-proﬁt) organizations
that receive transfers per child that they care for from the municipality.
These transfers are added to the expenditures for materials recorded for the
Type I (public) facilities. Together, these costs enter the analysis as the
ﬁrst input called "material expenditures."19 Personnel expenditures are only
recorded for the employees of the Type I centers. Therefore, we do not include
the personnel expenditures in the analysis. Instead, the combined personnel
(number of employed persons) in both Type I and Type II centers is included
19 Although the funds transferred to the Type II centers are included in the material
expenditures, we cannot know whether these funds are solely used for materials or if
some are also used to pay personnel. However, as the transfer payments account for
less than 5% of all material expenditures and as only 10% of the municipalities in our
sample engage in transfer payments, the potential bias is marginal.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of inputs and outputs
Variable Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Inputs
Material expenditures (e) (x1) 218,037 193,119 1,584 1,308,953
Personnel (# persons) (x2) 41 32 9 171
Outputs
Assigned places (y1) 397.50 297.70 103 1589
Facility densitya (y2) 0.87 0.36 0.34 2.38
Weighted under 3 year oldsb (y3) 72.29 59.84 11.03 336.36
Weighted 3-6 year olds (y4) 147.60 113.90 17.76 589.35
Weighted 6-10 year olds (y5) 133.75 98.52 23.52 549.47
a Facilities per 1,000 inhabitants
b Number of under 3 year olds times the county share of children under 3 receiving
child care. The corresponding calculation was performed for the weighing of the
other age groups.
as the second input. Because the wages of the child care employees in Type
I (public) and Type II (non-proﬁt) centers are regulated, the aggregation
should not introduce a bias. The second input is thus personnel. These
inputs are summarized in the top section of Table 4.3.
The services a municipality oﬀers are the outputs. De Witte and Geys
(2011) discuss the appropriate choice of outputs for local public services and
view the production as a two-stage process. The ﬁrst stage determines the
service potential and is described by the direct outputs produced with a given
amount of inputs. The second stage is comprised of observable outcomes
that are potentially inﬂuenced by demand for the service: thus, the level of
these outputs does not directly reﬂect the production process (e.g., number
of children receiving care). A direct output variable is therefore the total
number of assigned places (i.e., the legally allowed capacity aggregated for
all age groups in a given municipality).20 We call this variable assigned
places. The second output we consider is facility density which is measured
20 Data on the number of assigned places disaggregated by the age of the child is not
available. Therefore, the potential output variable is limited to the total number of
assigned places.
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as the number of facilities per 1,000 residents. Because the municipalities
can control how many facilities they operate, this variable accounts for size
diﬀerences and diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs from having multiple units. The
above two outputs describe the service potential and are considered direct
outputs.
However, using only these two outputs may mask the diﬀerences in care
intensity between the age groups. Because in the year 2006 only children
above the age of three until school age (6-year-olds) had a legal claim to a
place in a child care facility, this group forms the largest group for whom
services need to be produced. Two additional fractions remain, namely those
above the age of 6 who receive after school care, and those below the age of
3. On the one hand, children under the age of 3 require signiﬁcantly more
supervision than older children and therefore care for this relatively small
group is still costly and should also enter the analysis as an output. On
the other hand, school age children above the age of 6 form the third large
group of children receiving care in public child care facilities. Of all 1- to
3-year-olds 45.4% were in child care in 2006, of 3- to 6-year-olds 92.6% and
of 6 to 10-year-olds 67.2%.
To better account for the diﬀerences in the three age groups, we construct
a weighted output proxy. The county-speciﬁc shares of children in each of the
three age groups receiving care can be used to construct a demand index.21
The shares are multiplied by the number of children in each age group in a
given municipality. These three indices, weighted under 3 year olds, weighted
3- to 6-year-olds and weighted 6- to 10-year-olds, are then used as outputs
in two alternative speciﬁcations.22 The summary statistics of the potential
outputs are found in the bottom half of Table 4.3.
The DEA is conducted for four diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The four models
that result from the diﬀerent input-output combinations are summarized in
21 We must resort to the ﬁgures at the county level because the corresponding data are
not made available for the municipalities.
22 These are partially demand driven and thus do not just reﬂect the municipal service
potential or productive eﬃciency. However, to test whether the age structure has an
inﬂuence on the eﬃciency, we resort to these alternative outputs. The ﬁndings show
that diﬀerences are small, and therefore, our preferred model for the second stage
regression excludes these outputs.
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Table 4.4. All models contain the two inputs, materials and personnel, but
contain diﬀerent output combinations. Model A only contains one output,
namely the number of assigned places. Model B has facility density as an
additional output. The weighted number of children in the three relevant
age groups constitute the outputs in Models C. In addition to these three
outputs, the facility density is the fourth output in Model D.
Table 4.4: Overview of input and output combinations in the models
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Inputs
x1 × × × ×
x2 × × × ×
Outputs
y1 × ×
y2 × ×
y3 × ×
y4 × ×
y5 × ×
4.3.4 Results of the eﬃciency analysis
Municipalities have a set of resources (inputs) at their disposal with which
they produce the required services (i.e., outputs). Diﬀerent input-output
relations might stem from three sources: (i) diﬀerent input prices, (ii) ad-
ditional inputs that are used productively and (iii) additional inputs that
are used unproductively. Diﬀerent input prices are unlikely because of heavy
regulation and ﬁxed state wage scales. We can also exclude (ii) as a source of
more excessive input use, as the discussion in section 4.3.2 has shown. The
DEA speciﬁcation that we use implies that the deviation from the eﬃcient
frontier stems from ineﬃcient use of inputs. In other words, in ineﬃcient
municipalities, the same level of output of the same quality could be pro-
duced with fewer inputs. Unobservable diﬀerences that inﬂuence eﬃciency
may be present (such as unobserved inputs/outputs/quality diﬀerences or
measurement errors in the variables); however, we cannot identify these.
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With the described inputs and outputs, we evaluate four diﬀerent DEA
speciﬁcations (models A, B, C and D). For all four models, we compute
the CRS as well as the VRS eﬃciency scores in both the input and output
orientations. Furthermore, we test the level of scale eﬃciency using the CRS
speciﬁcation. Before selecting a speciﬁc model for the second stage regression
we discuss the results of the eﬃciency analysis in this section.
Table 4.5 shows the results from the four diﬀerent speciﬁcations in the
input orientation with VRS. The median eﬃciency of the four speciﬁcations
ranges from about 72% to 75%. This means that in the median municipality
the same level of output could be achieved using 28% to 25% fewer inputs.
In Models A and B, the minimum eﬃciency is 45%, and in Models C and
D is 36%. The standard deviation of the eﬃciency scores ranges from 13.8
to 15.3. Of the 213 municipalities in our sample, Models A and C contain
the same number of eﬃcient units, 20, whereas Models C and D deem 26
units fully eﬃcient. Therefore, the percentage of eﬃcient municipalities lies
between 9% and 12% of the sample. The inclusion of the facility density as an
input has a slightly larger inﬂuence on the eﬃciency than the disaggregation
of the outputs with respect to the three diﬀerent age groups. Considering
the range of output proxies, the variation between the models is relatively
small. The results are robust across speciﬁcations.
Table 4.5: Results of the eﬃciency analysis: VRS input orientation
Model Min. Median St. dev. Eﬃcient % eﬃcient
Model A 0.449 0.717 0.138 20 9%
Model B 0.449 0.731 0.141 26 12%
Model C 0.357 0.730 0.153 20 9%
Model D 0.357 0.752 0.152 26 12%
Table 4.6 contains the results of the same four models in the output ori-
entation with VRS. The diﬀerences in the results from the input orientation
are only slight. In Model C the minimum eﬃciency is lower than in the input
orientation of the respective model. This indicates that there is more vari-
ation with three outputs than with one. With more diﬀerentiated outputs
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there may be larger divergence from the frontier in the extreme. Models B
and D that contain the variable facility density have slightly less deviation.
The median eﬃciencies of all models, in both orientations, lie within 11%
points.
Table 4.6: Results of the eﬃciency analysis: VRS output orientation
Model Min. Median St. dev. Eﬃcient % eﬃcient
Model A 0.465 0.749 0.136 20 9%
Model B 0.519 0.782 0.118 26 12%
Model C 0.261 0.758 0.150 20 9%
Model D 0.484 0.830 0.113 26 12%
As it is not immediately clear whether the municipalities may choose to
lower their outputs or to increase their inputs, the production process may
be either input or output oriented. If the eﬃciencies of CRS and VRS are
equivalent, then the orientation is irrelevant and the municipalities can be
said to be operating on an eﬃcient scale. To test scale eﬃciency, we compute
for each unit the ratio of its CRS eﬃciency score to the VRS score, as deﬁned
by equation (4.3):
SEi =
CRSi
V RSi
. (4.3)
When the CRS and VRS scores are equal, a municipality is fully scale eﬃcient
and receives a score of 1. If, however, a municipality deviates from the
eﬃcient frontier under either of the orientations, then either increasing or
decreasing returns to scale are present. A municipality may then be deemed
relatively more or less eﬃcient depending on the respective orientation.
On average, the municipalities in our sample are from 89% to 92% scale
eﬃcient and thus operate close to constant returns to scale. As the economic
interpretation of adjusting inputs to meet a speciﬁed level of output is more
probable in this case, we proceed in the second stage with the eﬃciency scores
from input orientation.
Clearly, there are only small diﬀerences in the minimum and median
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eﬃciencies between the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. We use the Spearman rank
correlation to test the correlation of the rank of individual observations in
the diﬀerent speciﬁcations (see Table 4.7). Models A and B render almost
identical rankings; these models receive a correlation of 0.97. Models C and
D are also very similar; the two speciﬁcations have a rank correlation of 0.95.
The correlation between the remaining models is slightly lower (0.63-0.68).
Nonetheless, all four models are highly positively correlated.
Table 4.7: Rank correlations between the four models in the input orienta-
tion
Models A B C D
A 1
B 0.97 1
C 0.68 0.63 1
D 0.66 0.68 0.95 1
For the ensuing regression analysis, the eﬃciency scores from Model B
(computed in the input orientation) are used as the dependent variable. This
model contains two inputs and two outputs that capture the most important
factors with respect to eﬃciency.23
4.4 Second stage regression
In the previous section, we have shown that there are diﬀerences in the
technical eﬃciency of child care provision. We now proceed to explain these
diﬀerences systematically, making use of variables in three broad categories:
(1) variables that describe the political economy, (2) variables that describe
the local demography and (3) a variable that accounts for the fact that there
may be competition among facilities of Types I and II within a municipality.
23 As shown in the previous section, the alternative models deliver very similar rankings.
Therefore, in speciﬁcations using one of the other three sets of eﬃciency scores as the
dependent variable, the results are also similar.
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4.4.1 Explanatory variables
In the category of political economy, we consider the inﬂuence of the share
of open-ended grants to own tax income, the status of the mayor (full-time
salaried or uncompensated) and a Herﬁndahl index of political concentration
on the eﬃciency of child care provision.
Open-ended grants are transfers from the Free State of Saxony to the
municipalities. Such grants compensate for the heterogeneous economic sit-
uation across the municipalities and aim to achieve ﬁscal equalization within
the state. The higher the own tax revenues per capita, the lower the amount
in transfers a municipality receives from the government. For estimation pur-
poses, we put the grants in relation to tax revenues. Thus, the grant shares
are comparable across municipalities of diﬀerent size. Because there are no
restrictions on these grants with regard to investment decisions, it is possi-
ble that ﬁnancial aid is not fully used to adjust expenditures to local needs
(e.g., to adapt local expenditures to changes in demand, such as demographic
change). The eﬀect of such grants on municipal expenditure ineﬃciency is
analyzed by Kalb (2009). He ﬁnds that in the provision of county roads in
the state of Baden-Württemberg in southern Germany, higher intergovern-
mental grants typically lead to higher ineﬃciency (ﬂypaper eﬀect).24 We test
the inﬂuence of grants as stated in our ﬁrst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A larger share of grants increases ineﬃciency.
The second political variable is a dummy variable that is zero if a mu-
nicipality has a full-time salaried mayor. Municipalities are required by law
to have a full-time salaried mayor if their population exceeds 5,000. If the
population is smaller, the municipality is free to choose between a salaried
and an uncompensated mayor. In our sample, 48% of the municipalities have
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Therefore, smaller municipalities are encour-
aged to form administrative collectives, by which they may share a full-time
salaried mayor. Economic literature discusses the inﬂuence of the status of
24 Similar results are obtained by Silkman and Young (1982) for the United States and
De Borger and Kerstens (1996) for Belgian municipalities.
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a municipality's mayor on expenditures (Stumm and Corrigan, 1998; Deno
and Mehay, 1987). Full-time salaried mayors may be more qualiﬁed (e.g.,
have degrees in business administration or experience in politics). Thus, mu-
nicipalities with a full-time salaried mayor are expected to be more eﬃcient.
Hypothesis 2: Having an uncompensated mayor increases ineﬃciency.
The third political variable is a Herﬁndahl index of political fragmenta-
tion. The index H is constructed as the sum of parties' squared share of
votes (p):25
H =
I∑
i=1
p2i . (4.4)
A high index value is indicative of strong leadership. A high political con-
centration implies low political fragmentation. High fragmentation has been
shown to increase expenditures and deﬁcits, whereas more concentration
leads to lower spending (Ashworth et al., 2005; Roubini and Sachs, 1989;
Roubini et al., 1989).
Hypothesis 3: More political concentration decreases ineﬃciency.
Further factors that are likely to inﬂuence the eﬃciency of child care
provision are the ongoing demographic changes. Almost all municipalities
in Saxony already face a declining population, and this development will
continue during the next decades (State Oﬃce of Statistics of Saxony, 2008a).
Nevertheless, there is again strong heterogeneity: in the period between 2005
and 2020, some municipalities will lose about one quarter of their population,
whereas others will remain almost constant.
Usually, larger municipalities (in terms of inhabitants) can be expected
to be more eﬃcient for two reasons. First, due to increasing professional-
ism within organizations, when demand for speciﬁc services is suﬃciently
high, the employees may be more specialized in a narrow ﬁeld (e.g., care
givers for speciﬁc age groups instead of for all age groups). Second, a larger
population can act as an insurance against changes in demand. A larger
municipality with more public services may be more ﬂexible in the allocation
25 Independent candidates are collected in one category.
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of its resources. For example, if one child care center is faced with decreas-
ing demand, a facility in another part of town may need additional personnel.
Hypothesis 4: A larger population decreases ineﬃciency.
To capture an additional demographic aspect, we also use the share of
persons over 65 years old in relation to the total population in 2006. This is
both a demographic and a political economy variable. An increasing share
of the elderly implies that the median-voter gets older and thus, interest in
ﬁnancing child care facilities tends to decrease. Therefore, less funding is
made available to ﬁnance child care services, and the eﬃciency of child care
provision is expected to increase (Epple and Romano, 1996).26
Hypothesis 5: A larger share of over 65-year-olds decreases ineﬃciency.
Finally, we use a variable to analyze whether there is competition in the
provision of child care between Type I and Type II facilities. We make use of
a dummy variable indicating whether both types are present within a munic-
ipality. When Type II facilities are present the willingness to pay for Type
I facilities may be lower. Thus through competition the presence of external
service providers could provide an incentive for the municipality to operate
more eﬃciently.27
Hypothesis 6: The presence of transfers to Type II providers decreases inef-
ﬁciency.
Table 4.8 summarizes the above variables and their expected inﬂuence
on child care ineﬃciency. Table 4.9 contains the summary statistics of the
explanatory variables used in the second stage regression.28
26 Simultaneously, a large share of elderly implies a smaller inﬂuence of younger co-
horts (potential parents) on political outcomes. Altruism towards grandchildren could
counteract this eﬀect.
27 However other studies have shown that competition from private schools does not
necessarily increase the technical eﬃciency of public schools (Grosskopf et al., 2001).
When both types of child care facilities are present (and thus transfers from Type I to
Type II facilities are made), administrative costs may accrue, which lowers eﬃciency.
Additionally, when parents have a choice between diﬀerent types of facilities, the
facilities may have an incentive to spend ineﬃcient amounts to remain attractive.
28 In Appendix 4.E Table 4.13 presents the pairwise correlation among all independent
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Table 4.8: Variable description and expected inﬂuence on ineﬃciency
Category Variable description Expected inﬂuence
Ratio of grants to tax income +
Political economy Uncompensated mayor dummy +
Party concentration -
Demography Total population (in 1,000) -
Share in over 65 year olds -
Competition Type II dummy -
Table 4.9: Summary statistics of environmental variables
Variable description Variable Mean St. Dev.
Ratio of grants to tax income (z1) 1.24 0.73
Uncompensated mayor dummy (z2) 0.29 0.45
Political concentration (z3) 0.39 0.09
Total population (in 1,000) (z5) 7.19 5.63
Share of over 65 year olds (z4) 0.22 0.03
Type II dummy (z6) 0.16 0.37
4.4.2 Estimation results
Table 4.10 shows the coeﬃcients of the truncated regression. The boot-
strapped standard errors appear below the coeﬃcients in parentheses. The
dependent variable is the eﬃciency score of Model B computed in section
4.3.4. Because the inverse of the eﬃciency scores was used as the dependent
variable, a negative sign reduces ineﬃciency (or increases eﬃciency).29
The coeﬃcients of an uncompensated mayor, the share of over 65-year-
variables and shows that correlation between the variables is not a serious problem
in our data set.
29 Appendix 4.F shows the regression results using the eﬃciency scores obtained from
eﬃciency analyses with the quality proxies as an additional output. The results are
similar across all speciﬁcations, especially with regard to the sign of the coeﬃcients
and the level of signiﬁcance.
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Table 4.10: Truncated regression results
Variable Model B
Ratio of grants to tax income -0.035
(0.028)
Uncompensated mayor dummy 0.085*
(0.049)
Political concentration 0.052
(0.222)
Total population (in 1,000) -0.022**
(0.006)
Share of over 65 year olds 2.504**
(0.768)
Type II dummy 0.001
(0.060)
Constant 1.001**
(0.195)
σˆξ 0.239**
(0.015)
Log-likelihood 29.681
Note: N=193. Bootstrap corrected standard errors in parentheses.
** (*) denotes a 5% (10%) level of signiﬁcance.
olds and the total population are statistically signiﬁcant. All else held equal,
having an uncompensated mayor increases ineﬃciency in the provision of
child care services by 8.5% compared to having a full-time salaried mayor.
Although the state encourages cooperation among smaller municipalities to
support them in installing a professional mayor, many municipalities still
retain their uncompensated mayors.
Our hypothesis that municipalities with more elderly are more eﬃcient in
the provision of child care is not corroborated. A larger share of the elderly
inﬂuences the ineﬃciency positively. For a given level of output, excessive
inputs (expenditures on materials and personnel) are used. Aging municipal-
ities may have an incentive to have ineﬃciently high public spending for the
young when the municipalities engage in ﬁscal competition over the more
mobile younger population group (Montén and Thum, 2010). When this
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is the case, a large share of the elderly can have a negative impact on the
eﬃciency of child care provision.
The size of the total population has a negative inﬂuence on ineﬃciency
(i.e., larger municipalities are more eﬃcient). An increase of 1,000 inhab-
itants reduces ineﬃciency by 2.1%. This reﬂects that larger municipalities
may beneﬁt from more professional structures and general scale eﬀects. Addi-
tionally, they may be more ﬂexible in shifting capacities to meet local needs.
In light of the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on the share of grants, we ﬁnd no
support for the ﬂypaper eﬀect. The size of open-ended grants a municipality
receives does not inﬂuence the eﬃciency of child care provision.30 We inter-
pret this result positively, as municipalities would rather adjust the supply
of child care than channel additional resources from state grants to cover
over-sized provision. The insigniﬁcance of the Type II dummy indicates that
municipalities that transfer funds to Type II (non-proﬁt) providers use the
given resources equally eﬃciently as municipalities that provide the service
internally. Furthermore, we do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
remaining political variable.
4.5 Discussion and policy implications
We have analyzed the eﬃciency of municipalities in the provision of child care
services. Speciﬁcally, we used data on the municipalities in the Free State
of Saxony in Germany. We employed a two-stage analysis in which we ﬁrst
computed the eﬃciency scores using the non-parametric DEA method, and in
a second stage, we regressed the eﬃciency scores in a truncated regression.
From a policy perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the production
process follows an input orientation. The expenditures are adjusted to the
number of oﬀered places, and not vice versa.
In the ﬁrst stage, we identiﬁed diﬀerences in eﬃciency in the provision of
30 The same line of argument could be applied to an alternative variable per capita
income that we used in the alternative speciﬁcation (see Appendix 4.F). A nega-
tive inﬂuence on eﬃciency could be expected if higher incomes translate via higher
parental fees into higher spending. Again, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of
this variable.
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public child care services. The median municipality has eﬃciency reserves of
up to 25%. For the least eﬃcient municipalities, we ﬁnd eﬃciency reserves
of over 50%. Diﬀerent model speciﬁcations render similar eﬃciency scores,
which supports the choice of the inputs and outputs.
The regression analysis in the second stage shows that professionalism
in administration is an important factor in explaining diﬀerences in eﬃ-
ciency. This aspect is particularly relevant in a state where many small
municipalities are struggling with adverse demographic developments and
dwindling resources. By encouraging cooperation and professionalizing ad-
ministration, more appropriate expenditure decisions can be made at the
local level. This ﬁnding is further corroborated by the fact that municipali-
ties with a larger population tend to be more eﬃcient. A larger population
encourages more professional administration. Higher eﬃciency could thus be
achieved by merging municipalities. With regards to municipal amalgama-
tions, our results imply that child care is not an area in which per capita
cost savings can be achieved through increased service provision (high-scale
eﬃciency). Even if the production process follows constant returns to scale,
more professional administration may increase eﬃciency and reduce costs.
The demographic composition also inﬂuences eﬃciency. We ﬁnd that
municipalities with a larger share of over 65-year-olds over-spend on family
friendliness. To remain attractive to families with children, municipalities
with aging populations have an incentive to spend more on child care. A
generous provision of child care is important in the location choice of families,
particularly for those in which both parents are active in the labor force.
In the future, an investigation aimed at the facility level could comple-
ment our analysis. Although the municipalities are in charge of ﬁnancing this
service, a closer consideration of the facilities in selected municipalities could
render more evidence with respect to competition and scale eﬀects. Facili-
ties in selected municipalities could be surveyed to conduct such a detailed
evaluation.
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Appendix
Appendix 4.A Derivation of the DEA models
4.A.1 Constant and variable returns to scale eﬃciency
(CRS and VRS)
The original DEA estimator was proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes
(1978) and yields the constant returns to scale eﬃciency scores for the input
orientation.31 Subsequently the model was extended by Banker, Charnes and
Cooper (1984) to incorporate the case of variable returns to scale. In either
case, the eﬃciency of any decision making unit (DMU) is measured from the
maximization of a ratio of weighted outputs with respect to weighted inputs,
subject to the restriction that the ratios for the rest of similar DMU's are
less than or equal to unity. Charnes et al. (1978) emphasize the use of the
nomenclature DMU to distinguish that entities other than ﬁrms or industries
can also be studied, including non-proﬁt organizations for which weighing by
market prices is not possible.
Given a set of N DMU's, using M inputs and generating S outputs.
Then for the i-th DMU the known inputs and outputs are represented by the
vectors xi and yi respectively. For all N units the input matrix X has the
dimensions (M ×N) and the output matrix Y is represented by an (S ×N)
matrix. By weighing the inputs and outputs used by the units in the set, a
frontier which envelopes all units is constructed. The restriction dictates that
no unit may lie above the frontier. The frontier is constructed by specifying
optimal weights of outputs and inputs by considering the ratios of all out-
puts and inputs used by each DMU. The ratio is deﬁned as (u′yi/v′xi) ≤ 1,
where u is an (M × 1) vector of output weights and v is an (K × 1) vector of
input weights. By maximizing the constrained eﬃciency measure the weights
of inputs and outputs for each unit are determined. Additionally the con-
straint v′xi = 1 is imposed to limit the number of solutions, and the weights
31 For a textbook examination of the DEA models used here, see for instance Fried et al.
(2008)
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are changed from u and v into µ and ν. The multiplier form of the linear
programming problem is subsequently written as:
max
µ,ν
(µ′yi), (4.5)
s.t. νi = 1,
µ′yj − ν ′xj ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, ..., N,
µ, ν ≥ 0
the above problem involves N + 1 constraints. Therefore, the equivalent
envelopment form of the problem is preferred when solving since it uses fewer
constraints, namely S +M :
min
θ,λ
θ, (4.6)
s.t. −yi + Y λ ≥ 0,
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0.
θ is a scalar and is the eﬃciency score of the i-th unit. Therefore the linear
programming problem needs to be solved N times to obtain the scores for
each DMU. θ ≤ 1 where a value 1 indicates a technically eﬃcient unit that
lies on the frontier. λ is a (N × 1) vector of constraints.
This problem describes the envelopment form of the input oriented con-
stant returns to scale model. To account for variable returns to scale, an
additional convexity constraint on λ, namely N1′λ = 1 is needed (Banker
et al., 1984). Where N1 is an (N × 1) vector of ones. Through the incorpo-
ration of the variable returns to scale (VRS) assumption, the model becomes
the following:
min
θ,λ
θ, (4.7)
s.t. −yi + Y λ ≥ 0,
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0
N1′λ = 1
λ ≥ 0.
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The problem above describes the envelopment form of the input oriented
variable returns to scale model according to Banker et al. (1984). Again θ
is a scalar eﬃciency index and is interpreted as how much the inputs could
be reduced while still achieving a given level of output in a particular unit.
When θ is equal to one, for a given level of output no reduction in inputs
is possible. In this case the given DMU lies on the frontier and is a best-
practice unit. For ineﬃcient units, θ is strictly positive and indicates the
neighboring (reference) units, to which an ineﬃcient unit is to be compared.
The λ therefore guides how the linear combinations of the eﬃcient units for
the eﬃciency frontier are formed. A unit with λ = 1, is its own reference
point and must therefore lie on the frontier, and consequently also has an
eﬃciency index θ = 1. On the other hand values of λ > 0 indicate by how
much a given reference unit contributes to the virtual unit on the frontier
to which an ineﬃcient unit is to be compared. The linear program is solved
for each DMU separately, and hence the most favorable weights for each will
be assigned individually. Ineﬃciency in each case is the radial distance of θ
from the frontier, and since the frontier takes a value of 1, the ineﬃciency is
a value (1-θ). The value is then a percentage of how much inputs could be
reduced in a given unit without reducing output.
Appendix 4.B Returns to scale
Figure 4.1 depicts the CRS and VRS frontiers for the one input one output
case. The input x is on the horizontal axis and the output y is on the
vertical axis. The solid line forms the variable returns to scale (VRS) frontier,
according to which units A, B, and C are eﬃcient, and D is ineﬃcient. The
additional points depict additional ineﬃcient units. The dashed line depicts
the constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier which is a ray from the origin,
and only deems one unit, namely B as fully eﬃcient. The increasing and
decreasing returns to scale are therefore computed as the the diﬀerences
between the two frontiers. Along the ray "below" unit B (not including
point B) units can realize increasing returns to scale, whereas units operating
"above" unit B (not including point B) in terms of output operate under
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decreasing returns to scale.
Figure 4.1: Returns to scale in production for the one input one output
case
Appendix 4.C Bootstrap algorithm
Algorithm #1 (Simar and Wilson, 2007)
1. Using original data compute θˆ.
2. Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate of βˆ of
β as well as an estimate σˆε, of the true variance, σε, in the truncated
regression of θˆ on zi in θˆi = ziβ + ξi ≥ 1 using the m < n observations
where θˆ > 1.
3. Loop over the next three steps L times to obtain a set of bootstrap
estimates.
3.1 For each i = 1, ...,m draw εi from N(0, σˆ2ε) distribution with left
truncation at (1− ziβ).
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3.2 Again for each i = 1, ...,m compute θˆ∗i = ziβˆ + εi.
3.3 Use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated
regression of θˆ∗i on zi, yielding (βˆ∗, σˆ2ε).
4. Use the bootstrap values and the original estimates βˆ, σˆε to construct
estimated conﬁdence intervals for each element of β and for σε as de-
scribed below.
Since θˆi is a consistent estimator of θi, maximum likelihood in step 2 will lead
to consistent estimates of β. Step 3 is a parametric bootstrap of a nonlinear
regression model.
The number of bootstrap replications used to construct estimates of con-
ﬁdence intervals in the algorithm is deﬁned by L. We use the recommended
L = 2000.
Appendix 4.D Model B and speciﬁcations
accounting for quality
Table 4.11: Eﬃciency results of Model B including additional quality vari-
ables
Model Min. Median St. dev. Eﬃcient % eﬃcient
Model B 0.449 0.731 0.141 26 12%
Model B-speech 0.449 0.770 0.146 37 17%
Model B-ﬁne 0.449 0.760 0.142 32 15%
Model B-gross 0.449 0.757 0.142 33 15%
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Table 4.12: Spearman rank correlation of eﬃciency scores between Model
B and speciﬁcations additionally accounting for quality
Model B Model B-speech Model B-ﬁne Model B-gross
Model B 1
Model B-speech 0.81 1
Model B-ﬁne 0.87 0.84 1
Model B-gross 0.86 0.93 0.94 1
Appendix 4.E Correlation between
environmental variables
Table 4.13: Correlation matrix for the environmental variables
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 z7 z8
z1 1.000
z2 0.084 1.000
z3 -0.051 0.266 1.000
z4 0.129 -0.171 -0.225 1.000
z5 0.028 -0.387 -0.324 0.409 1.000
z6 -0.010 -0.147 -0.140 0.144 0.213 1.000
z7 -0.230 -0.125 -0.065 -0.495 -0.067 -0.078 1.000
z8 0.155 -0.227 -0.243 0.415 0.526 0.192 -0.584 1.000
Note: Variables z7 and z8 are average per capita income in a municipality and
unemployment rate, respectively. These variables are used in an alternative re-
gression (see Appendix 4.A).
Appendix 4.F Alternative estimation results
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis considered the inﬂuence of demographic developments on publicly
provided goods at the local level. The three main chapters analyzed distinct
aspects of public goods provision and local population change. The model
presented in Chapter 2 focused on ageing whereas the model in Chapter 3
considers shrinking. The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that the
demographic structure may have a decisive impact on expenditure decisions
and hence also on the eﬃciency with which municipal services are provided.
As was stated in Chapter 1, it is clear that the ongoing demographic devel-
opments will have wide reaching consequences for individuals and societies.
However, broad sweeping judgments that aging and shrinking populations
will cause stunted economic growth and lead to a melt down of welfare states
are imprudent. Instead a careful and detailed analysis of repercussions for
speciﬁc issues is more conducive. The focus here laid on the consequences
for the provision of publicly provided goods in municipalities. Some of the
results are counter-intuitive to what would be expected if populations were
growing, or if the perspective were of the national level.
Chapter 2 focused on the competition between municipalities, when the
number of young residents is declining. It is shown that in young gerontoc-
racies the provision of the publicly provided good for the young is provided
at an ineﬃciently low scale. However, when aging advances the competition
for young residents can intensify to such an extent that the provision actually
131
132 CONCLUSION
becomes excessive (with respect to the level that would be welfare maximiz-
ing). In this setting the threat of ageing towns is not the exploitation of the
smaller young cohorts but rather the excessive incentives for municipalities
to remain attractive for the mobile young residents.
The potential inability of local governments to scale back investments to
reﬂect the changing demand of the population is further analyzed in Chap-
ter 3. The model focuses on the eﬀects of a shrinking population (i.e. a
smaller subsequent generation) on the provision of intergenerational publicly
provided goods. In comparison to cases of population growth or stability,
the choices of private consumption and public goods provision is diﬀerent
when the population shrinks. Generally the successive generation beneﬁts
from the investments it inherits from the previous generation. However, it
may be optimal from the view of a small ensuing generation not to provide
any additional public goods at all. Furthermore, population loss lowers the
ineﬃciency of the intergenerational spillover. Only if no costs are associated
with the upkeep of the inherited infrastructure will the ensuing generation
surely beneﬁt. If the successive generation is smaller and has to allocate
resources toward the upkeep of the inherited stock, then the inheritance may
burden the budget to the point of insolvency. Therefore accounting for costs
of upkeep will result in a lower provision of public goods than would be the
case if such costs we ignored.
The consequences of both of the above formal analyses may have a com-
pounding eﬀect. If excessive investments in publicly provided goods that
are intergenerational in character are made today to attract young mobile
residents, then the future (inevitably) smaller generations, will face infras-
tructures that exceed their demand and which maintenance will excessively
burden their budgets. Therefore awareness among local policy makers with
regard to the long term consequences of their decisions is needed. Given
the current population trends, increasing polarization between communities
will arise. Inevitably, since the population in vast regions will decline, some
communities will lose. However, when the consequences are recognized and
policy is adapted, a smaller population does not need to equate to a lesser
quality of life for the remaining residents.
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The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 provided additional insights into
the provision of child care; a local public expenditure category that is highly
sensitive to demographic change. Using data from the Free State of Saxony, in
eastern Germany, the analysis identiﬁes signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the eﬃciency
of the provision between municipalities. In the median municipality the
same level of child care could be achieved with 25% less resources if the
municipality were operating eﬃciently. Thus the number of children receiving
care could be increased signiﬁcantly given the existing resources. This ﬁnding
is particularly relevant for the current eﬀort of the federal government to
guarantee a place of care also for all 1 and 2-year-olds in the country.
Furthermore it was shown that the professionalism of the local admin-
istration and the age structure of the municipality, inﬂuence the eﬃciency
with which child care services are provided. Municipalities that have a profes-
sional mayor tend to be signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient. Moreover, municipalities
with a relatively large share of elderly (persons above the age 65), tend to
be less eﬃcient in the provision of child care services. This ﬁnding seems to
corroborate the proposition raised in Chapter 2, that in ﬁscal competition
for the mobile young, communities with a large share of elderly may attempt
to attract young people by oﬀering an ineﬃciently generous bundle of public
goods.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate speciﬁc alternatives on
how public actors can adapt to the demographic developments. However,
one practicable option is the implementation of systematic evaluation of de-
mographic risk. Whenever local public governments plan projects with long
lasting impacts the (infrastructure) project is also to be evaluated with re-
spect to demographic sustainability. In fact, the Free State of Saxony recently
adopted a comprehensive "demographic test" to be conducted for all invest-
ment decisions with long lasting impacts (Saxon State Chancellery, 2011).
The aim is to prevent mis-investments both at the state and local levels and
thus reduce the ﬁscal risk. Speciﬁc investment decisions and in particular
new infrastructure investments, must be evaluated with respect to the local
demographic development in terms of aging and shrinking. Furthermore,
should demand dwindle the cost of downscaling are also to be accounted for
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when new investments are proposed.
This thesis was focused on the small spatial scale to highlight the fact
that policy implications for the national level may not necessarily hold true
for local communities. Furthermore, it was shown that the impact of demo-
graphic change is also very diﬀerentiated across diﬀerent spatial types and
locations.
Populations are continuously changing, however the current trend in
many developed countries has a foreseeable trajectory toward populations
with increase median age. Shrinking will also begin in ever more regions.
Even if birth rates would suddenly peak above replacement rate, due to
population momentum, the trend toward ageing and smaller populations is
inevitable in a growing number of countries. As national populations un-
dergo this change the local populations may become more polarized. This
thesis has only touched upon very speciﬁc aspects of population change in
the very speciﬁc context of the welfare state. Nonetheless as mentioned in
the introductory notes to this thesis, the spatial scale and realms of inﬂuence
of demographic change go beyond economics and touch on wide reaching
aspects of our daily lives.
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